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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Background/Context:  
Theory suggests that improving the education system and improvement of 
educational outcomes will require collective action generated by cross-sector 
partnerships. Yet as multi-sector groups attempt to pursue collective work, 
understanding the connection between collective commitment, collective action, 
and the role of race may be paramount to realizing change.  
 
Purpose/Focus of Study:  
The purpose of this study was to examine how collective action (via cross-sector 
partnership work) has been and could be used to address large social problems, and 
how collective commitment contributes to the success (or lack of success) of the 
collective action pursued by cross-sector initiatives aiming to make change in 
communities of color.  
 
Research Design: 
I first present a review and synthesis of four historical cases that examine how 
collective commitment and action was established and pursued within two 
grassroots (community-based) initiatives and two grass-high initiatives (initiatives 
started or charged by those with high influence and power). I drew data from 
primary and secondary sources that spoke of and/or provided an evaluation of 
these initiatives and conducted a two-phased analysis of each case first focusing on 
the contexts and mechanisms through which collective action was pursued with 
what outcomes and second on the role that collective commitment played. I then 
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present a narrative of each case using these frameworks, followed by a cross-case 
analysis.  
 
Second, I provide an extended case study of a local grass-high initiative--Highland 
County My Brother’s Keeper-- where I spent a year researching and working with 
the initiative as it evolved. I addressed the same questions as with the historical 
cases, using participatory ethnographic methods, and drawing on data from audio 
recordings of 13 team meetings, team meeting notes, 30 interviews with 
participants, fieldnotes of informal interactions, personal reflections, artifacts 
developed, and electronic communications.  
 
Lastly, I use critical race theory (CRT) to challenge the narrative of all cases, and 
examine evidence of how White interest-convergence was employed as a racial 
negotiation strategy across all 5 cases.  
 
Conclusions/Implications: 
I find that the grass-high initiatives attracted powerful people to the table, yet the 
initiatives pursued by the grassroots cases were more sustainable, and these groups 
were also more successful in developing collective commitment. Analysis also 
revealed that race was indeed crucial to the ways in which commitments were 
acquired. Whereas all partnerships showed evidence of using White interest-
convergence as a racial negotiation strategy, this tactic did not guarantee successful 
outcomes. Rather, creating spaces that privileged the voice, needs, and desires of 
communities of color, as each grassroots initiative did to some extent, appeared to 
make a critical difference in the collective commitment that was garnered and 
collective action they accomplished. This work and findings are significant because 
they challenge cross-sector leaders to consider whose interests are truly being 
served and think about the intricate connection between collective commitment, 
race, and power in a praxis-based way. 
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Chapter I. Introduction 
Purpose 
 The purpose of this study was to examine how collective action (via cross-
sector partnership work) has been and could be used to address large social 
problems, and how collective commitment contributes to the success (or lack of 
success) of the collective action pursued by cross-sector initiatives aiming to make 
change in communities of color1. I use realist synthesis (Pawson & Bellamy, 2006) to 
evaluate prior cases in which collective action was employed to pursue social 
change, and participatory ethnography informed by realist evaluation (Pawson & 
Tilley, 2004) to empirically investigate a local My Brother’s Keeper community, 
former President Obama's initiative aiming to address persistent opportunity gaps 
for boys and young men of color. This inquiry is significant because theory suggests 
that improving the education system and improvement of educational outcomes will 
require the collective action and commitment of those across many sectors (Kania & 
Kramer, 2011; Seitanidi, 2008; Selsky & Parker, 2005).  Understanding the 
connection between collective commitment, collective action, and the role of race 
may be paramount to realizing change.  
 Throughout the dissertation, I conceptualize collective commitment and 
                                                        
1 While race was not initially foregrounded in my study, it emerged as a critical factor, and I later analyze it as 
central to answering my research questions. 
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collective action as mutually reinforcing mechanisms. This concept develops from 
the premise that patterns of individual commitment and collective commitment 
continuously affect each other and similarly reconcile as they’re developed from 
interactions and shared feeling within a collective group (Gardner, Wright, & 
Moynihan, 2011; Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). I also use the cases studies and 
empirical work to examine how grassroots partnerships and grass-high 
partnerships connect to individuals’ values and beliefs, and foster, detract, or 
sustain these commitments towards the collective level. I then theorize and evaluate 
how group environments foster, contribute, and sustain collective commitment 
during the early phases of their initiative. Lastly, I investigate how race and power 
intersect and are negotiated in the process of developing collective commitment 
towards collective action.  
 I find that vision, trust, and space to learn are critical elements towards 
fostering collective commitment, and consequently are critical towards achieving 
collective action. Grassroots initiatives are more likely to develop and foster 
collective commitment, and ultimately employ collective commitment to galvanize 
towards collective action. I also find that racial dynamics are central to groups’ 
ability to realize collective commitment and action.  
 
Motivating Concerns 
 Structural inequity is not uncommon in American systems, in particular its 
public systems. Consequently, individuals, organizations, and systems have long 
attempted to address inequity through programs, interventions, public policies, the 
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court of law, and social movements. Yet as social problems and inequity rises from 
the interplay and behaviors of multiple public, private, and nonprofit entities, theory 
speculates that the isolated impact of one sector, program, institution, or system 
cannot address multi-system failures (Kania & Kramer, 2011). Rather, this theory 
purports that “large-scale social change comes from better cross-sector 
coordination rather than from the isolated intervention of individual organizations” 
(Kania & Kramer, 2011, p. 38).  
 Some educational scholars have extended this ideology, and see schools and 
educational leaders at the forefront of such social change and collaborative 
partnerships (Anyon, 2014; Elmore, 2000; M. Fullan, 1993; Payne, 2008). M. Fullan 
(1993) contends that education is the only societal institution that has the potential 
promise of contributing to the goal of cultivating dynamic citizens who proactively 
deal with change both individually and collaboratively (p. 15).  In contrast, some 
organizational and public policy scholars have conceptualized collaborative cross-
sector work as a retroactive response to system failures, including the failure of the 
educational system (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006). From this perspective, cross-
sector partners “fail” into collaborative work (Bryson et al., 2006; Hudson, Hardy, 
Henwood, & Wistow, 1999; Roberts, 2001). 
 Yet cross-sector partnerships that arise to ‘fix’ social ills vary in mission, 
structure, process, the sectors they engage, and even subnational level of operation.  
Moreover, the theory of change each partnership uses to achieve its desired 
outcome varies, and also has deep implications for how the group builds and 
connects to the mission and commitment of individuals involved.   
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 These variations lead to the two particular concerns that motivate this study. 
 
 Concern 1: The constant attempt to evaluate and understand ‘what works’.  
 
 Perhaps one of the most prevalent policy questions of our time is the 
relentless pursuit and questioning of ‘what works?’. Program and policy makers 
alike attempt to understand what programs, partnerships, tactics, policies will ‘fix’ a 
particular social problem, and if and how these things can be replicated in other 
spaces to produce similar results.  
 This question and pursuit has led to a variety of program evaluations, 
research, reports, and attempts to find ‘silver bullets’ that can holistically fix social 
ills. An example of this can be observed in the rhetoric used throughout the My 
Brother’s Keeper Initiative, which provides communities with a loose framework to  
“…identify, invest, and build what works” (Taylor & Johnson, 2017, p. np). While 
communities are given freedom to explore solutions that seem appropriate towards 
addressing local issues, the rhetoric of lifting up what works and replicating 
successful programs from one area to the next suggests an attempt to find panaceas 
for social barriers inhibiting young men of color. Others, such as Whitehurst and 
Croft (2010), have critiqued this notion-  
“President Obama was a community organizer before he was a politician, so 
it is natural that his instincts are to invest in community programs. But 
President Obama has repeatedly called for what works. Doing what works 
depends on evidence not instincts” (p. 9). 
  4 
 Further critique of this criticism would likewise question the types of data 
and evidence used to assess ‘what works’. Whitehurst and Croft (2010) and 
guidebooks used to help establish the initiatives I investigate here in this 
dissertation assert that strong evidence comes from “studies with designs that can 
support causal conclusions” ("Evidence-Based Practice: A Primer for Promise 
Neighborhoods," 2015, p. 1). Yet these studies often exclude an understanding the 
environments in which interventions, programs, and practices flourish, as well as 
the critical lens as to how crucial factors such as race and power play a role in the 
process of program creation, engagement, and implementation. 
 Nevertheless, many of the social ills we’ve attempted to programmatically 
solve persist. This brings a question of whether we’ve yet to find ‘real solutions’, or, 
if we’ve fallen short of asking better and more critical questions, aiming for more 
meaningful outcomes, and addressing the confounding individual, institutional, and 
systemic barriers of change.  
 
Concern 2: Insufficient understanding of how change is made within collective 
spaces 
 
 Multi-sector partnerships require collaborative effort and the use of 
collective action to achieve collective outcomes or goals. Yet effective collective 
action within these spaces requires both individual and collective commitments. 
Precisely, “the commitment of organizational participants- to each other and the 
organization itself- becomes a critical, and at times, even necessary mechanism for 
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directing their behavior towards collective goal accomplishment” (Robertson & 
Tang, 1995, p. 67).  This notion is further complicated by how race and power are 
negotiated within these spaces, as the initiatives I study all use a multi-sector space 
to pursue change in areas, neighborhoods, or schools that primarily serve people of 
color.   
 Given this framework, both effective collective action and collective 
commitment can be understood as essential tools towards achieving change within 
complex problems. Consequently, understanding collective action (i.e. what is it 
about it that works, for whom, in what circumstances, and why), in addition to 
collective commitment (how it’s formed, its contributors, detractors, and sustainers) 
are imperative inquiries towards the task of comprehending theories about change 
making in collaborative spaces. 
 This dissertation takes up both areas of concern. First, it examines cross-
sector partnership work and its use of collective action to address complex social 
problems. The historical case studies and empirical case for this study highlight the 
interworking of collective work by examining their various theories of change, 
contexts, mechanisms, and observed outcomes.  Secondly, it attempts to understand 
the ways in which collective commitment and collective action interact within 
collective spaces. In particular, it examines the dynamic ways in which individual 
level values, beliefs, and commitments matriculate and are fostered (or not) at the 
collective level, and how race and power are represented in this process.  
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Research Questions 
The primary questions for this study were: 
1) How does collective action work, for whom, in what circumstances, and why 
when addressing large social problems?  
2) How does collective commitment contribute to the success (or lack of success) of 
the collective action pursued by cross-sector partnerships aiming to make 
change in communities of color?  
i. What are the ways in which the partnership does/does not connect to 
individuals’ values, beliefs, and ideologies; and what are the conditions and 
mechanisms through which those individual commitments are fostered, 
detracted from, or sustained towards the collective level?  
ii. How are race and power represented and negotiated in these collective 
spaces, particularly in the process of achieving collective action and 
commitment?  
 
Definition of Terms 
 As stated, this study investigates how those working in collaborative spaces 
use collective action to carry out social change for underserved communities and 
people of color. Before presenting a theoretical framework for this study, I identify 
and define the terms and ideas that are significant in this project. 
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 Cross-Sector Partnerships2.  A cross-sector partnership can broadly be 
defined as “…the linking or sharing of information, resources, activities, and 
capabilities by organizations in two or more sectors to achieve jointly an outcome 
that could not be achieved by organizations in one sector separately” (Bryson et al., 
2006, p. 44).  S. A. Waddock (1991) also provides an early definition for particular 
cross-sector partnerships that attempt to organize and collectively work around 
large social problems as-  
“Voluntary collaborative efforts of actors from organizations in two or more 
economic sectors in a forum in which they cooperatively attempt to solve a 
problem or issues of mutual concern that is in some way identified with a 
public policy agenda item” (Selsky & Parker, 2005, p. 850).  
Multi-sector work that addresses social problems can take a variety of 
organizational forms. Some of these forms include funder collaboratives, social 
sector networks, public-private partnerships, and collective impact initiatives 
(Kania & Kramer, 2011). Warren (1998) and Campbell (1994) also provide 
examples as to how grassroots organizations navigate cross-sector spaces and 
engage multiple organizations to realize change.  
 Organizational theorists, scholars in public management, and change-making 
practitioners all suggest that cross-sector collaborations are often the response of 
those who realize addressing complex problems may not be accomplished by the 
efforts of one separate sector (Bryson et al., 2006; Kania & Kramer, 2011; Selsky & 
Parker, 2005, 2010; White, 2001). Moreover, just as M. G. Fullan (1996) suggests 
                                                        
2 I will use the terms cross-sector partnerships/collaboration, and multi-sector partnerships/collaboration 
interchangeably throughout the dissertation.   
  8 
that systems are infamous for maintaining the status quo, cross-sector partnerships 
are often acknowledged as crucial to change and addressing social challenges, as 
they propose to combine and improve resources, capabilities , and communication 
across sectors (Austin, 2000; Seitanidi, 2008; Selsky & Parker, 2005; S. Waddock & 
Smith, 2000; S. A. Waddock, 1991).   
 Yet partnerships across sector lines provide a keen acknowledgement of the 
intricacy and interwoven nature of complex social issues. As cross-sector 
collaborative take on the intricacies and dynamics of multiple structures, 
organizations, systems, people, and- in this study- cities, they often do so in order to 
address large problems that impact people, organizations, and systems represented 
within and outside of the collaborative. Bryson et al. (2006) state that “people who 
want to tackle tough social problems and achieve beneficial community outcomes 
are beginning to understand that multiple sectors of a democratic society- business, 
nonprofits and philanthropies, the media the community, and government- must 
collaborate to deal effectively and humanely with the challenges” (p. 44). As a result, 
Seitanidi (2008) suggests that cross-sector partnerships can also serve as a form of 
social entrepreneurship, as they have potential to be innovative social processes 
that provide bridges across organizational boundaries and deliver change. 
 Yet fewer acknowledgements have been given to the role of race in these 
cross-sector spaces. While proponents of multi-sector collaborative readily 
emphasize that “authentic engagement with people who are experiencing the 
problem first hand is critical to ensuring that strategies are effective”, the race of 
those “experiencing the problem first hand” is often omitted, and most often they 
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are Black and Latino/a (Kania, Hanleybrown, & Splansky Juster, 2014, p. 3). 
Moreover, these partnerships often give little consideration to the historic struggle 
for civil and human rights communities of color have engaged in for many years, and 
the systematic ways people of color have been underserved. While McAfee, 
Blackwell, and Bell (2015) attempt to highlight the role of equity in collective action 
and impact work by emphasizing the importance of race in these conversations and 
spaces, further consideration is needed.  
 Collective Action. While collective action has and can be used to infer many 
things, in this work, I will utilize to Robertson and Tang’s (1995) definition of 
collective action, stating “collective action refers to activities that require 
cooperation among individuals to achieve desirable outcomes” (p. 78). Given this 
definition, I conceptualize collective action as the mechanisms groups use to achieve 
their desired outcomes. As Pawson and Tilley (2004) suggest via their definition of 
mechanisms, collective action is then an act/acts, or processes that is used to bring 
about change, or in these specific cases, social change.  
 Collective action in cross-sector work proves to be a significant concept as 
those working in various sectors and systems see the limitations of isolated work, 
and see value in strategic partnerships. Yet collective action is not always 
conceptualized as a mechanism, or a process that can be used to leverage change. 
This conceptualization requires one to consider relationships between people, 
organizations, and progress that is (or isn’t) made towards shared objectives, and 
the potential tools and resources that are leveraged to reach these objectives (Kania 
& Kramer, 2011). One key resource and tool is that of collective commitment.  
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 Collective Commitment. A simplistic understanding of collective 
commitment revolves around the notion of “individual commitments multiplied”, as 
Evans (1996) indicates that collective action towards real change is first 
accomplished person by person (p. 71). Yet throughout the dissertation, I adopt a 
definition of collective commitment from Gardner et al. (2011), which defines 
collective commitment as “a shared mindset and shared psychological state among a 
delimited collective of individuals regarding their employer typified by feelings of 
loyalty and a desire to invest mental and physical energy in helping the organization 
achieve its goals” (p. 318)3. 
  Robertson and Tang (1995) illuminate the two dominant perspectives on 
commitment in collective settings; one originating from literature on organizational 
behavior (OB), and the other stemming from rational choice literature often used in 
theories of economic behavior. While the two perspectives differ in how they define 
collective commitment and its role in collective action spaces, the authors point to a 
point of consensus that asserts the importance of collective commitment in such 
collaborative settings-  
“Both the OB and rational choice perspective share in common the belief that 
commitment is an important factor affecting collective action systems. 
Furthermore, implicit in both perspectives is the notion that individuals with 
higher levels of commitment will be more likely to engage in behaviors 
oriented toward the good of the collective. In other words, commitment can 
                                                        
3 Gardner et al. (2011) use this definition to define collective affective commitment, which I explain in Chapter 2. 
Moreover, I recognize that the cross-sector partnerships and groups studied in this dissertation do not all serve 
as employers of the individuals within the collectives/groups I investigate. However, this definition does present 
an insightful perspective as to the connection between the individual and collective levels of commitment, and 
commitment as it’s directed towards outcomes and action.  
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motivate individuals to act cooperatively in pursuit of shared collective ends” 
(p. 69).  
Collective commitment also bears importance from the perspectives of realist 
evaluation and theories on race and commitment. Realist evaluation purports that 
social change is triggered by the thinking, doing, and resource employment of those 
involved and affected by the intervention (Pawson & Tilley, 2004). This perspective 
consequently purports that collectively achieving a desired outcome is highly 
dependent on the active engagement and commitment of individuals involved in the 
group. Moreover, studies have also shown that perceiving one’s group as 
disadvantaged and the racial composition of a working group compels the 
commitment of those that share that identity (Frankenberg, Taylor, & Merseth, 
2010; Zaal, Van Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers, & Derks, 2012). Examining collective 
commitment from a realist perspective and also looking at how race is represented 
in these collective spaces adds to a deeper understanding of commitment and its 
connection to action.  
 
Overview of the Dissertation  
  This dissertation has two major sections. Chapter 2 begins with a theoretical 
and conceptual framework for both sections. I ground the research synthesis and 
empirical work in theory from public management. Yet, I also draw heavily from 
scholarship in education, social innovation, psychology, and human resourcing. 
Chapter 3 presents the first major section, which includes a research synthesis of 
historical cases of cross-sector partnerships. The methodology used to examine 
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these cases is included in this chapter. Nonetheless, these studies were 
systematically selected and serve as examples of cross-sector partnerships that 
attempt to create change for underserved communities and people of color. I pay 
particular attention to the early stages of collective action, as well as the power-
origin of these cases; delineating between cases that are grass-high initiatives (or 
initiatives started or charged by those with high influence and power) and those 
that I consider grassroots initiatives. In addition to charting themes and variations 
across these categories, I also (a) use realist evaluation to evaluate the theories of 
action, context, mechanisms and intended outcomes across these cases; and (b) 
evaluate how and if groups foster and sustain individual commitment towards a 
collective level, as well as create an environment that fosters collective commitment. 
I also provide a cross-case analysis of the grassroots cases, and later the grass-high 
cases.  
  The second section begins in Chapter 4 where I present empirical data in the 
form of a realist participatory ethnography. In this study, I examine how Highland 
County My Brother’s Keeper (HMBK), a countywide multi-sector collaboration, 
attempts to make change for young men of color within the county.  As a local 
community associated with of the larger grass-high My Brother’s Keeper (MBK) 
Community Challenge initiated by former President Obama, MBK charges local 
communities to “…convene leaders, identify effect strategies, and to work together” 
to address barriers of opportunity for young men of color ("MBK community 
challenge for action," 2014).  
  I spent a year within this group space as a researcher and group participant, 
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collecting data in the form of interviews, fields notes, recordings of group meetings, 
reflective memos, and artifacts created by or for the group. Similar to the case 
studies, I employ realist evaluation to evaluate the theories of action, context, 
mechanisms and intended outcomes of HMBK and evaluate if and how collective 
action and commitment is used and formed among the group.   
  Chapter 5 presents a second analysis that centers race and the 
representation of race in the cases I previously reviewed. Originally, race served as 
an aspect of the selection criteria I used to solidify the cases I would study, but it 
was not initially foregrounded. However, race emerged as a critical factor as I 
studied the development of collective commitment and the progress towards 
collective action for these cases. Consequently, Chapter 5 uses critical race theory to 
evaluate how race is represented and negotiated in the process of attaining (or not 
attaining) collective commitment towards collective action. In particular, I examine 
the function of White interest-convergence and its use as an intentional strategy 
within each case. Chapter 6 then concludes the dissertation with a summary of the 
findings.  
 
Logic of Inquiry for the Dissertation  
 Methodologically, I employ realist synthesis (Pawson & Bellamy, 2006) to 
unveil how social change is conceptualized and enacted by those involved in the 
initiative. Realist evaluation and synthesis acknowledges that social change is 
contingent on “the social circumstances” of those involved in the initiative, and as 
such, change cannot be built on an assumption that intervention resources spur 
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transformation (Pawson & Tilley, 2004, p. 4). Consequently, the realist approach 
intentionally investigates contextual characteristics, relationships, and the 
positionality of organizations and individuals involved (Pawson & Tilley, 2004).  
I concur with Kania and Kramer (2011) that simply encouraging more partnership 
and collaborative work won’t produce the radical change sought by those involved 
in change-making work. Consequently, this dissertation unwraps the particular 
theories that drive the work of multi-sector collaborative groups that seek to 
change, evaluates their realization and progress towards change through a realist 
lens, and critically examines how race is reflected and negotiated in this process.   
  As previously stated, the purpose of this project was to evaluate and 
understand how collective action (as carried out through multi-sector initiatives) 
has been and could be used to address large social problems, and how collective 
commitment contributes to the collective work that is pursued. Here, I should note 
that in both the synthesis and empirical analysis, my intent is not to make the work 
and collaborative space of the initiatives studied appear neater than they actually 
were. Moreover, even in studying the contexts, mechanisms, and outcomes of these 
initiatives, I cannot make claim to the total reasoning as to why things worked in the 
ways it did. However, in evaluating each case from a realist perspective, considering 
collective commitment as a crucial resource towards collective action, and later 
appraising findings from a critical race perspective, I do intend to add to the 
literature that elucidates how effective change can be made. Furthermore, I seek to 
shed light on the contributors, detractors, and sustainers of collective commitment 
in these spaces.  
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 I am also very aware that my personal identity and the role that I took on 
during the empirical project greatly influenced my perspective in this work. I am a 
Midwestern Black woman that attended public schools serving predominately 
Latino/a students for my K-12 education, and later attended a predominately White 
university for undergraduate education. I spent my early career years working as a 
college counselor at an all boys high school on the south side of Chicago, and later a 
program manager for a cross-sector mentorship program for Chicago Public School 
students. These experiences not only refined my skills around teaching and learning, 
but also illuminated as to how (often broken) systems join forces with each other to 
treat their ills.  
  These experiences also led me to my doctoral program, and a quest to 
understand why those working in difficult educational spaces chose to work in 
those settings, and why they remained committed. I conducted a study during this 
time on highly committed educational leaders that purposefully work in challenging 
contexts. My findings from this study showed that while the Black educators and 
White educators I interviewed stated they were committed to different things, both 
the actions and thoughts about their work proved very similar4.  
  In addition, my personal commitment to practice and research application 
drew me to working with my local school district while I pursued by doctoral 
program, and later the county school district that led much of the collaborative work 
among the local districts. As a district consultant, I worked on the strategic plan for 
                                                        
4 Similar actions included each participant’s long tenure in their school, their purposefully supporting Black, 
Brown, and other vulnerable students within the school, and the time they spent in their schools on a daily basis. 
Similar “thinking about their work” was exemplified through acknowledging their commitment as a sacrifice 
they were willing to make, as well as acknowledging that their role allowed them to give marginalized students 
voice and power.  
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the merging of two financially unstable local districts, as well as strategic plans for 
the county district’s focus and priority schools5. When I came to the point of 
designing a study for my dissertation work, I naturally sought insight from leaders 
within the district as to questions they had and wanted to explore through research. 
Their insight and own inquiries led to the county’s My Brother’s Keeper project, an 
emerging cross-sector partnership focused on addressing barriers for young men of 
color within the county. The district had embraced the effort, but was unsure of the 
best ways to support.  
  Consequently, I was contracted to consult as a partnership facilitator for the 
effort. In this role, I directly connected with stakeholders and partners that were a 
part of the initiative, facilitated conversations around strategic decisions, and 
managed the work of two AmeriCorp VISTAs that were also hired to work on the 
initiative. Hence, the perspectives I take reflect my views as both a facilitator and 
participant in the effort, and also a researcher studying on the project.  
 
 
 
  
                                                        
5 Priority schools are schools located in Washington’s bottom 5% in academic performance indicators. Focus 
schools are schools that have large achievement gaps across various categories of students (i.e. race, 
socioeconomic status, ESL and Non-ESL, etc.).  
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Chapter II. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
  
 This study investigates how those working in cross-sector spaces use 
collective action and collective commitment to address large social problems. Here, I 
identify, define, and explain the use of particular terms and ideas that are significant 
in this project and clarify how these concepts connect to one another.  
 
Collective Action 
 As stated, I am using Robertson and Tang (1995) definition of collective 
action which states “collective action refers to activities that require cooperation 
among individuals to achieve desirable outcomes” (p. 78). I intellectualize collective 
action to be the mechanism that cross-sector groups use to achieve their desired 
outcomes. Yet how and why these groups are formed, and the perceived and 
enacted power of individuals and the group all have implications as to the how the 
group proceeds, the theory of change it utilizes, the type of action it pursues, how it 
is able to accomplish it’s desired outcomes, and much more. Consequently, I’ve 
organized the historical cases in terms of power-origin and dynamics as a means to 
specifically understand how power is reflected and negotiated in collective action 
spaces.  
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Theories on How Power is Negotiated and Reflected in the Process of 
Achieving Collective Action 
Collective Action via Grassroots Organizing 
 In their introduction to community organizing, Schutz and Sandy (2011) 
affirm that in comparison to other approaches to change, “…[community] organizers 
believe that significant social change only comes through conflict with the 
entrenches interests of the status quo” (p. 12). In similar light, Moses and Cobb Jr 
(2001) emphasize the need for demand in organizing. As systems depend on the 
lack of voice and demand from the bottom, in order for change to occur, “…the 
system has to be challenged” (Moses & Cobb Jr, 2001, p. 4). Hence, organizing 
groups apply pressure to powerful institutions and individuals by bringing 
“…masses of people together in actions where they make demands through their 
leaders in a collective voice” (Schutz & Sandy, 2011, p. 12). While the idea of 
“community” within community organizing is often misunderstood, Warren and 
Mapp (2011) suggest that strong forms of community organizing preference the 
perspective of “engaging people through their shared connections” rather than 
approaching people as “isolated individuals” needing to join for a common purpose 
(p. 19).  
 Setting the agenda. In community organizing groups, ‘organizers’ are 
generally paid staff that are tasked with the day-to-day operations of the 
organization, including supporting campaigns and training leaders. In contrast, 
‘leaders’ serve as the face of organized work and are more often unpaid volunteers. 
They direct the organizing group, decide which issues will be worked on, and will 
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speak on behalf of the group in public settings (Schutz & Sandy, 2011, p. 24). Hence, 
it is important to note that the majority of those participating in collective work via 
community organizing/grassroots work are volunteers, and are not compensated by 
the organization for their participation.  
 Players at the table. Grassroots organizers and leaders use large, public, 
democratically structured meetings, which allow group members to vote on the 
actions and pursuits of the group. However decisions made in these larger meetings 
reflect direction-setting and the decision-making of a smaller group of organizers 
and leaders (Schutz & Sandy, 2011). Traditional grassroots organizing also 
emphasizes the importance of context and leaders working within communities 
they work and live (Moses & Cobb Jr, 2001).  
 Strategy. Warren and Mapp (2011) suggest that organizing begins with 
relationship building, as “organizers seek to connect people to each other for the 
purposes of taking public action” (p. 24). Strategically, leaders within organizing 
groups use tactics such as house meetings and interviews to remain connected to 
the interests and needs of their large constituencies. Community organizing groups 
also employ the following strategies to accomplish their goal of shifting relational 
power-  
o increasing their membership 
o nurturing and training leaders 
o gaining a reputation for canny strategy 
o demonstrating a capacity to get large numbers of people out to public 
action (Schutz & Sandy, 2011, p. 12).  
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 Potential challenges in grassroots organizing. One potential challenge in 
organizing at the grassroots is what Moses and Cobb Jr (2001) call “dealing with the 
particulars of time and space” (p. 3). Understanding how to build and work within 
the time (i.e. current events and current political agendas) and space (i.e. political 
and geographic issues, local resources available) in order to reach where power is 
can often be a challenge for community organizing groups, and particularly for 
young and inexperienced groups (Moses & Cobb Jr, 2001). Warren and Mapp (2011) 
also note potential challenges in knowledge and know-how on building various 
kinds of social capital, navigating unequal power relations, and resource acquisition 
via staffing and budgeting.  
Collective Action via Grass-High Approaches 
  Another method to organizing towards collective action is through grass-
high approaches. I am defining grass-high approaches as initiatives started or 
charged by those with high influence and/or power6. While grass-high initiatives 
may use similar strategies and tactics to those of grassroots organizing groups, 
there is a distinct difference in the origin of the initiative, as well as how those with 
power are involved in the decision-making process of the collaborative effort. In 
their seminal piece on collective impact, Kania and Kramer (2011) provide a brief 
index of frameworks for grass-high collaborations, including funder collaboratives, 
public-private partnerships, multi-stakeholder initiatives, social sector networks, 
and collective impact initiatives. While the authors argue that the sustainability of 
                                                        
6 I was first introduced to this terminology in an interaction with Dr. Kristie Dotson, an epistemologist and 
philosopher at Michigan State University. While the term (as defined) does not appear in scholarly literature, 
given its importance to this project, I believe it is important to share where my interaction with the concept was 
initiated.   
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these efforts vary, they recognize that large, complex social issues require “…a 
systematic approach to social impact that focuses on the relationships between 
organizations and the progress towards shared objectives” (Kania & Kramer, 2011, 
p. 39). Given that empirical work for this project and another historical case 
example attempt to utilize the collective impact approach to organize their 
collective work, I concentrate on the features of this framework in the descriptions 
below.  
 Setting the agenda. Agenda setting varies across the type of collaboration 
and goals that are pursued in the collective group. Yet most frameworks recognize 
that “…transformative work in communities requires the participation and 
alignment of many people, organizations, and sectors… “ (McAfee et al., 2015, p. 
463). In attempt to help nascent collective impact groups move their work forward, 
Hanleybrown, Kania, and Kramer (2012) investigate the critical preconditions for 
collective work in grass-high spaces. They find that one critical necessity for multi-
stakeholder groups was the need of financial rescores “…to last for at least two to 
three years, generally in the form of at least one anchor funder who is engaged from 
the beginning and can support and mobilize other resources to pay for the needed 
infrastructure and planning processes” (Hanleybrown et al., 2012, p. 3). Hence, 
there is a clear initial connection to resource-rich funders, and a clear call for 
implementers to work with funders early on in the collaboration. Consequently, the 
agenda for grass-high cross-sector groups is most often set by influential leaders 
(Anthony, Fewins-Bliss, Jacobs, Johnson, & King, 2013 ). The day-to-day work and 
operations however is often tasked to a “backbone support organization”, or 
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“…dedicated staff separate from the participating organizations who can plan, 
manage, and support the initiative…” (Kania & Kramer, 2011, p. 40). 
 Players at the table.  In Turcotte and Pasquero’s (2001) case study of a 
multi-stakeholder collaborative roundtable on environmental protection , the 
authors inform that the most active players in environmental waste management 
were invited to join the collaborative they investigated. Consequently, at the group’s 
first meeting, many of the group’s participants were perceived to be “particularly 
significant” (p. 453). Hanleybrown et al. (2012) also suggest that in collective impact 
initiatives, “the most critical factor by far is an influential champion (or small group 
of champions) who commands the respect necessary to bring CEO-level cross-sector 
leaders together and keep their engagement over time” (p. 3).  As such, the 
individuals that participate in grass-high cross-sector initiatives most often include 
high-ranking personnel within institutions and sectors that (in some way) impact 
the social issue being address. Collective impact practitioners note these 
collaborations are more effective when building off existing organizations and 
collaborative efforts rather than creating new solutions from scratch (Hanleybrown 
et al., 2012; Kania et al., 2014; Kania & Kramer, 2011) 
 Potential challenges in grass-high approaches. Similar to grassroots 
approaches to collective work, grass-high initiatives also face potential challenges 
towards effective collective action. One such limitation is the potential gridlock due 
to diversity in thought. In their study of a multi-stakeholder collaborative 
roundtable, Turcotte and Pasquero (2001) find that while consensus and “small 
wins” towards the group’s larger objectives were achievable, the perceived value of 
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the group (diversity of perspective) actually served as a limitation, as “[diversity of 
perspective] increased the possibility of deadlock as each participant tried to 
impose his or her own logic (or perceptual framework) and each had veto power” 
(p. 459).  
 Cross-sector groups using the collective impact model also face the challenge 
of inclusion, in ensuring that those that are most affected by the problem they are 
addressing are also valued in the work. Given that these issues more often follow 
along socioeconomic, racial, and power lines, McAfee et al. (2015) cautions that 
those using the model make sure “… that low-income communities and communities 
of color are included as equal partners in planning, implementing, and governing 
initiatives “(p.4). Hanleybrown et al. (2012) also suggest that funding for backbone 
support organizations presents a challenge for groups utilizing the collective impact 
framework, as  “…few funders are yet stepping up to support backbones associated 
with the issues they care about” (p. 6).  
 
Collective Commitment  
 I’m adopting Gardner et al. (2011)’s definition of collective affective 
organizational commitment, which expresses collective commitment as “a shared 
mindset and shared psychological state among a delineated collective of individuals 
regarding their employer typified by feelings of loyalty and a desire to invest mental 
and physical energy in helping the organization achieve its goals” (p. 318). While the 
cross-sector partnerships and groups studied in this dissertation do not all serve as 
employers of the individuals within the collectives/groups I investigate, this 
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definition does present an insightful perspective as to the connection between the 
individual and collective levels of commitment, and commitment as it’s directed 
towards collective action.  
 Theorists on collective commitment have suggested the important 
connection between collective commitment and collective action, as higher levels of 
commitment are often attributed to greater ability to achieve collective action 
(Reichers, 1985; Robertson & Tang, 1995; Walton, 1985). Yet as the definition for 
collective commitment acknowledges the significance of individual commitment, I 
begin to unpack the notion of collective commitment at the individual level.  I also 
review literature that emphasizes commitment in challenging spaces, such as hard-
to-staff or low-resourced schools. I parallel these environments to nascent collective 
action groups, as both represent places where resources to pursue collective action 
are more often scarce, the organization has little resources to induce commitment 
from those that are engaged in the work, and the communities that are often most 
impacted are low-resourced communities of color.  
 
Theories on Individual Commitment 
 Individual Commitment as Measured by Organizational Commitment. 
The concept of individual commitment is most popularly understood through 
organizational commitment, and was introduced by Mowday, Porter, and Steers 
(1982). Their empirical and theoretical work showed that links between the 
individual employees and the organization led to strong beliefs and acceptance of 
the organizational goals, strong desires for organizational membership, and a 
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motivation to exert considerable effort on behalf of the organization (Reyes, 1990). 
Reyes (1990) presents a precise definition of organizational commitment as “…the 
global evaluation of the linkage between the individual employee and the 
organization” (p. 143). Dee, Henkin, and Singleton (2006) reinforce this definition 
by noting these linkages measure “the relative strength of an individual’s 
identification with, and involvement in a particular organization” (Mowday, Porter, 
& Steers, 1982 in Dee et. al., 2006, p.604). Hence, affective commitment can most 
easily be understood as the “psychological bond” between an employee and 
employer (Gardner et al., 2011, p. 317).  
 Rosenholtz (1991) also identifies a sociological perspective of organizational 
commitment, which purports that “organizational members are motivated to 
remain within a setting and to contribute productively only so long as the 
inducements offered are as great or greater than the contribution they are asked to 
make”7 (March & Simon, 1958 in Rosenholtz, 1991, p. 140). More individual 
commitment (as measured by organizational commitment) is considered to be 
better for the organization, as Reyes (1994) cites Scholl (1981) who acknowledged 
that “individuals who are committed represent a more stable, consistent body of 
employees who will exert effort when work conditions are not ideal”(p. 229).  
Employees with strong organizational commitment are considered to employ more 
effort as they have clearer intentions in stay with the organization (Reyes, 1994). 
Hence, early theoretical constructions of individual commitment via organizational 
commitment upholds the notion that commitment from organizational employees is 
                                                        
7 Rosenholtz refers to this concept as “psychic rewards”.  
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dependent on strong connections between the employee and the institution, as well 
as employees’ perception of rewards acquired from their commitment to the 
institution.  
 In her empirical test of how individuals’ attitudes and behaviors affect 
performance in government agencies, Kim (2005) speaks to two approaches of 
understanding organizational commitment. The first approach, attitudinal 
commitment, positions  “commitment as an attitude reflecting the nature and 
quality of the linkage between an employee and organization” (p. 247). Meyer and 
Allen (1991) suggest that attitudinal commitment is measured by affective 
commitment, which is indicated by “employees’ emotional attachment to, 
identification with, and involvement in the organization” (Kim, 2005, p. 248). 
Researchers attempting to measure affective commitment have often utilized the 
Organizational Commitment Questionnaire; a survey-based measure developed by 
Porter, Steers, Mowday, and Boulian (1974) to quantify an individual’s attitude as 
related to the organization they work for.   
  The second approach, behavioral commitment, is “…the process by which 
individuals develop a sense of attachment not to an organization, but to their own 
actions” (Kim, 2005, p. 247). This approach is measured by continuance 
commitment, which Meyer and Allen (1991) define as an the awareness of the cost 
associated with leaving the organization. Of the two approaches, evidence proposes 
that affective commitment is the most important measure of organizational 
commitment, as affective commitment and organizational performance have been 
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positively correlated in some studies (Meyer, Paunonen, Gellatly, Goffin, & Jackson, 
1989; Somers & Birnbaum, 2000).  
 Critiquing the use of Organizational Commitment. Whereas 
organizational commitment dominates American conceptions and models of 
individual commitment in workspaces, international literature presents a 
compelling critique of this model. While the organizational commitment perspective 
places a great amount of responsibility on the workplace to cultivate employee 
commitment, more complex models of commitment reflect the intricate 
interconnection between external and internal orientations and motivators of 
commitment. While affective commitment considers emotional attachment and 
involvement in an organization, this traditional interpretation considers the 
interaction between the concept and the organization as measured by survey 
methods, rather than deconstructing what leads individuals to become emotionally 
attached or involved in their work.  Consequently, more consideration for internal 
factors that induce commitment is needed in order to form a more holistic and 
fitting conceptualization of commitment.  
 Day (Day, 2004, 2008; Day, Elliot, & Kington, 2005) and Crosswell (L. 
Crosswell, 2006; L. J. Crosswell & Elliott, 2004; Elliott & Crosswell, 2002) add to a 
growing body of literature that attempts to challenge the notion that commitment is 
focused and motivated exclusively by external factors8. They use individual 
interview and survey data to argue that commitment can be highly personal and 
                                                        
8Day and Crosswell study commitment in the context of schools, teachers, and education leaders. They pay 
particular attention to challenging school contexts (i.e. low-resourced schools). As I mention earlier, I’ve drawn a 
parallel between these contexts and nascent social-change collective action spaces.  
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maintains an internal orientation, and this multidimensionality is seldom explored 
in research. Although individuals within these contexts may speak of their 
commitment being linked to external factors (such as organizations, students, etc.), 
both authors present evidence that participants’ conceptualizations of commitment 
were tied to their individual values, beliefs, passions, and personal ideologies (L. J. 
Crosswell & Elliott, 2004; Day et al., 2005). Moreover, while these individuals 
“…worked in situations which may reasonably be described as difficult, personally, 
emotionally, and cognitively challenging, sometimes turbulent and, occasionally, 
violently disruptive”, Day found that their work required a “ …passion to maintain a 
commitment over time, and courage to persist in caring for every student in the 
class” (Day, 2004, p. 428; 436).  
 Summary. In sum, traditional conceptualizations of commitment orient 
individuals’ commitment to the organization and workplace and concentrate on 
measures between the individual and external motivators induced by the 
organization. More complex understandings of commitment point to the idea that 
commitment is driven and connected to internal motivators, such as individuals’ 
values, beliefs, passions, and personal ideologies. I will later show how this notion of 
individual values, beliefs, and ideologies is critical to achieving collective 
commitment.  
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Theories on Collective Commitment9 
Public management scholars have found that collective commitment is developed 
through repeated interaction among individuals. Those with higher levels of 
commitment can transfer feelings and influence to those with less commitment and 
vise versa (Barsade, 2002; Gardner et al., 2011; Levinson, 1965). Hence, individual 
patterns and collective commitment patterns continuously affect each other and 
function similarly as they develop from interactions and shared feeling amongst the 
group (Gardner et al., 2011; Kozlowski & Klein, 2000).  
 As Gardener et al.’s (2011) definition of collective affective commitment and 
similar to theories of individual commitment suggest, theories on collective 
commitment are primarily positioned within the concept of organizational 
commitment, and are theorized in two distinct ways. The first theory is often used 
by scholars who study organizational behavior (OB), and aligns with the individual 
commitment conceptualization of affective commitment. This body of literature 
supports that commitment reflects an individual’s identification and involvement 
within the organization (Mowday et al., 1982; Porter et al., 1974). However, the OB 
literature is sparse in drawing explicit connections between individual commitment 
and collective commitment. Indeed, Robertson and Tang (1995) note that “many 
scholars writing in the organizational behavior literature (Bennis, 1966; McGregor, 
1957) have assumed, at least implicitly, that individual organizational members are 
                                                        
9 My understanding of a ‘collective’ is informed by Morgeson and Hofmann (1999), who define a collective as a 
interdependent, goal-centered, group of individuals. Hence, a ‘collective’ can be a team, unit, department, or 
entire organization (Gardner et al., 2011). 
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able and willing to cooperate with others to achieve shared or collective goals” (p. 
69).  
 The second conception, most often housed in rational choice literature, aligns 
with the individual commitment conceptualization of behavioral commitment. It 
maintains that individual behavior is governed by self-interest and their perceptions 
of costs and benefits (Robertson & Tang, 1995). Unlike the organizational behavior 
literature, scholars using the rational choice conception do not make assumptions 
between the individual and collective levels of commitment. Instead, they voice a 
clear argument that individuals, instead, are self-interested humans who make 
choices for their own gain, which makes collective action intrinsically difficult 
(Radnitzky, 1987; Robertson & Tang, 1995). Similarly, Olson (1965) argues that 
“even if all of the individuals in a large group are rational and self-interested, and 
would gain if, as a group, they acted to achieve their common interest or objective, 
they would still not voluntarily act to achieve the common or group interest” (p. 2). 
Changing their orientation to acting the group’s interest would require coercion, 
correlating to many theories of change that purport pressure or force as an 
important ingredient for change (Evans, 1996; M. Fullan, 1993; Olson, 1965).  
 Castelfranchi (1995) also introduces the concept of social commitment as a 
mediator between individual and collective commitment. He defines social 
commitment as “the commitment of one agent to another” and proposes that it is 
relational in nature (Castelfranchi, 1995, p. 42). Consequently, he suggests that 
individuals will first commit to one another (social commitment), and this 
relationship is later reflected in the collective action of both individuals.  
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Considering the Connections Between Collective Action and Collective 
Commitment 
 Theoretical Connections. The concepts of collective action and collective 
commitment connect in many ways. Theoretically, Robertson and Tang (1995) 
propose that collective commitment and collective action are mutually dependent. 
They argue “the commitment of organizational participants – to each other and to 
the organization itself- becomes a critical and, at times, even necessary mechanism 
for directing their behavior toward collective goal accomplishments” (p. 67). This 
argument also infers that while all collective action may not require collective 
commitment, the quality and success of the action is significantly interconnected to 
collective commitment.  
 Likewise, Zaal et al. (2012) look at increasing levels of collective commitment 
to collective action through the lens of regulatory factors. They find that perceived 
success within a collective action pursuit increased the likelihood that individuals 
would commit to a collective action outcome. Moreover, individuals that maintained 
a high concern for safety and/or fulfillment of duty and responsibility were more 
likely to commit to collective action if they perceived its goals as important as 
opposed to achievable.  
 A number of scholars also propose how groups might harness individual 
commitment, or what groups can do to garner collective commitment towards 
collective action. Hassan and Rohrbaugh (2011) consider psychological climate and 
how this can be used to foster affective commitment (or emotional attachment to 
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the organization)10. While they are clear that psychological climate is analyzed at 
the individual level, their test of its four domains reveal that goal ambiguity within 
an organization was negatively related to employees’ affective commitment, and 
that social environment characteristics (i.e. social cohesion) and leadership support 
and facilitation were highly correlated to greater individual affective commitment to 
the organization (Hassan & Rohrbaugh, 2011). 
 Whereas study participants in Hassan and Rohrbaugh (2011) were 
predominately white, Zaal et al. (2012) suggest that more disadvantaged groups  
may collectively commit and act on that commit differently. The authors verify 
“research has demonstrated that perceiving one’s group as being disadvantaged 
increases an individuals’ motivation to engage in collective action aimed at 
improving the group’s relative position” (p. 94). Given that the authors find that 
individuals were more willing to commit to collective action towards social change 
when they personally attached higher responsibility, duty, or importance to the goal 
the collective group was attempting to achieve, this also raises the particular 
question as to the connection between perceived racial disadvantage and 
willingness to commitment to collective action, which the authors do not address.  
 Lastly, Robertson and Tang (1995) also review informal social mechanisms 
that could induce collective commitment towards collective action. They suggest 
that social processes (i.e. recruitment and selection), leadership, and structural 
                                                        
10 “Psychological climate refers to an individual’s cognitive representation of relatively proximal situational 
conditions, expressed in terms that reflect psychologically meaningful interpretations of the situation” (Hassan 
& Rohrbaugh, 2011, p. 31). The authors note that individuals’ perceptions of the significance of their work 
spaces and their personal well-being are primary components of psychological climate.  
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design (i.e. development of organizational goals and values) may all help to facilitate 
greater commitment, and ultimately help groups achieve greater collective action.  
 Summary. In sum, the literature supports that there is a clear connection 
between the development of collective commitment and a group’s ability to 
undertake and accomplish collective action. Those that use orientations of 
organizational commitment such as affective commitment (Hassan & Rohrbaugh, 
2011; Kim, 2005) often highlight the need for alignment of personal and 
organizational goals to satisfy the emotional connection between individuals and 
organizations. Others that highlight the rational choice perspective (Olson, 1965; 
Robertson & Tang, 1995) note that social processes can lead or develop collective 
commitment towards collective action.  
 Methodological Connections. In this study, the concepts of collective action 
and commitment connect methodologically, as Pawson and Tilley (1997)’s concept 
of mechanisms serves as a solid description of the potential relationship between 
the two concepts. According to realist evaluation (Pawson & Tilley, 1997, 2004) 
theory, “mechanisms describe what it is about programs and interventions that 
bring about any effects” (Pawson & Tilley, 2004, p. 6). Hence, mechanisms represent 
the things that individuals (and similarly groups) do, act on, and perform in order to 
get from point A to point B. Given this, I am conceptualizing collective action and 
collective commitment as mutually reinforcing mechanisms. As collective action 
describes the doings of an organized group, collective commitment represents a 
driving force that enables the group to pursue collective action (See Graphic I). Both 
are critical towards achieving a group’s desired outcomes.  
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Interconnections Between Race, Gender, and Commitment 
(Evidence from Challenging School Contexts) 
 
 In addition to examining the interconnections between collective 
commitment and collective action, I also aim to critically examine the role of race 
and power in the process of achieving collective commitment and ultimately, 
collective action. Zaal et al. (2012) suggests that perceiving one’s group as 
disadvantaged uniquely influences individuals’ decisions to participate in collective 
action, particularly if one believes collective action will make their group better off. 
Literature from education on teachers’ commitment to working in challenging 
contexts presents a compelling parallel to this concept11.  While studies show that 
school conditions and leadership are critical factors when examining individuals’ 
preferences and tenure in urban and urban-rim schools, “there is also some 
evidence to suggest that racial composition of a school’s student body, regardless of 
conditions may be the most important factor associated with teachers’ decisions to 
change jobs” (Frankenberg et al., 2010, p. 314). Hence, teachers of color are more 
likely than White teachers to commit and work in schools with higher numbers 
students of color.  
 In attempt to understand why this might be, Su (1997) conducted a case 
study of African-American, Asian-American, and Latino/a teacher candidates at a 
                                                        
11 As mentioned, I’ve drawn a parallel between commitment in challenging school contexts (i.e. low-resourced 
schools particularly those with higher percentages of students of color, students eligible to receive free or 
reduced-price lunches, and/or families who live below the federal poverty level) and nascent changing-making 
collective action spaces. The reasons why individuals may commit, the actions employed by those involved, and 
the challenges faced by those in both spaces bare many similarities. Moreover, as with cross-sector partnerships, 
teaching is a unique profession that “involves a complex combination of working relationship with not only the 
school [one’s organization], but with various stakeholders including students” (Park, 2005, p. 463). 
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state university in the US. Candidates of color frequently stated that “…a good 
teacher [was] someone who not only [cared] for children and learning, but also 
[was] sensitive to diversity in the schools and society, and [was] committed to 
improving and transforming the society” (Su, 1997, p. 329). This belief remained 
consistent with the reasons for which the many of the candidates of color entered 
the field. While all candidates expressed altruistic/intrinsic desires as a reason for 
entering the field, White candidates did not express concern or a desire to teach 
poor children or children of color (Su, 1997).  Yet this was a driving factor for many 
of the teaching candidates of color.  
“…About one third of [the teaching candidates of color], especially those who 
perceived their early school experiences as particularly or uniquely negative 
due to their racial status and language difficulties, demonstrated a strong 
awareness of the unequal educational opportunities for the poor and 
minority children, the irrelevance of the existing curriculum and instruction 
for minority students, and the need to restructure schools and society. The 
black students were among the most conscious of social justice… These 
minority students are clearly committed to entering teaching as social 
change agents. For them, the rewards for teaching would be less financial 
than emotional and cultural” (Su, 1997, p. 332).  
Commitment to serving underserved students as displayed by the teacher 
candidates of color in Su’s study is not uncommon. Irizarry and Donaldson (2012) 
study of Latino/a high school students and teacher candidates reveals a similar 
conviction.  The authors found that feelings of reciprocity and giving back to their 
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communities were among students’ primary reason for entering the field of 
teaching. 
“Latinas/os displayed a forceful commitment to returning to schools like 
those they had attended to address systematic injustices in their own 
educational backgrounds. At three points in the teacher pipeline [prior to 
teacher preparation, upon entry to the field, and after completing a two-year 
teaching commitment], Latina/o teachers exhibited a strong commitment to 
teaching in schools serving students of color and low-income students” 
(Irizarry & Donaldson, 2012, p. 167). 
 In a literature review on the recruitment and retention of teachers of color, 
Achinstein, Ogawa, Sexton, and Freitas (2010) describe an emergent theme of a 
“humanistic commitment”, which authors define as a commitment to serve 
nondominant racial and cultural students to enhance their academic outcomes (p. 
82).  In relation to teacher turnover rates, Ingersoll (2001) found that teachers of 
color, specifically Black and Latino/a teachers, maintained lower rates of turnover, 
and thus sustained commitments made to spaces they worked in. Likewise, Irizarry 
and Donaldson (2012) found that Latina/o teachers were more likely to remain in 
the teaching profession than their White counterparts. In a 5-year study on teachers 
of color, Achinstein and Ogawa (2011) also revealed a connection between the 
“humanistic commitment” amongst teachers of color and retention. 
“A primary reason that teachers gave for remaining in their schools through 
the 5th year of teaching was a commitment to working in schools with 
students from nondominant cultural and linguistic communities. These 
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teachers saw themselves as cultural and linguistic resources to youth and 
their families and wanted to give back to their communities by making a 
difference in the lives of students of color” (Achinstein & Ogawa, 2011, p. 80). 
Yet literature also points out that all teachers of color are not the same and bring 
different factors to the table. Kauchak and Burbank (2003) discovered this very idea 
in their study of two minority teachers enrolled in an urban teacher preparation 
program. The authors acknowledged that although both White and non-White 
candidates enrolled in the program with a desire to work in urban schools, 
“different minority teachers [brought] unique voices and perspectives” and this in 
turn determined the ways in which they approached classroom instruction and their 
beliefs about teaching (Kauchak & Burbank, 2003, p. 73). Moreover, they propose 
that teachers of color could not be viewed as better teachers of students of color due 
to the fact that they may share similar racial or ethnic backgrounds.  
“What is needed,” they propose, “…is an understanding of the factors that 
might make minority teachers better at addressing the needs of minority 
children. Such an understanding would be a great benefit because it would 
provide a means for enhancing the skills of all teachers who work with 
minority children” (Kauchak & Burbank, 2003, p. 63).  
 Drawing on this parallel, I recognize commitment to teaching in challenging 
contexts presents many similarities to a commitment to work in multi-sector social 
change-making initiatives. As the cases I focus on aim to serve populations of people 
of color, those underserved, and foreground educational outcomes as part of their 
desired change, it is highly likely that leaders and those that work within these 
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initiatives commit to participation in these collectives for similar reasons, such as 
racial identification and connection. Yet as these partnerships work towards 
addressing social inequities, critical race theory foregrounds that “racism is and has 
been an integral feature of American life, law, and culture, and any attempt to 
eradicate inequities has to be centered on the socio-historical legacy of racism” 
(Howard, 2008, p. 963).  
 Whereas starting initiatives and using multi-sector partnerships to address 
large social problems aligns with a more progressive agenda, applying a critical lens 
to this type of collective work forces one to counter the “dominant narrative of 
rational, objective, color-blind policy formation”, and consider what Gillborn (2013) 
describes as the “taken-for-granted traditional view of policy as an incremental 
process moving toward greater justice and inclusion” (p. 130). Hence, as I recognize 
that identity such as race and gender may compel individuals to commit to collective 
action that addresses issues rooted in a socio-history of racism, I am also 
questioning how race is represented and negotiated in these collective spaces, 
particularly in the process of achieving collective commitment and action.   
 Consequently, in addition to conceptualizing and analyzing around the ways 
in which individuals’ values and commitments (such as race and gender) are 
fostered at the collective level, I will also apply a critical lens to help illuminate how, 
and whose beliefs, values, and biases are being legitimized and marginalized by way 
of race and power (Khalifa, Jennings, Briscoe, Oleszweski, & Abdi, 2014).  
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A Conceptual Framework For Individual Commitment, Collective 
Commitment, and Collective Action 
 Here I present the conceptualization of individual commitment, collective 
commitment, and collective action I will be using to situate my work given the 
aforementioned theories and literature. The literature reviewed on individual 
commitment point to a tension in the traditional theory and study of commitment. 
Most scholars using the organizational behavior theory of commitment have 
conceptualized and attempted to measure individuals’ attachment, involvement, and 
their motivators committing them to the organization via quantitative analyses and 
the measurement of affective commitment. The rational choice literature then 
suggests how organizations may use external motivators (i.e. social mechanisms) to 
induce commitment. However, empirical studies rarely consider both internal and 
external motivators to commitment. Moreover, there is little qualitative work on 
how internal motivators (individuals’ values, beliefs, passions, and personal 
ideologies) are/aren’t aligned to collective commitment towards collective work, 
and also little work on what critical factors new and developing groups need to 
foster when attempting to pursue collective action.  
 If collective commitment is conceptualized as a collective of individual 
commitments, then collective commitment, at its core, can be thought of as the 
collection of individuals’ values, beliefs, passions, and personal ideologies.  If 
collective entities and groups are going to harness collective commitment towards 
collective action, the group/entity needs to (1) speak to, relate, and align with 
individuals’ values, beliefs, and ideologies, and (2) create an inspiring environment 
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in which individuals aspire to achieve the social-change and outcomes of the 
collective group. This idea is all the more true when the collective group is a 
developing entity, and there aren’t many outside resources (i.e. money or prestige) 
to reward individuals and/or induce their commitment.    
 As nascent groups attempt to forge collective commitment and use it towards 
the implementation of a successful initiative, I contend that consideration must be 
given to both the internal and external motivators to commitment, as individual 
beliefs, values, and passions as well as environment are critical to new groups as 
they begin to develop their own values and establish their own culture. This project 
considers the ways in which collectives connect to individuals’ values, beliefs, and 
passions, and the conditions and mechanisms through which those individual 
commitments are fostered, detracted from, or sustained at the collective level. I look 
at alignment between individual and collective values, and the critical 
environmental factors that can aid new collective action groups in their 
development of collective commitment and achievable outcomes.  
 I contend that collective spaces that foster and create vision, trust, and a 
space to learn fare better in speaking to, relating, and aligning with the values and 
beliefs of those that join them. One can decipher what ignites, detracts, and sustains 
individual commitment and ultimately collective commitment by analyzing if and 
how critical factors of vision, trust, and space to learn are developed, by unpacking 
individual to collective alignment of values, beliefs, and ideologies, and by 
understanding how identity (i.e. race and power) are negotiated in the process of 
achieving collective commitment and ultimately collective action.
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Chapter III. Historical Cases (Realist Synthesis) 
 
 Using collective action as a social-change making space is not a new 
endeavor.  Specifically, cross-sector collaborations are often the response of those 
who realize addressing complex problems may not be accomplished by the efforts of 
one separate sector. In light of the MBK/HMBK’s cross-sector approach to 
addressing equities for boys and young men of color, and given that many social 
change-making projects have similarly attempted to use partnership and collective 
action to achieve system level change and impact, here I present a research 
synthesis on social change initiatives that have attempted to create change for 
underserved populations and people of color.   
 I approach this review of literature using realist evaluation to evaluate these 
initiatives and projects. While traditional program evaluation inquiries ask 
questions such as ‘what works?’ or ‘does this program work?’, realist evaluation 
assesses a program through probing its theory of change, understanding the 
conditions for change, and acknowledging the complex nature and multiple ways 
change can be achieved. Consequently, this research synthesis illuminates the 
mechanisms, contexts, and outcome patterns that explain the observed 
programmatic choices, moves, and outcomes of social change-making initiatives. 
Moreover, I investigate these historical cases with respect to the development of 
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collective commitment, and how race and power is represented and negotiated in 
the process of achieving (or not achieving) collective action.  
 
 
Methodology 
Sample Cases and Case Selection  
 The cases I explore are cases that exemplify the use of collective action to 
tackle a large social problem and/or create social change for underserved and 
people of color. Given this frame, I began my case exploration and selection with 
some preemptive boundaries. First, all cases had to incorporate some degree of 
cross-sector partnership, in which people from different spheres agree to 
collaborate and collectively pursue change. Secondly, I looked for cases that both 
represented initiatives that were charged by those with high influence and power 
(grass-high initiatives), and those that were initiated by communities that desired 
change for themselves (grassroots initiatives)12. I also required that cases date 
within the last 50 years, and those working within the case had outcome measures 
that aimed to positively serve underserved populations and people of color.  
 I conducted a systematic review of the literature through electronic 
databases such as ERIC, Google Scholar, JSTOR, and ProQuest to find examples cases 
that fit the aforementioned boundaries. I conducted a hand search of bibliographies 
of handbooks such as The Handbook on Social Change and the Oxford Handbook of 
Social Movements. I used books on school reform, systematic change, and personal 
                                                        
12 My proposal work for this project revealed that the power origins of a social change initiative could 
profoundly impact observed outcomes (Kania et al., 2014; Kania & Kramer, 2013; Philpart & Bell, 2015).  Hence, 
an appeal from an influential or powerful figure to pursue a social change could operate differently from a grass 
roots initiative, in which communities that are experiencing a problem decide to organize themselves. For this 
reason, I chose to use power-origin as a boundary and organizing tool within this review.  
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references to direct my case search. I also referred to other sources (i.e. the Stanford 
Social Innovation Review, The Harvard Business Review, the Collective Impact 
Forum, and audio-visual sources such as public talks), as I recognized that 
information on these ideal cases might not be represented in scholarly forums.  
 Ultimately, I identified 14 cases that meet the initial boundary criteria. I then 
created a matrix to organize these cases using general questions (i.e. source, 
location, power-origin, and social issue) and also questions from a realist evaluation 
framework (i.e. mechanisms, outcomes, theory of change). After organizing these 
cases, I foregrounded the cases that were domestic (occurred in the US), and this 
decision eliminated one case. I then foregrounded cases that sought some degree of 
educational change as a desired outcome, and cases for which I could find an array 
of sources that pointed to multiple perspectives on the case. This excluded 5 
additional cases. After applying these additional boundaries, I was left 8 cases, and 
with a larger number of grass-high cases (five grass-high, three grassroots).  
 I decided to investigate the same number of grass-high and grassroots cases, 
as I wanted to give parallel attention to both types of cases.  One of the remaining 
grassroots cases presented a concerning complication, as the case participants likely 
would have classified the case as a grassroots initiative, yet given my definition for 
‘grass-high’ and reading further documentation on the case, I began to see the case 
as a grass-high example. In view of this complication, I decided not to include this 
case and eliminated it from the remaining three potential grassroots cases.  
 The remaining two grassroots cases maintained geographic origins in 
Western and Southwestern parts of the country. Knowing this, I decided that I 
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wanted both grass-high cases to include a larger geographical base, as I was curious 
if geographic range or nation-wide initiatives would reveal any “left-out variables” 
(George & Bennett, 2005, p. 32)13. These decisions helped to eliminate two grass-
high cases, as both had originated in California, and did not reach beyond this 
geographic area. Furthermore, these two cases highlighted university-initiated 
community partnerships, but involved multiple partnerships/programs within each 
case. Given that I wanted to expand geographic boundaries and realizing the 
multiple partnerships/programs within each case would austerely complicate a 
realist analysis of these cases, I made a final decision to eliminate both of them.   
  I then eliminated the final grass-high case on the basis of lack of 
documentation. After an ample search, I was unable secure enough sources that 
provided different perspectives of stakeholders within the case, as well as sources 
that had direct articulations from case participants. Given this, I eliminated this final 
case, and as such, solidified the four cases are that represented in this synthesis.  
                                                        
13 I should also note that I was intentional in selecting cases that would complicate a simple interpretation on 
the basis of power-origin (i.e. “grass-high cases were successful, and grassroots cases weren’t”). Consequently, I 
was careful to include cases that would perplex my findings. Yet I also knew the limitations of realist evaluation, 
and having multiple cases/programs within one case (as with the last two California grass-high cases) would 
have been beyond the methodological capacity of this small study. Hence, I attempted to be mindful of 
complexity in areas in which I was able to address it confidently.  
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Table A. Overview of Historical Case 
Case Location Power-Origin Social Issue  Description of Partnership 
Project Quest San Antonio, TX Grassroots San Antonio community lost 
5,000 jobs in manufacturing, 
textiles, transportation, 
construction, etc. in the early 
80's, yet experienced job 
growth in other industries. 
Project Quest was an attempt to 
rectify the mismatch of job 
opportunities and skilled 
workers  
Community-based 
organizations, businesses, 
education institutions, 
elected officials  
Padres y Jóvenes Unidos 
(PJU) and the Redesign 
of North High School 
Denver, CO Grassroots Parents and students 
collectively organize with 
education partners to address 
the depleting state of a popular 
local high school is West 
Denver  
Parents, students, school 
administration, education 
partners, local media, local 
elected officials 
PUSH/Excel Nation-wide Grass-high Collective pursuit of excellence 
in education initiated by Jesse 
Jackson 
Parents, students, school 
staff, local program staff, 
national PUSH/Excel staff, 
media, churches, businesses, 
foundations, National 
Institute of Education (NIE), 
US Department of Education 
Promise Neighborhoods Nation-wide Grass-high Improve educational outcomes 
for children in distressed areas 
and reduce generational 
poverty 
US Department of 
Education, local educational 
institutions, faith-based 
organizations, non-profits, 
family and community 
organizations 
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Data & Analysis  
 After selecting the 4 cases, I conducted a systematic study of each case. I first 
searched for articles, books, media pieces, and reports that spoke of and/or 
provided an evaluation of the case. I looked for and focused on material that (1) 
represented the perspective of particular stakeholders within the case; (2) served as 
a program evaluation report for the case; (3) utilized direct quotations from those 
that participated in the activities of the case; (4) provided a detailed account of a 
primary actor within the case. This prioritization led me to secure 7-12 documents 
per case.  
 Once I determined what documents I’d analyze, I used realist evaluation as a 
frame for my first pass through each document. I crafted an analytic question 
outline that summarized questions around the realist evaluation (Pawson & Tilley, 
1997, 2004) conceptualizations of context, mechanisms, outcomes, and theory of 
change that I would consider as I read through each case document (See Table A -1st 
Phase Analytical Questions Outline). In particular, I used the descriptions of the 
realist evaluation codes in Pawson and Tilley (2004) to develop and abstract 
specific questions that could be used to answer as to how a code would operate in a 
program/initiative/policy.  
 For example, as Pawson and Tilley (2004) describes context as “those 
features of the condition in which programs are introduced that are relevant to the 
operative of the program mechanisms”, I began to think of questions that would 
help to identify such contextual features (p. 7). Hence, questions such as “what is the 
case?”; “what is the social issue the program is addressing?”, “what is the program / 
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intervention being used?”; “who and how are people involved throughout the 
program’s course?” all deemed as relevant and critical questions to ask within each 
case in order to understand its contextual features. I repeated this exercise for the 
mechanisms, outcomes, and theory of change codes.  Once I constructed the outline, 
I then went through each document I collected for each case and coded them using 
this outline and framework.  
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Realist 
Area of 
Focus 
Theory of Change Context Mechanisms Outcomes 
Attending 
Questions 
 What’s the broad theory 
of change, and where 
does this theory draw 
from?  
 What was the theory of 
action, hunch, 
expectation, or rationale 
for why this 
program/intervention 
might have worked?   
 
 What is the case?  
 Where did the action originate? 
(geographic location) 
 What is the power-origin of the 
action? (grass high/grassroots/etc.) 
 How is the partnership described? 
(sectors involved, description of 
organizational and community 
collaborators) 
 What is the social issue this case is 
addressing?  
 What are the a priori outcomes the 
collective group is hoping to achieve? 
(general or specific) 
 What is the program/invention being 
used? (generated or applied 
intervention)  
 How were people involved 
throughout the program’s course? 
 Who was involved in the program? 
What role, knowledge, and resources 
did they bear individually? What 
influence, knowledge, and resources 
did they bring as a representative of 
their sectors/institutions?  
 How do individuals relate to each 
other within the program? 
 How are individuals visualizing the 
work? 
 
 What are the actual 
doings of individuals 
involved in the program?  
 What tactics/methods do 
they employ to reach 
their desired outcomes?  
 In what ways are 
partners and leaders 
choosing to build their 
program/intervention?   
 
 What leads to successes 
and failures along the 
program’s course? How 
do these successes and 
failures point to the 
program’s collision with 
the context, and its initial 
desired outcomes?   
 How do the expected 
outcomes compare to 
actual outcomes?  
 What argument was 
made around measuring 
the “right” outcomes? (i.e. 
does it seem like the 
outcomes the program 
aspired to were the right 
outcomes to measure? If 
no, why not, and what 
seems to be missing?)  
 How well does the theory 
of action/program 
rationale appraise to the 
outcomes that are 
observed? 
 
Table B. 1st Phase Analytical Questions 
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 After coding, I then reconstructed a narration of each case using statements 
regarding the theory of change as central points of the case. Given that all the codes 
during this analysis phase foregrounded questions regarding what works, for whom, 
in what circumstances, and why (realist evaluation [Pawson and Tilley (2004)]), I 
narrated each case from this realist perspective, showing how various aspects of 
context and mechanisms supported and/or challenged each theory of change 
statement.  
 Once each case was reconstructed using my initial analytic questions/realist 
framework, I then considered both the initiative’s intended outcomes and the 
outcome of interest for this study (collective commitment). As each case document 
had already been coded with the realist framework, my second pass through the 
material focused on outcomes, or my ‘O’ code. I compiled all the notes from this code 
within the case, first paying special attention to both the outcomes of interest that 
emerged from the case. In particular, I noted how the case accomplished, or failed to 
accomplish, its desired outcomes, how outcomes aligned with individual and 
collective visions for the project, as well as how expected outcomes compared to 
actual outcomes.  
 Asking these 1st phase analytic questions also allowed me to consider and 
look for evidence of collective commitment. Understanding the CMOs of each case 
supported me in constructing a theory on collective commitment, specifically 
looking for contributors, detractors, and sustainers of a group level commitment. I 
recognized that the notion of collective commitment represented a higher inference 
concept, and most often would not be explicitly named or explained in the original 
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case documents. Nonetheless, the act of using the realist evaluation (Pawson & 
Tilley, 1997, 2004) coding scheme gave me the opportunity to look for collective 
commitment while engaging in coding of the original documents. Consequently, I 
consistently asked myself how collective commitment was functioning, noted if and 
how authors were talking about commitment, and looked for instances of 
disconfirming evidence towards the notion of harnessing collective commitment as I 
parsed through the original documentation (Erickson, 1985).  
 Erickson (2012) characterizes this process as analytic induction, which is a 
“…recursive process of reviewing evidence with an assertion in mind” and “revising 
the assertion in light of the evidence”, and reviewing the evidence again (p. 1460). 
As such, using analytic induction enabled me to systematically detect patterns 
across cases in which (1) groups were able to align and draw on individuals’ beliefs, 
values, and ideologies towards collective goals and outcomes, and (2) the group 
environment helped to develop, contribute to, and sustain (or failed to develop, 
contribute and sustain) collective commitment. Whereas this process differs from 
directly coding one’s original data, it allows the researcher to recognize patterns of 
variation of groups, actions, and opinions even within a particular phenomenon, 
make inferences, and use the data to challenge and modify their inferences.  
 I used memos to name environmental features (i.e. trust, vision, and space to 
learn) and document patterns I saw, and tested the veracity of these features within 
each case. These environmental factors represented “the conditions under which 
specified outcomes occur, and the mechanisms through which they occur” (George 
& Bennett, 2005, p. 31). I then began to formulate positive statements that explicitly 
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stated what served as evidence for each of these statements. For example, within 
trust, I made note that trusting environments within the cases were places where 
individuals could share their thoughts, feelings, and insights with the group 
believing they will be heard and acknowledged, places where individuals were 
willing to be honest about the collective work (i.e. where the initiative is heading, 
leadership, decision-making process, etc.), and the group would be open to listening 
and grappling with thoughts and concerns of those within the group, among other 
positive indicators. This led to an iterative process of theory development on 
collective commitment, which I ultimately organized into 2nd Phase Analytical 
questions (see Table B). I then used this conceptualization to trace and explain the 
development of collective commitment within each case, and convergence and 
divergences across cases.  
 After I constructed the 2nd phase questions, I then analyzed how trust, vision, 
and space to learn contributed to the development  (or stasis of) collective 
commitment. As with the first phase, I went through my written cases and 
annotated using indicators from the 2nd phase analytical questions. In addition, I 
looked for evidence as to how race and power was represented and negotiated in 
the process of achieving (or not achieving) collective commitment. I also used a data 
matrix to organize and synthesize my findings. 
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Collective Commitment Contributors  
General inquiries: How is collective commitment formed? What are contributors, detractors, and sustainers of collective 
commitment?  
Critical Factor Trust Vision Space to Learn 
Definition 
The security individuals feel and 
have in the group and overall 
initiative, and the belief that 
they can work openly and 
honestly within their group 
space 
A clear idea of what the initiative is 
about, why it exists, and what the 
group is attempting to do reach its 
desired outcomes 
The time and capacity for the group to grow (individually 
and collectively) in knowledge and understanding of the 
problem, context, barriers, and each other.  
STL encompasses the meaning individuals attribute to 
the collective space, as relationships and interactions 
contribute to a development of personal and group 
identity. STL allows for learning through doing, and 
making missteps without harsh consequences.  
Evidence 
 Individuals share their 
thoughts, feelings, and 
insights with the group 
believing they will be heard 
and acknowledged 
 Individuals are willing to be 
honest about the collective 
work and each other (i.e. 
where the initiative is 
heading, leadership, 
decision-making process, 
mistrust of another, etc.) 
 Group is open to listening 
and grappling with thoughts 
and concerns of those within 
the group 
 Group has confidence in the 
vision for the initiative 
 Group has confidence in the 
leadership for the initiative 
 Group has clear idea of 
outcome, goal, ideal, and 
strategy that they’re working 
towards achieving  
 Passion and knowledge drives 
pursuit of seeking best course of 
action for group 
 Individuals within the group see 
themselves contributing to 
realizing the vision 
 Group takes time to understand 
the problem before creating a 
solution  
 Group is ‘close enough’ [close- 
aligning mindsets, close in 
communication, may even 
include close in proximity] to 
understand the vision 
 The vision for the space and 
initiative incorporates the 
conceptualization of all group 
members, not just leaders’  
  Individuals are allowed space to take risks, make 
mistakes, and learn from both successes and failures 
 Time is used to pursue what’s important to the group, 
not only select individuals 
 Individuals are willing to learn from group members 
despite potential power differentials 
 Individuals are given space to grow personally in their 
understanding and connection to the problem 
 Leaders and individuals may situate and understand 
their work in context of a historic struggle 
 There is opportunity to reflect and recalibrate as the 
group works towards their vision and desired 
outcomes  
 Leadership supports and encourages their own 
learning and others’ knowledge, and promotes 
wanting to learn through the process of development 
 Competition does not impede adaptive learning  
Table C. 2nd Phase Analytical Questions
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 I conducted this two-phase analysis for each case, alternating between 
completing a grassroots and grass-high cases. I then went back into each case with 
the 1st phase analytical question outline with the intent of answering the 
overarching first research question (How does collective action work, for whom, in 
what circumstances, and why when addressing large social problems?) to complete 
the cross-case analysis sections. I annotated the cases I had written, looking for 
themes and evidence regarding contexts, mechanisms, and outcomes. I abstracted 
the themes and evidence and used a data matrix to organize and analyze my 
findings with respect to the questions and categories in Chart A. While each case 
narrative provides rich description of case particularities, the analysis following the 
grassroots and later grass-high cases looks to characterize and compare these 
features via a lens of collective commitment (with respect to the characterizations in 
Table B) and answer the second research question (How does collective commitment 
connect to the success [or lack of success] of the collective action pursued by cross-
sector partnerships?). The next section provides individual case narratives followed 
by a comparative analysis across all the cases, which explores points of convergence 
and divergence around how these groups pursued collective commitment and 
collective action.
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Case: Project Quest 
Location: San Antonio, Texas 
Type: Grassroots  
 
Overview 
 Project Quest depicts collective action that arises from a community-
organizational base that shifted into a cross-sector partnership and program over 
time. As San Antonio city residents felt the economic ramifications of the closure of 
large manufacturing plants within the city, they also recognized the suburban and 
metro areas around the city had thousands of jobs in other fields such as health care, 
mechanics, and education (Anyon, 2014).  
 Project Quest became the creation of two regionally affiliated community-
based organizations joining together and partnering with San Antonio’s business 
community, local employers, education and job training institutions, the City of San 
Antonio, the city’s regional Private Industry Council, and social service agencies 
(Campbell, 1994). Project Quest organizers, developers, and partners utilized a 
relational organizing approach to understand residents’ experiences, garner 
political will and relational capital, and ultimately push for the creation and 
implementation of a program designed to put people at the center of job training 
education. 
 The goals of the training program included providing community members 
with high quality and better paying jobs, improving the economic vivacity of San 
Antonio, matching the needs of both participants and employers, and aiding 
program participants in becoming more self-sufficient and finding social stability 
(Osterman & Lautsch, 1996). While program evaluations reflected how participants 
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made considerable economic and social gains (as measured by outcomes such as 
increases in hourly wages, decreases in welfare recipiency, increased enrollment in 
college, etc.), the three year development of Project Quest was characterized by 
keen political strategy, leaders’ and residents’ extensive participation in research 
and learning around San Antonio’s labor market and residents’ experiences, and 
tactical partnership building with San Antonio’s business community. The case of 
Project Quest ultimately represents how those who were most affected by the 
breach in the San Antonio’s old order (i.e. the factory closures) shifted to making 
change meaningful enough to for them to transformation individually, and 
ultimately work collectively to create a robust employment training opportunity. 
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Project Quest Theory of Change (TOC)  
TOC 1- The use of individual experiences and transformation are imperative 
towards collective work and change. 
 Context. The vision and creation of Project Quest was initiated by the 
erosion of San Antonio’s manufacturing industry and the resulting economic 
dislocation of San Antonian residents. By early 1990, major factories such as Levi 
Strauss, Roeglein Meat Packing, Miller Curtain, the Kelly Air Force Base, and San 
Antonio Shoe had all closed, draining the city of over 14,000 living-wage jobs.  
 The loss of jobs had the greatest repercussions for San Antonio’s 
economically disadvantaged communities, whom were mostly Latino residents 
living in the city’s south, east, and west sides that often lacked education or 
advanced training (Campbell, 1994; Warren, 1998). Father Jost, a Catholic priest 
widely recognized as the initiator of the conversations that led to Project Quest, 
noted that despite skill-level, people “…got jobs through relationships”, and low-skill 
jobs with moderate wages gave residents an opportunity to achieve a middle-class 
standard of living (Campbell, 1994, p. 4). 
 Both he and Episcopal priest, Father Will Wauters, witnessed the individual 
experiences of their congregants and others, reflecting how job disruption led to 
financial insecurity, family disruption, domestic abuse, drug use, and what they 
considered, hopelessness (Osterman & Lautsch, 1996, p. 7). 
“‘I saw the strains, the burdens, that so many people were under,’ Father Jost 
recalled. Divorces increased. I saw women becoming heads of households, 
not making it on one income. And even when two members of the family 
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might be working, they weren’t making enough money to support a family. 
The result of that was a lot of domestic violence, a lot of drinking, a lot of 
drugs. There was no sense of purpose in life. We saw people trying to work 
through this burden, trying to make a better life for themselves and their 
families and not being able to’” (p. 4).  
 This led both leaders to begin conversations with two community-based 
organizations, Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS) and Metro Alliance, 
in hopes of finding solutions. Both COPS and Metro Alliance had over twenty years 
of experience working on community issues in San Antonio. While COPS members 
were predominately Catholic and Mexican-American, Metro Alliance drew 
constituency from predominately African-American, Latino, and White 
congregations14 (Warren, 1998). 
  Mechanisms. The initial work for Project Quest was built on the existing 
efforts of several community organizations and religious leaders, including COPS 
and Metro Alliance. Nevertheless the insights as to how these organizations and 
alliance should move forward came from the local level, in which COPS and Metro 
Alliance leaders organized house meeting with four to fifteen people that were 
impacted by the plant closings (Osterman & Lautsch, 1996). COPS co-chair Virginia 
Ramirez recounted-  
“When Levi’s closed, people were so upset. It was a tremendous opportunity 
for us to really get people to understand the things that were affecting them. 
                                                        
14 COPS was founded among Catholic parishes in west and south San Antonio where most residents were 
Latino/a.   
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More than anything else, the political will had to be there, and Levi’s gave us 
that” (Campbell, 1994, p. 12) 
COPS and Metro Alliance church leaders committed thousands of hours to 
organizing nearly 300 house meetings during the summer of 1990 (Campbell, 
1994). During these meetings, leaders listened to community members’ accounts of 
job displacement, and also heard about their experiences with current or prior job 
training programs. House meetings provided leaders opportunities to reconnect 
with their neighbors, and draw valuable insight as leaders listened to community 
members’ accounts of job displacement, and also heard about their experiences with 
current or prior job training programs. Common experiences included increased 
indebtedness, feeling their training certification was worthless, and inability to find 
work after the training program was over (Campbell, 1994; Osterman & Lautsch, 
1996). The meetings also served as a mechanism to build the political will of the 
community they would later need to collectively create a cohesive program plan and 
participate in the demand of city funding (Campbell, 1994). 
 As leaders carried out research actions and conduct house meetings, they 
found that house meetings changed from spaces where they simply listened to their 
neighbors’, to spaces where leaders were also teaching community members about 
evidence of possible changes that could be made to address problems many 
community members were facing. Campbell (1994) notes-  
“The meetings transformed the anger over lack of jobs into clamor for job 
training opportunities, and eventually, willingness to sacrifice time and 
money to participate” (p. 17).  
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This fundamental shift from lamenting job loss and employment opportunities to a 
commitment to endorse new training opportunities provided community members 
and COPS / Metro Alliance committee leaders with the ammunition to collectively 
work with community members and local experts in crafting a strategy that would 
change residents current economic and social realities. Hence, the individual 
experiences and transformation underwent through house meetings served as the 
fuel for collective action and change-making.  
 
TOC 2- Find opportunity amidst loss.  
 Context. Although San Antonio’s economy showed signs of decline with the 
loss of manufacturing jobs, this shift was counterpoised by a gain and opening of 
other higher skilled well-paying jobs. Factory closures contributed to 14,000 jobs 
lost, yet 19,000 new jobs within the fields of healthcare, education, auto repair, and 
law research offered job seekers well-paid positions, yet demanded workers with 
higher skills (Campbell, 1994; Osterman & Lautsch, 1996; Rademacher, Bear, 
Conway, Educational Resources Information Center (U.S.), & Aspen Inst. Washington 
DC., 2001). If displaced San Antonioan workers were going to meet the needs of 
employers and the demands of the emerging technology-driven industries and jobs, 
they would need customized training programs. Hence, “Quest was designed to 
bridge the gap between skill and opportunity” (Rademacher et al., 2001, p. 7).  
 Current job training programs were federally funded by Jobs Training 
Partnership Act (JTPA) programs, yet were state implemented (Barnow, 2000). San 
Antonio’s local data of JTPA programs pointed to a broken system, ineffective 
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programming, and negative success indicators. "JTPA programs encouraged short 
term rather than long-term training...” which likely led participants to dead-end and 
low-waged jobs (Campbell, 1994, p. 19). In addition to the short length of 
programming, typical JTPA programs provided trainees with few resources and 
support (Osterman & Lautsch, 1996). Most training programs utilizing JTPA funds at 
this time did not provide substantial financial supports such as childcare, 
transportation, emergency rent/utility/phone funds, clothing for professional 
engagements, nor specialized academic or social support via counseling. 
Consequently, economically disadvantaged youth and adults often could not afford 
to take on training (Warren, 1998, p. 9) 
 Mechanisms. In addition to conducting house meetings, initiative leaders 
organized and educated themselves in order to push their efforts forward. In spring 
1991, COPS and Metro Alliance leaders formed a 40-person job training committee, 
which met bi-weekly for two years (Campbell, 1994; Osterman & Lautsch, 1996). 
These core leaders dedicated their time to researching the San Antonio’s economic 
trends and previous and existing local job training efforts.  
 Findings showed the city’s loss of low-skilled jobs was being accompanied by 
new high-waged jobs that also required high-skill (Rademacher et al., 2001). Hence, 
San Antonians needed help obtaining the new high-skill jobs that were being 
created. Committee leaders saw that training for future jobs presented an 
opportunity to secure good jobs for city residents (Campbell, 1994). 
 Furthermore, the joint committee researched and identified potential 
funding that could be applied to job training programs. Should they pursue job 
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training, leaders estimated they would need $5 million in public funds to sustain the 
program for at least two years (Warren, 1998). They learned that they could apply 
federal JTPA funding to their potential program, but federal funding came with 
restrictions that would limit how monies could be spent. COPS and Metro Alliance 
would have to work with regional leaders to lobby for additional local and state 
funding that would provide for a more innovative and flexible program strategy 
(Rademacher et al., 2001).  
 
TOC 3- Relational organizing can strategically build community and political 
capital for politically challenging collective action.  
  Context. Both COPS and Metro Alliance were affiliates of a larger regional 
organization, Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF). As part of the nation’s largest faith-
based organizing network, the southwest IAF network founded COPS, and was 
credited with building COPS into the most powerful community organizing group in 
the county (Warren, 1998). IAF’s southwest network developed through state 
campaigns, conventions, and close partnerships with its local arms such as COPS 
and Metro Alliance. IAF affiliates were supported by their regional network in 
successful campaigns on school reforms, reconstruction of affordable housing, 
urban infrastructural development, community policing programs, college 
scholarships and job opportunities for high school graduates (Campbell, 1994; 
Warren, 1998). Consequently, “the Project Quest campaign…occurred in the context 
of the most developed IAF regional network” (Warren, 1998, p. 81).   
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 The initial stage of change-making for Project Quest was undergirded by the 
regional efforts of IAF. Within the southwest network of the IAF, regional director 
Ernesto Coretz directed a staff of 45 that worked with 17 local affiliate organizations 
(Warren, 1998). Warren (1998) also notes that Cortez’s well-structured regional 
network was the largest and most sophisticated organizing network, and did not 
have many competing community-based or party-based organizations within the 
region. 
 Mechanisms. IAF intentionally used a relational organizing as a political 
strategy to connect community building and political action towards the end 
creating change for residents in San Antonio (Warren, 1998). According to Warren, 
“relational organizing involved the deliberate building of relationship for the 
purpose of finding common ground for political action”, and works best when 
institutions within the context allow for discussion amongst diverse communities as 
well as across and between levels of power (Warren, 1998, p. 86).  
 The IAF supported and undergirded the local action of COPS and Metro 
Alliance by this strategy to develop the capacity of local leaders, garner support and 
commitments from political and business leaders, and build the local community’s 
political relationships (Warren, 1998). In spring 1990, the IAF chose to make job 
training and workforce development its primary issue focus (Campbell, 1994). 
Regional leaders also organized meetings with leading economist who showed 
leaders data on the shift of industry and job availability within the city (Warren, 
1998, p. 83). 
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  In addition, the IAF also supported COPS and Metro Alliance leaders in 
meeting with local employers and the San Antonio business community. As with 
house meetings, IAF leaders used small business meetings to not only listen to 
employers, but educate them on the possibilities of a new training program that 
could fill gaps in hard-to-staff positions (Campbell, 1994). “They [IAF leaders] 
started by gaining the involvement of a few influential employers and then 
leveraged their commitment in larger meetings of business leaders” (Osterman & 
Lautsch, 1996, p. 8).  
 As COPS and Metro Alliance leaders had worked with experts and employers 
to identify local high-skilled jobs that were available and under-staffed, regional and 
local leaders were endeavoring to craft a program that would directly meet the 
needs of these employers by specifically training graduates for these positions. IAF 
and COPS/Metro Alliance leaders leveraged the connections of a converted ally and 
local banker, Tom Frost, to call a meeting with 40 of the city’s local employers 
(Campbell, 1994; Osterman & Lautsch, 1996; Warren, 1998). IAF leaders insisted 
that employers commit to hiring Quest graduates for these jobs in exchange for 
skilled employees (Warren, 1998). Business leaders were reluctant to do so at first 
(Campbell, 1994). Yet IAF, COPS, and Metro Alliance leaders’ persistence, 
confidence, and extensive research convinced business leaders that the group “had 
done their homework on job training” and “earned a place at the table” (Campbell, 
1994, p. 19). By July 1991, the business community committed 650 jobs to Quest 
graduates (Warren, 1998).  
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 The IAF also used relational organizing as a tool to garner political support 
for Project Quest. As San Antonio’s mayoral election coincided with the time span of 
research, business, and house meetings, the IAF strategically sought to pressure 
mayoral and city council candidates in support of funding for Project Quest. 
Gubernatorial candidate Ann Richards was invited to address the over 10,000 IAF 
members at its spring convention in Texas (Campbell, 1994). COPS and Metro 
Alliance churches hosted a series of highly attended accountability nights with 
candidates, where most candidates voiced public support for the new program 
(Warren, 1998). When the newly elected mayor defaulted on providing committed 
funds to the project, IAF organized well-attended rallies at city council meetings, 
demanding promised funds. 
 It is also crucial to note the positioning of the IAF as an intermediary 
institution. Given its position as a regional organization, it provided national, state, 
and local resources and networks that could be leveraged to support local action.  
Hence, using relational organizing along with aligning multiple levels of organizing 
with significant support from an intermediary organization proved to be a 
significant catalyst for change.  
Outcomes 
 After garnering the commitment across multiple sectors and partners, the 
joint COPS and Metro Alliance committee contracted Bob McPhereson, an 
employment and training expert from the University of Texas, and Brian Deaton, an 
employment expert from the federal Department of Labor, to design Project Quest  
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(Osterman & Lautsch, 1996, p. 9). The dual team worked with IAF, business, and 
political leaders to produce a program centered around the San Antonio’s residents 
and labor market (Campbell, 1994). Key principles of the program included:  
 Providing extensive financial and personal supports for trainees for the 
duration of time enrolled in the program. Project Quest envisioned a “long 
term and substantial investment in its clients”, and aimed to address the 
myriad of barriers trainees faced during skill acquisition (Osterman & 
Lautsch, 1996, p. 1; Rademacher et al., 2001) 
 Tying the program to industry and labor market demands from local 
employers and ensuring the post-training jobs offered were living-wage pay 
and offered opportunities for advancement 
 Continuing strong ties to the community organizations that initiated the 
work and local resources (Osterman & Lautsch, 1996; Warren, 1998).  
 At operation, Project Quest would run as a two-year job-training program 
that trained participants in skilled occupations that were strongly tied to the 
“occupational demands of local employers” (Rademacher et al., 2001, p. 13). The San 
Antonio Works Board voted to apply $2 million of JTPA funds to the program, as it 
had already received the commitment of guaranteed jobs through the business 
community (Campbell, 1994). Hence, the restrictive JTPA funding, the non-
restrictive state funding, and local city funding through Community Development 
Block Grant funds would finance the program during its initial years.  
 Early committee work at the regional and local level recognized job training 
as an appropriate response to the plant closings across San Antonio (Warren, 1998). 
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Yet leaders sought to challenge and strengthen this idea through relational 
organizing and listening to those with power (i.e. well-known economist and 
business leaders) and those without (i.e. neighbors and community members) 
(Campbell, 1994). The development and implementation of a demand-driven job-
training program also reflects perspective of local community members, and how 
the capacity of multi-sectors could address them (Rademacher et al., 2001). 
 Long-Term Outcomes. January 1993, Project Quest enrolled its first 140 
program participants at Alamo Community College District campuses. By June 1994, 
650 participants were enrolled (Campbell, 1994). Campbell (1994) notes that one 
important lesson learned during Project Quest’s first year was the “…essential role 
played by social services such as child care, income support and counseling. The 
services and stipends it provides are keeping participants in school and in training” 
(46).   
 In spite of knowledge gained from this lesson, Quest was denied further 
funding through JTPA in 1995, and this led to a reduction funding for stipends that 
could be used for support services, and a reduction in the counseling staff. 
Consequently, the program instituted a new enrollment limit to 100 participants. 
Whereas secondary sources include supportive testimonials from program 
participants about Quest’s ability to “cause real change in a person’s life”, and the 
program’s tested ability to substantially impact annual earning of participants, 
institutional and business support and funding for the program lacked, causing 
program leaders to cut back on services (Campbell, 1994, p. 49; Osterman & 
Lautsch, 1996). 
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Case: Padres y Jóvenes Unidos (Parents and Youth United) 
Location: Denver, Colorado 
Type: Grassroots  
Overview 
 In 2002, Denver Public Schools (DPS) served 71,972 students. 1,541 of those 
students attended North High School ("Fall 2002 pupil memebership by district, 
school, and grade," 2002). 85% of North High School students and families were 
predominately Latino, many of which were immigrants and spoke English as a 
second language. Yet North High’s academic standing was particularly alarming. 
With a publicized graduation rate of 60%, North was consistently low performing 
("Colorado department of education graduation and completer rates for the class of 
2002," 2002). Only 15% percent of students were proficient or advanced in reading, 
and only 2% were proficient in math (Warren & Mapp, 2011; Warren, Mira, 
Nikundiwe, & Mapp, 2012). Moreover, when accounting for attrition rates between 
over the four years of high school, Padres and Jóvenes Unidos (PJU) calculated that 
graduation rates were more reflective of 38% (Warren et al., 2012). 
 This is the context in which PJU’s campaign for North High School begins.  Yet 
historically, PJU sees themselves as growing out of the Chicano movement of the 
sixties, and deeply connected to Denver’s 1960 student walkouts, in which Chicano 
students protested against discrimination (Freeman, 2015). Padres Unidos was 
formally established as a community-based organization in 1989 when Latino 
parents organized and protested in response to a White principal punishing 
Spanish-speaking students by forcing them to eat lunch on the floor (Fernández, 
Kirshner, & Lewis, 2016). The North High School campaign presents the first 
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campaign in which Padres Unidos formally included youth in its work, and the 
group was renamed Padres y Jóvenes Unidos. Yet even as a newly minted group, PJU 
still maintained strong roots in the struggle of the past, and the use of traditional 
mechanisms “of the historical struggle for human rights [remained] at the heart of 
the work…” (Warren & Mapp, 2011, p. 133). 
 This PJU case presents an illustration of an initial partnership between 
parents, students, administrators, teachers, educational intermediary agency, that 
later shift to a PJU-led predominately Latino multi-sector partnership. This shift 
(among other mechanisms) caused great conflict between PJU and Denver’s primary 
teachers’ union, and what Shirley (2016) cites as a common “outright animosity” 
that can spring up between community-based organizations and teachers unions (p. 
46).  
 Whereas the North High campaign ends in a decision to redesign the school 
(an instance in which teachers are required to reapply for their jobs), outcomes post 
redesign make for a thought provoking consideration on the limits of systematic 
change. 
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PJU Theory of Change (TOC) 
TOC 1: Intergenerational organizing provides a powerful foundation for 
current and future change. 
 Context. As mentioned, PJU was originally a parent organization (Padres 
Unidos), founded by six parents who met voluntarily to support each other as they 
and their children navigated Denver’s public school system. Warren and Mapp 
(2011) suggest that “the relationships that parents in Padres Unidos formed with 
one another would ultimately be crucial to education reform in Denver, as many of 
the organization’s members and supporters would go on to become leaders in the 
community, including members of the city council and the school board” (p. 103). 
This proved true as they successfully organized their initial campaigns around a 
principal’s maltreatment of Spanish-speaking students at Valverde Elementary 
School in 1997, a federal case against Denver Public Schools for racial bias and 
discrimination, which resulted in a ruling in PU’s favor, and the high rate of 
suspensions at Cole Middle School. The Cole Campaign particularly taught PU 
parents about the importance of youth organizing, and “tapping into a long tradition 
of intergenerational organizing in the Chicano and civil rights movements”(Warren 
et al., 2012, p. 4). 
 Mechanisms. With this lesson in mind, in 2002 PU parents began the North 
High Campaign by distributing surveys to North High students. The surveys served a 
dual purpose of gathering students’ thoughts on their education and experience at 
North, and a means to recruit youth to join PU. Youth unquestionably had deeper 
access to the school, as well as peer relationships with those that were experiencing 
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the problem (Warren et al., 2012). As students became more interested and 
involved in the survey, the organization was renamed Padres y Jóvenes Unidos to 
capture the work of the new youth contingency. PJU youth redrafted and created 
their own version of the surveys and distributed them during lunchtime and class 
time with permission of teachers and administrators (Shirley, 2016; Warren & 
Mapp, 2011; Warren et al., 2012). For some North High students, the survey was the 
first time they were asked to contemplate the quality of their education. Teachers 
were also supportive of survey distribution, as the youth that were now working 
with PJU were seen as “leaders in the school” (Warren & Mapp, 2011, p. 110). 
 Final outcomes reveal that students suffered stark repercussions and 
backlash from North teachers and administrators for their participation in PJU 
during the North Campaign. Yet intergenerational organizing taught both student 
and parent leaders the power of working together as part of a long history of 
struggle, and the importance of grooming young organizers who would eventually 
be “the future fighters for equality” (Warren & Mapp, 2011, p. 109) 
 
TOC 2: Organizations can use political education to educate community 
members and fashion strategies to counteract systematic oppression. 
 Mechanisms. By spring of 2003, PJU had collected nearly 700 student 
surveys. That summer, PJU youth and organizational leaders dedicated their efforts 
towards analyzing survey results. Their findings reveled that only 38% of 9th 
graders that entered North graduated within four years. Moreover, while 98% of 
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students stated they wanted to go to college, only 56% said they felt prepared to do 
so (Warren et al., 2012). 
 Youth organizer Amy Beres used a participatory action research process to 
help PJU youth and parents grapple with the collected data. Yet PJU leaders also 
engaged youth and parents in ‘political education’, their primary method for 
organizing. Conceptually, PJU sees political education as “…the mechanism by which 
the members and staff get to examine what impacts structural inequities and power 
structure have on their day-to-day lives”(Warren & Mapp, 2011, p. 108). It also 
focuses on connecting personal experiences with structural inequity to historical 
struggles.  
 Warren and Mapp (2011) provide a clear example of how PJU applied 
political education to their practices-  
“It [political education] occurs during an established meeting time, where a 
topic- such as machismo, racism, feudalism, colonialism, or immigration law- is 
introduced and people are then split into small groups to discuss the root causes 
of that particular topic…The staff or members in attendance then examine PJU’s 
current organizing work as it relates to the political education topic, which help 
them deepen their analysis and understand how their work is tied to the long-
term struggle for human rights” (p. 106).  
Political education also provided a foundation for using the “Padres Approach”, a 
strategy the organization used to understand problems and act on them. The 
“Padres Approach” included (1) understanding the problem, (2) analyzing the 
impact, (3) identifying concrete solutions. That summer, PJU youth engaged in 
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political education in the morning, and survey analysis in the evenings. They drafted 
a report with recommendations and solutions to the issues the survey revealed. 
Using the Padres Approach, they identified their first concrete solution as sharing 
their results and recommendations with North’s school administration, and 
demanding a school reform committee.  
 Youth demands for a reform committee were met with the administration’s 
pacification, avoidance, and deflection. Given this response, PJU held a community 
night with parents, community members, and others to explain the strategy for 
using media to expose the survey findings, and compel power-holders to take action 
(Warren & Mapp, 2011; Warren et al., 2012). PJU then held a press conference 
publicizing the findings from the report.  
 Context. The media attention soon brought feelings of mistrust and betrayal 
amongst teachers and students. Teachers felt betrayed, as they [North High 
teachers] had “signaled their willingness to work with PJU by distributing surveys in 
their classes, taking time away from instruction” (Shirley, 2016, p. 54). Moreover, 
PJU youth were being alienated and even harassed for exposing the school’s issues 
(Shirley, 2016; Warren & Mapp, 2011). In support of the students and the report, 
PJU “…gathered over 600 signatures from parents petitioning the Denver Public 
Schools to form a reform committee to develop and then implement a plan to 
improve North High School” (Shirley, 2016, p. 53). A committee finally formed two 
years following the survey distribution.  
 “For the next two years, PJU staff and members worked in collaboration with 
the administration and some teachers at North High School with the purpose of 
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improving the learning conditions and opportunities for all students at North, 
particularly Latino students” (Shirley, 2016, p. 53). Initially, the reform committee 
presented yet another challenge in community representation, and equal voice 
between those with power (i.e. administrators) and those with little power 
(community members). Moreover, administrators made attempts to control the 
meeting agendas and speaking time. Yet after attending a conference with Education 
Trust and seeing the alignment between missions, PJU, reform committee members, 
and school administration agreed to raise funds to bring Education Trust to North 
High school to help with reforms.  
 Mechanisms. The Education Trust came to Denver and worked with 
teachers and administrators in reviewing curriculum, and conducting series 
professional development. According to the educators involved, North High was 
making steady gains towards school improvement. “In response to the suggestions 
by the Education Trust, [a North High teacher] noted that they had created and 
implemented a Freshman Academy in addition to the Summer Enrichment Academy 
to help increase the achievement levels and test scores…. they were also adding 
additional AP classes…” (Warren et al., 2012, p. 9). Nevertheless, PJU youth and 
adults decided that these changes were not enough.  
 PJU held a different perspective.  They viewed the changes made as “too 
incremental”, and assessed that “teachers were not on board, and systemic change 
was not happening at the school-wide level. Ultimately, PJU concluded that this 
process would never lead to large-scale culture change where children of all racial 
and ethnic backgrounds were valued and respected” (Warren & Mapp, 2011, p. 
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116). Julie Gonzales [a PJU youth organizer] stated, “we went from 6% proficiency to 
11% proficiency; that’s so sad…these are minor little ticks. We need to see 30% -
40% gains on the Colorado Student Assessment Plan, and that’s not happening” 
(Warren et al., 2012, p. 9).  
 Consequently, PJU assessed that low teacher expectations were the root 
cause of students’ low achievement (Shirley, 2016). After two years of engaging in 
reform committee meetings and a partnership with Education Trust, PJU students 
and adults partners stopped attending reform meetings (Shirley, 2016; Warren & 
Mapp, 2011). Given this, the organization decided they would call for redesign of 
North High School, which would force the revision of the curriculum and for 
teachers to reapply for their jobs. Karen Ursetta, president of Denver’s teachers’ 
union was unsure of why PJU stopped participating and collaborating with the 
group, and instead chose to pursue redesign. “No one would disagree that things 
need[ed] to change in our high schools,” she stated. They need[ed] to change. And 
there [are] ways that you can bring people along and have everyone working 
together, or you can throw the bomb, and let it explode, and I think that they [PJU] 
chose to throw the grenade” (Sherry, 2007; Warren et al., 2012, p. 10).  
 
TOC 3: If we create a cross-sector coalition with individuals who are connected 
to Chicano struggles, we’ll realize the change we desire. 
 Context. The decision to pursue redesign placed a rift between PJU allies and 
teachers both at North and a part of the teachers’ union. Many teachers believed 
they had become scapegoats, and preferred the collaborative efforts the reform 
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committee had been using. Whereas the 15% gains on standardized assessments 
seemed “good enough” to teachers, this was not the progress PJU was looking for, 
and they believed “change wasn’t happening fast enough” (Warren & Mapp, 2011, p. 
119). 
 Mechanisms. As a result, PJU looked to its Chicano heritage and created a 
multi-sector collaborative, the Coalition to Save North. As a predominately Latino 
coalition, the Coalition to Save North included Denver business owners, city council 
members, politicians, renowned Chicano organizers, PJU supporters, and others 
who were deeply connected to the Chicano movements. “PJU was explicit about 
limiting the membership to those who identified as allies in the larger struggle 
around the Chicano and civil rights movements“, as they believed these allies 
“understood that brown people were being systematically underserved” (Warren & 
Mapp, 2011, p. 133; Warren et al., 2012, p. 11). Coalition meetings were 
considerably closed as the group crafted their vision for what a redesigned North 
High would look like.  
 Meanwhile, PJU also solidified a partnership with DPS’ superintendent 
Michael Bennet, who ultimately held the power to formally call for the redesign of 
North High School. Bennet had met with the co-directors of PJU during the selection 
process for the superintendent position in 2005. Although he had little experience 
and was the only White candidate, PJU endorsed Bennet for the position, as his plans 
seemed to align with their desires for change (Warren et al., 2012). Moreover, after 
a controversial yearlong closing of a Denver high school that predominately served 
African-American students, PJU provided the superintendent with social and 
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political capital to pursue redesign with community support (Shirley, 2016; Warren 
& Mapp, 2011). 
 After holding a large community meeting to share its vision and proposal, 
PJU organized a press conference at Viking Park to express their demands and 
conditions for redesign of North High School in the summer of 2006. The coalition’s 
demands for redesign included keeping North a non-charter traditional high school, 
and incorporating a college prep curriculum for all students with accelerated and 
advanced placement courses. Yet the organized effort was met with opposition,. 
North teachers and teacher’s union displayed a counter-protest during the meeting, 
as they handed out brochures and pamphlets to attendees outlining the assessment 
gains that North students had made within the last two years (Shirley, 2016; Warren 
& Mapp, 2011; Warren et al., 2012).  
 Students also encountered negative repercussions for participation in 
organizing efforts, just as they had when the survey reports were released. 
According to youth organizer Julieta Quinonez stated that “students ‘got a lot of 
heat’ from teachers, and it that it was the training them through political education 
that bolstered their commitment to the work” (Warren & Mapp, 2011, p. 124). Yet 
“with teachers fearful that they would lose their jobs at a school that many of them 
loved and had made their lives’’ work for decades, and with students’ active in PJU 
anxious that teachers would retaliate against them by punishing them with low 
grades, active mistrust between faculty and students came to saturate everyday life 
at North High School” (Shirley, 2016, p. 54).  
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 The antagonism between PJU youth, adults, and teachers continued as PJU 
shared the Coalition’s proposal and demand for redesign with the school board and 
other community members. Whereas allied parents drafted a letter to support to the 
reform effort, not all the students agreed with PJU. News records of the school board 
meeting record students’ voicing their support for teachers and their disagreement 
for redesign (Sherry, 2007). Although the Coalition to Save North had put together 
their vision for North, “these dissenting voices that raised cautionary notes were 
ignored” as Superintendent Bennet hosted a series of follow-up community 
meetings to gather community insight on redesign (Shirley, 2016, p. 55).  
 These community meetings (later known as the 19 Nights of North) were 
held in neutral spaces. Superintendent Bennet went on record explaining the 
importance of these meetings- 
 “All our staff and Padres and others thought it was important to have a 
series of community meetings in that part of town where we could go out to 
the community- and actually we host it in our schools- which we did on 
purpose because we wanted to get the broadest representation we could 
form the community” (Warren et al., 2012, p. 14) 
PJU adopted the slogan of “College Prep for All”, and used this frame during each 
community meeting to relay the importance of incorporating high standards in 
redesign. The months after the community meetings were filled with indecision, 
lobbied phone calls, and persistent pressure from PJU. Yet in winter 2006, 
Superintendent Bennet formally announced that North High School would be 
redesigned, and teachers would be required to reapply for their jobs.  
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Outcomes 
 Only half of the original North High teachers were rehired the following fall 
when the redesigned high school opened. While many of the teachers felt alienated 
by the reapplication process, those that were not hired at North found other jobs in 
Denver in which they still would be teaching large populations of Chicano/Latino 
students (Warren & Mapp, 2011). In light of their attributed success, PJU was able to 
hire three experienced Union organizers the year after the decision of North’s 
redesign with donor support. Furthermore, as a means to counteract teachers’ 
deficit-frameworks towards communities of color, PJU began conducting trainings 
with pre-service at the University of Denver.  
 Yet the call and pursuit of redesign also reaped unexpected and undesirable 
outcomes.  After organizing efforts in 2002, North High enrollment dropped by 50%, 
and the school experienced several administrative turnovers. According to Shirley 
(2016), “the turbulence created by the school redesign process did not attract 
students and did not retain staff. If anything, morale was worse than ever” (p. 55). In 
2010, North was designated a turnaround school in adherence to the Race to the 
Top turnaround guidelines. By 2012, North was selected to co-locate [traditional 
and charter schools located in the same building] with a charter school with charter 
management operator STRIVE Academies (Shirley, 2016).  
 Youth experiences and struggle during the North campaign must also be 
considered. After the campaign, PJU youth organizers relayed that “organizing work 
can often times be stressful for youth who are on the frontlines of education reform” 
(Warren & Mapp, 2011, p. 131). While PJU adults used savvy techniques to ensure 
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teachers and administrators did not tamper with students’ grades, the campaign 
caused significant mistrust among school community members. On a macro level, 
some have argued that PJU’s pursuit of redesign gave justification to conservative 
educational policies that “place the onus for academic outcomes on teachers”, and 
“dismantle traditional public education, and weaken teachers’ unions” (Shirley, 
2016, p. 56). In all, PJU alleged success with the North High campaign was 
undoubtedly weighed by the unexpected micro and macro repercussions of 
mandatory school reform.  
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Case: PUSH for Excellence (PUSH/Excel) 
Location: Nationwide 
Type: Grass-high Initiative 
 
Overview 
 PUSH/Excel (People United to Save Humanity) is an illustration of a 
charismatic movement that became a grass-high initiative via acceptance of federal 
funding and conditions. As a derivative of Operation PUSH, Jesse Jackson launched 
PUSH/Excel as a grassroots self-help crusade that called upon personal and 
community commitments to motivate urban youth to succeed in academic and 
personal endeavors (Farrar & House, 1983).  
 While demonstrating (and later dismissing) a staged White House protest in 
early 1975, Jackson realized he had to “change his target for reform”, and focus on 
the moral and academic development of Black youth (Farrar & House, 1983, p. 37).  
Hence, in 1976 Jackson began a crusade across the nation, assembling rallies and 
making appearances in stadiums, high schools, and conferences with the financial 
support of foundations and dedicated staff from Operation PUSH. His message was a 
clear call for multi-sector commitment, strong parental and community 
involvement, and an appeal for schools to hold high academic standards. This 
message was grounded in rhetoric of hard work, self-discipline, and qualities that 
would position “Black youth to strive toward solid, middle-class virtues” (House, 
1998, p.25).  
 Jackson’s message and ability to generate large support for the PUSH/Excel 
movement generated local and national attention, including the attention of major 
city school districts (i.e. Chicago, Los Angeles, Denver, and Chattanooga, among 
  81 
others), and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW). During 
EXCEL’s infant years (1976-1977), these local districts allocated their own funds 
and initiated EXCEL programs across their districts. In late 1978, the National 
Institution for Education (NIE) granted PUSH/Excel $445,000 for program and 
conference planning, HEW granted $700,000 for the designing projects across major 
US cities, and the Department of Labor contributed an additional $500,000 (House, 
1988). The federal dollars also came with conditions, including an external program 
evaluation of the PUSH/Excel program sites. Later, the evaluation would prove to be 
a point of contention for stakeholders, funders, and both national and local 
PUSH/Excel workers.  
 Five years after receiving federal funding, PUSH/Excel was struggling to 
secure further funding, lacked the human resources at the national and local 
program levels, and many local programs had disconnected from the national 
agenda (Farrar and House, 1983). Formal evaluations of PUSH/Excel assessed its 
programs as failing as local programs were quickly dismantling.  
 Consequently, the case of PUSH/Excel is a complex instance of how a 
charismatic leader attempted to transform a movement into a program to make 
change for Black youth across the nation. 
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PUSH/Excel Theory of Change (TOC) 
TOC 1- In order to impact systematic change in Black communities, one must 
target youth, and work with and within their systems of support. 
 Context. Operation PUSH was developed in 1971 as an extension of the civil 
rights movement’s ‘Operation Breadbasket’15 (Cashmore, 1992; House, 1988). In 
addition to encouraging Black Americans to exclusively support black-owned 
goods, products, and services, PUSH also used economic pressure (i.e. the threat of 
Black boycott) to impel large companies to eliminate discriminatory hiring 
practices, do business with other minority-owned businesses, and support Black-
owned publications and colleges (Cashmore, 1992; House, 1988). 
 January 15, 1975, Jackson organized a ministerial march around the White 
House in demand of employment opportunities for Black Americans. Yet halfway 
through the march, Jackson ordered everyone to go home (Farrar & House, 1983). 
Cole (1977) describes-  
“The moment was spoiled. The crowd was unruly, it lacked the discipline 
essential to enable unarmed marchers to face armed horsemen…Jackson was 
shocked to see that many of the youthful demonstrators were drunk or 
stoned, red-eyed, and out of control” (p. 378).  
The plan for PUSH/Excel was then developed as an extension of a Black-organized 
pursuit for economic and educational parity, for which Jackson’s main target was 
                                                        
15 Operation PUSH identified as a ‘civil economics’ organization; “…the goal of which was to secure jobs, organize 
those not making a livable wage, and support the growth of black-owned business” (House, 1988). Operation 
PUSH contested for economic parity for Black Americans by using tested tactics from the civil rights movement 
(i.e. boycotts, sit-ins, etc.) (Farrar & House, 1983; Morris, 1986).  
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Black teenagers (House, 1988; Jackson, 1978). PUSH/Excel’s message also entreated 
the participation and support of entire communities, including parents, schools, 
churches, and influential figures (i.e. disc jockeys).  
 Hence, PUSH/Excel was launched as a grass-roots movement built on middle 
class values of self-help, ethical conduct, and personal and community commitment 
(Farrar & House, 1983; House, 1988). Yet critics of the movement-turned-program 
recognized that Jackson’s message was not an education reform plan, and lacked the 
human capital needed (i.e. educators and program managers) to carry out a 
strategic and systematic change. In summary, Farrar and House (1983) note that in 
PUSH/Excel’s infant years-  
“…what existed was an eloquent, charismatic leader of national reputation 
who had attracted a staff of committed followers, considerable public and 
private funding, and several school districts willing to make an attempt to 
translate a self-help ideology into a school program that could regenerate 
Black youth…” (p. 37).  
 
TOC 2- If youth, parents, and school personnel are motivated and make 
external commitments to change, then changed behavior will soon follow.  
 Mechanisms. Despite loose infrastructure and lack of concrete strategy, 
school districts and cities across the nation began to latch on to Jackson’s message. 
By 1979, 22 independent PUSH/Excel programs had emerged and looked to Jackson 
and his national staff for direction (House, 1988).  As Jackson toured the country 
participating in pep rallies and speaking engagements, his theory of change for 
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PUSH/Excel became more evident in his message, actions, and activities of his the 
national staff. The developing PUSH/Excel program maintained that verbal and 
written commitments would create and inspire the needed change for Black youth 
to be successful in school and life.  
 This theory of change manifested in several ways. First, Jackson’s pep rallies 
and speeches ended with a visible public pledge, which students, parents, and 
teachers would sign to commit to a pursuit of excellence. Farrar and House (1983) 
document that “Jackson would come and commence a school rally and have student 
and teachers sign commitment cards, schools would sign on or commit to doing 
Excel activities, “but, the methods that schools used to get the activities under way 
and to increase participation were left to local invention” (p. 41) (Jackson, 1978).  
Student commitment cards reflected a promise to learn, respect authority, and use 
learning time effectively. Parent commitment cards reflected a moral obligation to 
raise and be involved in their children’s lives, and teacher commitment cards 
reflected a promise to being supportive and motivating role models (House, 1988). 
Once pledges were made, school leaders and local program managers would 
determine and implement activities that would allow the community to achieve 
their pledges.  
 While the decentralized approach to the program allowed for local control, it 
did not provide local chapters with guidance and understanding of what a 
PUSH/Excel program entailed.  Eventually the national PUSH/Excel team created 
two booklets with ideas of activities schools could use to sustain that commitment. 
The first booklet included ideas such as “inventive programs, career day forums, 
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“excellence” meetings, yet had no tangible instruction on how to carry out these 
ideas (Farrar & House, 1983).  
 The second booklet proved to be more comprehensive, as it laid out the six 
activities that were at the core of the PUSH/Excel program: the State of the School 
Address, Student Pledges, Parents Pledges, Teacher Pledges, a Written Ethical Code 
of Conduct, Voter Registration (end of students’ senior year) (Farrar & House, 1983; 
House, 1988). “Once Mr. Jackson has spoken and moved on, it [was] up to the local 
PUSH-EXCEL staff, working with teachers and others in the schools, to sustain the 
enthusiasm” and to continue local interventions that would extend on six core 
activities (Fiske, 1981, p. np).  
 As reflected in the six core activities, the PUSH/Excel scheme maintained a 
strategic role for each member of a community. Whereas students, parents, and 
teachers used commitment cards and signed pledges, other institutions were also as 
vital to the success of PUSH/Excel programs. Churches were instructed to provide 
tutoring services and spiritual guidance, businesses were to provide jobs and 
scholarships for young people, and the media was seen as important stakeholder in 
promoting and advertising PUSH/Excel.  
 Theoretically, “if all these practices were followed, the student would be 
embedded in a web of high expectations and support that was mutually reinforced 
by the whole environment” (House, 1988). Youth would begin to transform as each 
community member and institution voiced their commitment and acceptance of 
their prescribed responsibility. Jackson believed communities simply needed a 
stimulus, such as PUSH/Excel, to propel individuals to take on their respective 
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responsibilities. Hence, Jackson’s theory of change was deeply rooted in the notion 
of inspiration and motivation.  In an article written in the New York Times, Jackson 
is quoted saying “I assumed that if we could provide the motivation to get kids into 
the schools and ready to work, then the school would take over from there…I 
learned that it’s not that simple” (Fiske, 1981, p. np).  
 
TOC 3- Meaningful rhetoric of moral discipline will resonate and create a 
fervor for change in urban youth and communities. 
 Context. Jackson’s theory for change heavily relied on the power of 
pontificating, and its reputed effectiveness in producing change. Here, it is 
important to reiterate that PUSH/Excel began as a movement. “At first, PUSH/Excel 
was more a message than a program, and a strongly Calvinist message at that…”  
(House, 1988, p. 26). Cole (1977) describes a typical speech Jackson would deliver-  
“Always Jackson’s sermons mix street talk and rhythms, urban sociology and 
learned the hard way and down-home gospel fire…Children, he says, staff of 
the streets, discipline yourself…Mother’s and fathers, support your child’s 
teachers and principals; raise babies, don’t just make them…Principals and 
teachers, go to church where the parents go, go to the store where they shop. 
Dollars earned in the inner city should be spent there…” (p. 379).  
 Accounts of Jackson’s messages indicate that students and communities were 
captivated by the message, and perhaps more so Jackson’s charisma (Cole, 1977; 
House, 1988; Jackson, 1978). Yet Jackson frequently dodged the critique of using 
“pietistic moralism” to fuel PUSH/Excel, and often explained his ideology as a 
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pragmatic approach, aiming to dismantle the “’…’politics of decadence’, the 
‘diversionary’ evils of alcohol, drugs, and lack of discipline that prevent black people 
from keeping pressure for change on white society” (Cole, 1977, p. 378).   
 Mechanisms. One of Jackson and PUSH/Excel’s leading followers was mass 
media. As a movement, PUSH/Excel attracted the attention of media sources across 
the nation, and also garnered the financial support of the philanthropic community. 
Jackson’s appearances at high schools and stadiums were often found in columns in 
the Chicago Sun-Times, the Washington Post, and the Denver Post, and interviewed 
as a guest on CBS’ “Sixty Minutes” program (Farrar & House, 1983; House, 1998). 
Jackson was often framed as a ‘Black Moses’ who “…launched a national campaign, 
‘PUSH for Excellence,’ to break ghetto patterns of dependence and destructiveness 
and convince children that ‘they have a responsibility to learn as well as a right to an 
education’” (Back Matter, 1978, p. 9). Knowing the capricious nature of mass media 
and his belief in meaningful rhetoric, Jackson’s “…solution was to control and use 
the media to support his own objectives” (House, 1988, p. 33). Consequently, the use 
of media space and attention became a vital mechanism for obtaining buy-in for the 
PUSH/Excel movement and program.  
 
Outcomes 
 The five years after PUSH/Excel received federal funding were wrought by 
tremendous momentum, yet ended in great dispersion. While the momentum of the 
PUSH/Excel movement and Jackson’s vigor led some practitioners across the 
country to believe PUSH/Excel “was going to be around for a long time”, signs of a 
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breakdown in the movement turned program were brought to bear by its third year 
in operation (Cole, 1977, p. 381).  
 PUSH/Excel’s most revealing critique came from the stakeholder evaluation 
that was conducted due to the federal dollars attached to the new program. 
Although evaluation creators opted to use a stakeholder evaluation model to ensure 
the evaluative measures would mutually benefit program managers and funding 
decision-makers, retrospective analysis uncovers that there was likely a mismatch 
between the capabilities of a movement turned program, and the measures that 
were being evaluated (Farrar & House, 1983; House, 1988; Nettles, 1991). Whereas 
students, parents, and teachers signed pledges signaling a commitment to moral 
excellence, the site evaluations measured outcomes such as school attendance, 
achievement (grades), participation in extracurricular activities, and other school 
related behaviors (Nettles, 1991).  
 Furthermore, the decentralized program model was to be used as a 
movement builder. However in practice, the model became a source of division and 
conflict. In Fiske (1981) assessment of PUSH/Excel’s progress, he concludes “the 
program’s most serious operational problem was the lack of practical guidelines for 
the local PUSH/Excel leaders to follow in setting up their own programs. Activities 
varied widely, from ‘academic Olympics to voter registration drives, but they 
frequently lack[ed] coordination and objectives” (np). While some programs, such 
as the Baltimore program, were able to establish itself and pursue the work 
independently with little help and guidance from the national office, many others 
were unable to do the same (Cole, 1977).  
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 Finally, Jackson’s leadership style also served as a point of conflict. As a 
leader, Jesse Jackson profiled to be a controversial figure, and at times despotic in 
his management of Operation PUSH.  Biographic and ethnographic accounts of 
Jackson and PUSH noted that PUSH operations often lacked systematic 
administration, as the organization drifted from issue to issue based on Jackson’s 
interests and decision-making (House, 1998; Reynolds, 1975). “When he [Jackson] 
decided to seek reform among youth, the organization accommodated once more 
and added a new box to its organization chart- this time labeled Push for Excellence” 
(Farrar & House, 1983, p. 39). To this end, some believed that the nationalization of 
PUSH/Excel simply became a fleeting priority for Jackson (Farrar & House, 1983; 
House, 1988)
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Case: Promise Neighborhoods 
Location: Nationwide 
Type: Grass-high Initiative 
 
Overview 
 In 2007, (then) Senator Barak Obama delivered a speech entitled “Changing 
the Odds for Urban America” during his 2008 campaign for the presidency. In his 
remarks, he addressed the issues and connections between generational poverty 
and educational achievement, proposed the political and practical framework for 
Promise Neighborhoods, and promised to create 20 promise neighborhoods across 
the nation if elected. In keeping to this promise, the U.S. Department of Education 
launched the Promise Neighborhood grant competition in April 2010 (Horsford & 
Sampson, 2014, p. 961).  
 “The federal Promise Neighborhoods brings together community partners to 
provide children and families with comprehensive, coordinated support to improve 
results and reverse the cycle of generational poverty” (McAfee & Torre, 2015, p. 37). 
As the model reflects the concept and approach of the Harlem Children’s Zone in 
New York City, Promise Neighborhoods intend to turn neighborhood with 
concentrated poverty into neighborhoods of opportunity through cradle-to-career 
strategies that coordinate cross-sectorial support across health, social, educational 
entities (Comey, 2013). Promise Neighborhood Institute director Michael McAfee 
has explained, “Promise Neighborhoods [are] not just about effectively managing 
the federal program. It’s also about using the resources of the federal program to 
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transcend siloed and one-off responses to complex problems“ (McAfee & Torre, 
2015, p. 40).  
 The U.S Department of Education describes the purpose of Promise 
Neighborhoods as a policy aiming to improve the educational and developmental 
outcomes of youth in the nation’s most challenging communities by 
 “Identifying and increasing the capacity of eligible entities that are focused 
on achieving results for children and youth throughout an entire 
neighborhood; 
 Building a complete continuum of cradle-to-career solutions of both 
educational programs and family and community supports, with great 
schools at the center; 
 Integrating programs and breaking down agency “silos” so that solutions are 
implemented effectively and efficiently across agencies; 
 Developing the local infrastructure of systems and resources needed to 
sustain and scale up proven, effective solutions across the broader region 
beyond the initial neighborhood; and 
 Learning about the overall impact of the Promise Neighborhoods program 
and about the relationship between particular strategies in Promise 
Neighborhoods and student outcomes, including through a rigorous 
evaluation of the program” ("Programs- Promise Neighborhoods"). 
 With this theory of change and approach to community revitalization and 
education reform, the US Department of Education received a total of 720 Promise 
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Neighborhood planning grant applications and 95 implementation grants 
applications over the span of 3 years, with applications representing communities in 
every state including Puerto Rico and American Samoa (Horsford & Sampson, 
2014). As Promise Neighborhoods seek to have a significant increase in the number 
of families and children served by Promise Neighborhood services and programs, 
successful applicants have created long-term plans (i.e. 20 year outlooks), and look 
to use federal government funding to support the neighborhood’s first 5 years 
(McAfee & Torre, 2015, p. 40).  
 As a more recent policy, long-term results and outcomes for Promise 
Neighborhoods are impending. Yet researchers and policy-makers have used 
available data to present case studies and early lessons from pioneering 
neighborhoods. Findings and insights vary from encouraging feedback to pragmatic 
critique. In all, Promise Neighborhoods presents a case of a progressive federal 
administration’s grass-high attempt to address large social issues in distressed 
schools and communities.  
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Promise Neighborhood Theory of Change (TOC) 
TOC 1: If we conduct a rigorous application process that identifies applicants 
that share a vision of interconnected school reform and community change, 
we’ll reap an innovative cadre of Promise Neighborhoods that will implement 
a vision towards school and community improvement. 
 
 Context. Promise Neighborhoods are deemed as the “first federal initiative 
to put education at the center of comprehensive effort to fight poverty in urban and 
rural areas” (Horsford & Sampson, 2014, p. 955). After taking office in 2008, 
President proposed Promise Neighborhoods as a plausible intervention for 
distressed neighborhoods and schools on based on the success of the Harlem 
Children’s Zone model. As the Harlem Children’s Zone had been lauded as a program 
and approach that takes on both neighborhood and individual student success, some 
studies have also shown that “the nonprofit group’s work has closed the 
achievement gap between students in low-income communities and their middle-
class contemporaries”16(Chudnofsky, 2014; Lester, 2010, p. np). 
 The theory of action for programs such as the Harlem Children’s Zone and 
Promise Neighborhoods is grounded in the belief that neighborhoods and 
communities can positively and/or negatively impact student educational outcomes. 
As such, policies in urban and rural areas that address student outcomes must also 
consider ways to mitigate the effects of concentrated and intergenerational poverty, 
                                                        
16 Although studies such as Dobbie and Fryer Jr (2009) highlight the successes of the Harlem Children’s Zone 
particularly in regards to closing achievement gaps, critics such as Whitehurst and Croft (2010) have questioned 
the merit and measures of these studies.  
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health, and other agents that could impede student success (Horsford & Sampson, 
2014). This theory also suggests that agencies, schools, parents, community, and 
other local partners would have greater capacities to serve students if they worked 
collectively and in partnership (Miller, Wills, & Scanlan, 2013). Promise 
Neighborhoods grants were then shaped to aid self-delegated communities and 
neighborhoods create their own versions of the Harlem Children’s Zone (Lester, 
2010). 
 The Obama administration pursued neighborhood revitalization through 
Promise Neighborhoods and a suite of other similar policies grounded in this theory. 
These policies, entitled the Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative, was “an 
interagency federal partnership focused on empowering local communities to 
develop and obtain the tools and resources they need to transform neighborhoods 
of concentrated poverty into neighborhoods of opportunity that support the optimal 
development and well-being of children and families” ("Promise Neighborhoods"). 
Other policies included in the initiative included Choice Neighborhoods, a housing 
and urban development policy linking public housing, education, social services, and 
other services provided by Promise Neighborhoods (Lester, 2010). 
 Mechanisms.  The first Promise Neighborhood grant competition opened in 
April 2010. “To be competitive, each collaborative would need to demonstrate 
convincingly the need in its clearly defined target neighborhood, its plan to build a 
cradle-to-career continuum of solution; intentions to use data and conduct a need 
assessment; the strength of its experience, organizational capacity, and partners; 
and a commitment to work with a national evaluator” (Horsford & Sampson, 2014, 
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p. 959). All Promise Neighborhood applications needed a lead agency, as well as a 
partnership with one of more schools within their neighborhood. One of the 
participating schools had to be low performing (Chudnofsky, 2014).  
 In line with its vision for interconnected school and community reform, the 
rigorous application also required candidates to utilize diverse and multi-sector 
partnerships to achieve its a priori goals. In fact, Miller et al. (2013) note that 
“…Promise Neighborhood funding instigated the diversification of programs’ 
networks by mandating that their governing boards be actively involved in decision-
making”, and “…stipulated that at least one-third of each entity’s board be composed 
of …residents who live in the geographic areas served”; lower-income residents to 
live in the city or county of the neighborhood yet geographically outside the 
boundaries of serviced area; and/or “public officials who serve the geographic area 
proposed to be served” (p. 553). Consequently, Promise Neighborhoods would 
intentionally bring in diverse perspectives to their planning and implementation 
settings, as well as individuals with a range or influence within their respective 
domains. 
 Context. In response to the grant competition, in 2010 the US Department of 
Education received 991 notices of intent to apply. 339 applications were actually 
received, and 21 were selected as the first Promise Neighborhoods (Chudnofsky, 
2014; Horsford & Sampson, 2014; Lester, 2010). Having made the cut and selection 
rate of 6%, these Promise Neighborhoods received planning grants from the 
department with an award of $500,000 each (Chudnofsky, 2014). 
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 Selection patterns and rates continued in similar fashion over the next two 
years. Yet in addition to planning grants, the federal government also made 
provision for implementation grants for those communities who had spent time 
planning and needed funds to execute their plans. “In 2011, Congress approved $30 
million in funding for a second round of planning grants and a first round of 
implementation grants. The funding provided 15 planning grants of up to $500,000 
each (out of 199 applications [7% selection rate]), and five implementation grants of 
$4-$6 million each, over three to five years” (Chudnofsky, 2014, p. 1; Horsford & 
Sampson, 2014). In 2012, 10 communities received planning grants (out of 182), 
and 7 communities received implementations grants (out of 60 applications) 
(Horsford & Sampson, 2014). As of 2014, funding for Promise Neighborhoods 
totaled $100 million, and promise neighborhoods could be found in 20 states and 
D.C. Promise Neighborhoods were represented across 50 rural, urban, and tribal 
communities and included participation of more than 700 schools (Chudnofsky, 
2014). 
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TOC 2:  Commitment to use a framework, data, and evidence-based practices 
will stimulate positive movement and achievement on selected outcomes and 
indicators. 
 Mechanisms. In addition to a rigorous application process, the Promise 
Neighborhood model also required applicants to use several other mechanisms to 
achieve their vision of whole communities and schools. The framework used in 
many communities encompassed collective impact principals and tenants (McAfee & 
Torre, 2015). Generally, “the program’s hallmarks [have been] cross-sector 
partnerships, a seamless continuum of solutions, a common set of ten academic and 
community results that make the biggest difference for low-income children with 
fifteen associated indicators, and shared accountability for results, using real-time 
data for continuous improvement and rapid response when interventions fall short” 
(McAfee & Torre, 2015, p. 38).  
 In particular, the federal initiative partnered with similarly inclined 
institutions to create The Promise Neighborhood Institute at PolicyLink (PNI), a 
guidance agency for Promise Neighborhood applicants and grantees. PNI coalesces 
leadership from PolicyLink, Harlem Children’s Zone, and The Center for the Study of 
Social Policy to provide resources (i.e. planning guides, early lessons, and other 
online resources) and guidance (i.e. consultations and conferences) to cultivate and 
sustain Promise Neighborhoods. As of 2015, the institute has helped more then 60 
communities plan implement their promise neighborhoods (McAfee & Torre, 2015, 
p. 38). In addition, PNI has invested in a national case management system, data 
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dashboard for the network, and integration of these systems to prevent individual 
sites from having to buy data systems (p. 41).  
 PNI’s contribution and use of a national case management system is also 
evident of the initiative’s strong commitment to data usage. Lester (2010) notes that 
commitment to using data was not an unfamiliar approach, as the overarching 
governmental strategy during Obama administration centered around rewarding 
organizations and programs that used data to provide evidence of their success and 
results. Consequently, PNI and other organizational partners created multiple 
guidance documents on how Promise Neighborhoods could collect data and report 
results. Particularly, Comey (2013)- Measuring Performance: A Guidance Document 
for Promise Neighborhoods on Collecting and Reporting Results- provides 
neighborhoods with guidance on how to collect and report on the US Department of 
Education’s Government Performance and Results Act indicators (GPRA)17.  
Reporting on GPRA indicators was a condition for receiving federal funding, and 
Comey (2013) provides strategies for data collection and methods on how to use 
data to improve program quality and achieve results. PNI also assisted in helping 
communities create data-sharing agreements with school districts and other 
agencies who housed individual and neighborhood level data.  
 Lastly, the Promise Neighborhoods model, applicants, and grantees were 
expected to maintain a high commitment to evidence-based practices. In a primer to 
potential Promise Neighborhood applicants, PNI provided detail as to what was 
                                                        
17 GPRAs included 10 results around the cradle-to-career continuum and 15 indicators (i.e. attendance, 
graduation rates, other community-based measures) that would track the progress and overall achievement of 
Promise Neighborhoods ("Early Learning in Promise Neighborhoods," 2016). 
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considered evidence-based practice (EBP) and why these practices were required 
within the application and practice within promise neighborhoods. The document 
argues EBP as a critical mechanism given that the federal government wanted “…to 
invest resources and energy in programs, services, and policies that have empirical 
evidence demonstrating they work”, and “Increasingly, funders are encouraging 
grantees to use evidence-based approaches. The Promise Neighborhoods initiative 
exemplifies this shift” ("Evidence-Based Practice: A Primer for Promise 
Neighborhoods," 2015, p. 1). The primer deemed evidence-based practices as 
practices supported by studies with “strong evidence” and designs that could 
“support causal conclusions”, as well as studies that “include enough of the range of 
participants and settings to support scaling up to the state, regional, or national 
level” ("Evidence-Based Practice: A Primer for Promise Neighborhoods," 2015, p. 2). 
 
TOC 3: Invest in what already exists.  
 Mechanisms. As stated, the framework for collective action used by Promise 
Neighborhoods required applicants to fashion diverse and multi-sector 
partnerships, as well as use shared data, measurement systems, and evidence-based 
practices to support schools and communities within the designated neighborhood 
in breaking cycles of poverty. Yet Promise Neighborhoods were not expected to 
create new programs or projects to support communities in reaching this end. 
Instead, they were expected to use results frameworks in tandem with already 
existing programs, projects, and community leaders.  
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 Michael McAfee, co-director of PNI, was clear about this concept. “A Promise 
Neighborhood, “ he stated, “should not necessarily come in and start its own 
program just because it has federal money and can do that. It should work with folks 
who are ready to co-invest in that result” (McAfee & Torre, 2015, p. 40). Rationale 
for utilizing existing work included a desire for families to co-invest in the 
neighborhood and results, as well as acknowledging the wisdom and experience of 
those in the area that have been working on achieving similar results. In keeping 
with this commitment, “applicants were also required to involve community in the 
plan-making process and make sure that members in the community participate in 
assessing progress towards the project’s goals”, and leadership was encouraged to 
include community members in meetings (Chudnofsky, 2014, p. 9; McAfee & Torre, 
2015). 
 
Outcomes 
 Given that Promise Neighborhoods represent the most recent cross-sector 
initiative within the cases analyzed for my study, it is relatively early to examine the 
overall effectiveness of Promise Neighborhoods (particularly those that received 
planning and implementation grants), although this data should be expected in the 
future (Horsford & Sampson, 2014). Nonetheless, the Center for Study of Social 
Policy created a report to document the strategies of pioneering promise 
neighborhoods, and how and why stakeholders have used these strategies for 
implementation and tracking results ("Early Learning in Promise Neighborhoods," 
2016). They found that that three factors were crucial towards the success of 
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Promise neighborhoods, including (1) strong and trusting relationships among 
initiative leaders and partners, staff, and participating families; (2) institutional 
culture that promotes collaborative partnerships and values the perspective of 
families, providers, and community voice; and (3) alignment with state and federal 
priorities and resources.  
 Moreover, individual case studies of Promise Neighborhoods across the 
nation have emerged with initial outcomes. For example, Horsford and Sampson 
(2014) investigate the Las Vegas Promise Neighborhood, a Promise Neighborhood 
applicant that did not receive a planning grant when it applied in 2011. The authors 
present a descriptive case analysis of the group’s potential to engage community 
capacity building, the pre-application and post-application challenges the group 
faced in pursuing their goals and mission, as well as a descriptive comparison of 
2011 Promise Neighborhood grant applications from urban and tribal settings. They 
find that leadership in tribal promise neighborhoods applications were more 
heterogeneous, but also discover that “efforts to revitalize neighborhoods through 
collaboration, capacity building, resident engagement, local leadership, 
comprehensive support, and sustained and leverages investment” require a 
“fundamental level of community capacity, without which it is nearly impossible for 
low-capacity communities to compete for much-needed capacity building 
resources” (Horsford & Sampson, 2014, p. 985).  
 Similarly, McAfee and Torre (2015) observed through their participation and 
work with Promise Neighborhoods that most organizations did not have the 
resources or capacity to build up and support achievement of the neighborhood (or 
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“population-level”) results they were aiming for (p. 41). Primary findings also 
revealed that the cross-sector nature of Promise Neighborhoods made the internal 
partnerships more prone to instability and “lip service” (Miller et al., 2013, p. 554). 
This assessment mirrors the evaluation of critical scholars such as Smyth (2009), 
who view Promise Neighborhoods as part of “bottom-up programs” that are in 
reality controlled by the state, yet use progressive language (i.e. community, social 
capital, equity) as part of their discourse.  Nevertheless, the “real intent of [of these 
policies, initiatives, endeavors] seems to be to use progressive discourse to veil a 
cost-cutting agenda by the state” (Smyth, 2009, p. 12).  Person (2011) also contends 
that Promise Neighborhoods are unlikely to reach longer-term goals given their 
neoliberal approach.  
 Nonetheless, Promise Neighborhoods continue to subsist even with federal 
administrative changes. While new planning and implementation grants have not 
been available since 2014, PNI hopes that a focus on results will still help promise 
neighborhoods make steady and incremental progress towards community and 
school transformation (McAfee & Torre, 2015).  
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Cross-Case Comparison: Grassroots and Grass-High Cases 
 
 The case descriptions above reflect narratives based on power-origin, 
including two examples of those at the local level working collectively to make 
educational change, and two examples of those in powerful spaces attempting to 
pursue a national agenda for educational change that intends to operate and make 
the most impact at a local level. Here, I draw upon evidence from these four cases. I 
will also note that I will be drawing from individual program level data for the two 
grass-high cases, which include local Promise Neighborhoods and interactions 
between the national and local stakeholders for the PUSH/Excel programs18. This 
evidence enables me to make reliable cross-case comparisons with the individual 
grassroots programs/initiatives I’ve reviewed.  
 
A. How does collective action work, for whom, in what circumstances, and why 
when addressing large social problems?  
 Context. Contextually, both cases present a geographic and historical 
similarity. Project Quest was implemented in the southwestern city of San Antonio, 
and PJU’s work concentrates in the western city of Denver, Colorado. As both cases 
are examples of grassroots approaches to systematic change, these locations prove 
important given the rich history western and southwestern areas have in the 
struggle for human rights. Sources from both cases acknowledge this as well. 
Warren (1998) acknowledges that COPS and Metro Alliance were affiliates of the 
                                                        
18 PUSH/Excel has been reviewed in other evaluations as an example of an attempt to use a stakeholder-holder 
approach within program evaluation (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1983; Farrar & House, 1983; Nettles, 1991). These 
evaluations include a plethora of individual level data, including interview quotes from PUSH/Excel local 
program directors, national PUSH/Excel personnel, and external evaluators. For this reason, I’m able to extract 
individual and collective level data from these data sources as opposed to using individual local program data.  
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southwest Industrial Areas Foundation, the largest faith-based organizing network 
in the county. The southwest chapter was considered IAF’s most developed regional 
network, and had worked with the predominately Latino/a COPS group on school 
reform campaigns, reconstruction of affordable housing, urban infrastructural 
development, community policing programs, college scholarships and job 
opportunities for high school graduates (Campbell, 1994; Warren, 1998). Likewise, 
PJU saw their work as a continuation “of the historical struggle for human rights”, 
particularly growing out of the Chicano movement of the sixties, and deeply 
connected to Denver’s 1960 student walkouts, when Chicano students protested 
against discrimination (Freeman, 2015). Hence, geographic location and its 
connection to a history of organizing for civil and human rights is a contextual 
similarity that contributed towards collective action in both cases.  
 PUSH/Excel shared a commonality with the grassroots cases, as was also 
rooted in a history of struggle and organizing in Black communities. Operation 
PUSH, Jackson’s initial organization, was an advocacy group that campaigned for 
economic parity for Black Americans using tested tactics from the civil rights 
movement (i.e. boycotts, sit-ins, etc.). According to Jackson (1978), the plan for 
PUSH/Excel was developed as an extension of PUSH’s organized pursuit for 
economic and educational parity, and Jackson’s main target would be Black 
teenagers. Hence, the PUSH/Excel movement turned program also held roots in 
community organizing and the struggle for human rights.  
 Yet in contrast to the two grassroots cases, Promise Neighborhoods and 
PUSH/Excel began with significant funding, particularly from federal agencies. The 
  105 
6% of applicants who were granted Promise Neighborhoods planning grants 
received an award of $500,000 each, and Jackson’s PUSH/Excel campaign received 
over $1.6 million to begin programmatic planning and program replication across 
the US (Chudnofsky, 2014; House, 1988). This unique contextual feature enabled 
both initiatives to start their journey with substantial resources, and quickly 
accomplish the outcome of achieving program implementation.  
 Yet another interesting contextual feature of both grass-high cases was the 
preeminence of and race of the initiatives’ leaders. As two highly influential Black 
men, Jesse Jackson and (then) President Obama stood at the forefront of 
PUSH/Excel and Promise Neighborhoods respectively. Whereas the grassroots cases 
were also led by people of color, the high influence and trust these grass-high 
leaders maintained within both Black and White communities later proved to be 
important to the mechanisms used to draw other powerful and influential 
stakeholders to the table during the programs’ early stages.  
 Mechanisms. In analyzing the mechanisms groups used to pursue collective 
action, a number of commonalities and divergences are evidenced. First, both 
grassroots groups drew heavily on the passion and deep emotion of those that were 
experiencing the problem, and directed this energy towards collective action. For 
PJU, the inclusion and later leadership of the youth in the North High Campaign 
evidenced this. The North High campaign began because the parents within PU 
(Padres Unidos) were concerned by the school’s low graduation rates, and students’ 
unpreparedness for collegiate education. Instead of pursuing the campaign 
themselves, they involved North High students in the organization and organizing 
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effort, as they were ones experiencing the problem first hand. Once involved in the 
organization’s surveying of other students, the youths’ passion drew them to not 
only participating, but also leading the campaign effort.  
 In a similar manner, Project Quest committee members and leaders spent 
hundreds of hours in house meetings with those that had been displaced by plant 
closures. Campbell (1994) captures Pat Ozuna’s (COPS’s job training committee co-
chair) thoughts on how house meetings deeply connected to the challenging 
experiences those that had lost jobs-   
"‘You can learn more at a house meeting with 10 people than in a church 
meeting with a hundred people,' Ozuna explains. ‘You talk about what's 
happening with your family, because the people that are sitting around you 
are people like you, and they understand. This is a community that shares, 
and everybody's in the same boat.’"  (p. 13). 
 Both grassroots groups also engaged in extensive research in order to 
position themselves to lead action towards their desired outcomes. COPS and Metro 
Alliance formed a 40-person job training committee across the two organizations 
which met bi-weekly for two years, and dedicated their time to researching San 
Antonio’s economic trends as well as the city’s current and prior job training efforts. 
In all, their research work and house meetings enabled their team to become 
extremely knowledgeable of individuals’ lived experiences in training programs and 
post plant closures, and the demand and employment opportunities of other high-
waged jobs.  
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 PJU’s youth organizers and campaign participants also used extensive 
research to fuel their action. Youth collected nearly 700 student surveys, and used 
participatory action research principles to guide their data collection and analysis. 
Campaign leaders and participants then spent their summer analyzing survey 
results, and gathering cases of high-performing schools that predominately served 
Latino/a populations (Warren & Mapp, 2011). These findings were then placed in a 
report and shared with school and community leaders.  
 Both grass-high cases maintained a number of commonalities, yet also 
diverged in particular ways. First, both Promise Neighborhoods and PUSH/Excel 
maintained a strong belief in the unique contributions of various partners and 
required participants to commit to varied stakeholder engagement. As noted, Miller 
et al. (2013) provide the stipulations set by the government for local Promise 
Neighborhood governing boards, which required a “diversification of programs’ 
networks” and that low-income residents and public officials who serve the 
geographic area be a part of the decision-making process (p. 553).  
 Likewise, Jackson not only set a vision for PUSH/Excel programs which 
maintained a strategic role for each member and sector of a community, but also 
required students, parents, and school personnel who committed to the program to 
sign pledges reflecting their commitment to their role in PUSH/Excel and 
community at large. Lastly, personnel at the national level created and distributed 
guidebooks and instructions to steer the work of local communities. Yet this 
mechanism came with critique from both sides of the spectrum, as many local 
PUSH/Excel local programs found the guidebooks to be too vague, and many local 
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Promise Neighborhoods found they did not have the capacity or resources to create 
and build out the structures outlined in Promise Neighborhood instructional 
material (Farrar & House, 1983; Horsford & Sampson, 2014). 
 Although maintaining points of similarity, the grassroots cases diverged in 
employment of their primary theory of action. Project Quest organized using a 
strategy of relational organizing, which “…involved the deliberate building of 
relationship for the purpose of finding common ground for political action” 
(Warren, 1998, p. 86). In contrast, PJU used political education as their 
“…mechanism by which the members and staff [got] to examine what impacts 
structural inequities and power structure have on their day-to-day lives”(Warren & 
Mapp, 2011, p. 108). Consequently, their focus was not on the developing and 
building relationships, but rather ensuring those involved in the organizing work 
had a similar knowledge base and understanding of the problem.  
 Similarly, PUSH/Excel and Promise Neighborhoods also diverged in some of 
the mechanisms they used to pursue collective action. Specifically, Promise 
Neighborhoods utilized competition and a rigorous application process to reward 
planning and implementation grants to the promising and similarly inclined 
applicants19. In contrast, PUSH/Excel encouraged local programs to pursue 
programming that seemed to best fit their schools. Nonetheless, this decentralized 
approach proved to be a barrier to the development of numerous local programs, as 
many local chapters did not have guidance and understanding of what a PUSH/Excel 
                                                        
19 It is important to also note that the $500,000 grant awarded to each local Promise Neighborhood for planning 
was comparatively minuscule to costs of creating and maintaining the Harlem Children’s Zone (the model 
program for Promise Neighborhoods)(HCZ). HCZ expanded to several blocks over the course of ten years, and 
now maintains an operational budget of $67 million dollars (Person, 2011). 
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program entailed.  Consequently, many local chapters did not progress and closed 
within years of program implementation.  
 Outcomes. These different approaches to change undoubtedly contributed 
to the outcomes all four cases experienced. After two years of working within a 
school-based reform collaborative with the Education Trust, PJU pulled out of the 
effort. After assessing that teachers were not fully committed, maintained low-
expectations for Latino/a youth, and systemic change would never be reached in 
these conditions, they created another cross-sector coalition of allies who were 
deeply committed to addressing the inequities Chicanos faced. They theorized that 
this commonality amongst the new coalition would provide them with the political 
knowledge base and commitment to achieve their desired outcome. While PJU 
ultimately accomplished their goal of redesign for North High School, this was 
achieved at the expense of relationships with teachers, school administration, and 
Denver’s teachers’ union. Moreover, the dissension and breach in trust had long-
term implications, as the school suffered from organizational instability in the years 
following.  
 In contrast, IAF and COPS/Metro Alliance leaders deliberately built 
relationships with high-influence leaders in order to make progress towards the 
creation of a jobs training program. One example of this was their alliance with Tom 
Frost, a bank owner who had opposed COPS’s campaigns in the past. Yet after 
meeting with committee leaders and seeing the opportunities embedded in t a 
program such as Project Quest, Tom Frost agreed to align with the project and 
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leverage his influence with business leaders to arrange the first business meeting 
and ask20.  
 Nonetheless, both groups had clear outcomes they were aiming for. Project 
Quest leaders, committee members, and COPS/Metro Alliance at large knew they 
wanted a training program that could be used to help displaced plant workers 
recoup economic stability and mobility. PJU aimed to address the graduation rates 
and low achievement of Latino/a students at North High. While their strategy and 
aim for redesign was revealed later in the process of the campaign, they 
accomplished their short-term goal of achieving redesign, yet ultimately did not 
realize school transformation.  
 In contrast, neither grass-roots cases fully realized the outcomes they 
intended to accomplish. It’s important to first recognize that within local 
communities, both Promise Neighborhoods and PUSH/Excel quickly attracted 
powerful people to the table. Moreover, as both programs provided or obtained 
initial funding, both programs were able to accomplish the outcome of 
implementing/creating a new program.  
 Despite having the ability and financial resources to quickly begin 
implementation, in both cases, most local communities still proved to be too under 
resourced and incapable of moving towards the large-scale change both initiatives 
were ultimately aiming to achieve. As Horsford and Sampson (2014) conclude, the 
high-order tasks of Promise Neighborhoods (i.e. collaboration, capacity building, 
                                                        
20 I should note that relational organizing was not a substitute or means to avoid confrontation. Throughout the 
campaign, COPS/Metro Alliance protested at city hall when pledged funding wasn’t delivered, as well as held 
accountability nights where those running for office gave an account of their policies and potentially support 
efforts towards a new jobs training program (Rademacher et al., 2001; Warren, 1998).  
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resident engagement, local leadership, comprehensive support) required local 
groups to have a “fundamental level of community capacity”, and this made it nearly 
impossible for low-capacity communities to compete for resources or be successful 
in caring out such tasks (p. 985). Likewise, PUSH/Excel’s decentralized approach left 
local PUSH/Excel leaders without practical guidelines, understanding, and 
objectives for PUSH/Excel activities (Fiske, 1981). Consequently, local activities and 
programs lacked coordination and the majority folded with five years of starting up.  
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B. How does collective commitment contribute to the success (or lack of 
success) of the collective action pursued by these cross-sector partnerships 
aiming to make change in communities of color?  
i. What are the ways in which the partnerships do/do not connect to 
individuals’ values, beliefs, and ideologies; and what are the conditions and 
mechanisms through which those individual commitments are fostered, 
detracted from, or sustained towards the collective level?  
ii. How are race and power represented and negotiated in these collective 
spaces, particularly in the process of achieving collective action and 
commitment?  
 
Collective Commitment Towards Collective Action 
 In addition to reaching their immediate desired outcomes, Project Quest and 
PJU also exemplify cases in which a multi-sector collective group was able to achieve 
solid collective commitment from individuals, and leverage individual commitment 
towards collective commitment to the outcomes they set to achieve. In contrast, 
Promise Neighborhoods and PUSH/Excel struggled to connect to individuals’ values, 
beliefs, and ideologies, and ultimately did not achieve collective commitment. Here, I 
use the three key indicators for collective commitment in early-staged collective 
action to evaluate how these collaboratives did/did not foster collective 
commitment, and the role commitment played towards the initiative’s success or 
lack of success.  
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 Vision.  Perhaps one of the most helpful mediums to Project Quest’s 
achievement of collective commitment was both its vision for a new job training 
program and strategy for collective action. A key contributor (and also sustainer) 
towards this vision was the group’s decision to spend a great deal of time unpacking 
the problem before pursuing solutions leadership had previously explored in 
conversation. Prior to house meetings, IAF staff and organizers had been meeting 
with labor economists about plausible responses to the factory closings (Campbell, 
1994; Warren, 1998). In these initial meetings, leaders and experts observed data 
about the city and determined that the most beneficial investment in San Antonio’s 
job market would be a new jobs training program. However, IAF leaders did not 
follow this insight or vision right away.  
 Instead, they gave the task to local COPS and Metro Alliance leaders who then 
conducted house meetings to gather community members’ insights, and to see if this 
vision matched the experiences and personal visions of community members. COPS 
and Metro Alliance then created a job training committee with 40 local community 
members who committed to spending up to 20 hours on research, preparation, and 
conducting house meetings, exploring current job programs in the city, and meeting 
with city and state officials. The vision of a training program was tested against their 
research and conversations with those that had experienced the problem, and this 
helped them to closely align the vision across the minds of all those involved.  
 House meetings, consequently, were used to “size up the employment 
problem in the city”, foreground the insights and ideas of the broader community, 
and build out principles for the new program (Rademacher et al., 2001, p. 8). As 
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such, individual community and business members soon saw themselves as part of 
realizing this vision. Father Waltuers also commented as to the fervor that fueled 
the vision and ultimately the group’s commitment-  
 “I think the real strength [of the fight for Project Quest] was listening to 
people’s stories and then using that anger. You had a real passionate group of 
folks who wanted not only jobs for themselves, but also a lot of parents and 
grandparents who understood that this is the future for their family and 
community” (Campbell, 1994, p. 16). 
 Race also played a key role in the development of collective commitment 
towards collective action. As mentioned, job loss and economic instability impacted 
San Antonio’s Latino/a communities hardest, as generations of lower-resourced 
Latino/a residents who often lacked education or advanced training relied on 
factory jobs to achieve a middle-class livelihood. Moreover, project leaders were a 
part of community organizations (COPS and Metro Alliance) who predominately 
drew its based from Black and Latino/a communities. Hence, the vast majority of 
participants and those committed to driving the work (i.e. engaging in house 
meetings, protesting at city hall, participating in accountability nights with local 
politicians) were Latino/a and Black.  
 In addition to leaders and participants sharing similar racial identities, 
gender parity also served as an undercurrent for collective commitment and action. 
Women led much of the organizing efforts for Project Quest. Both co-chairs of COPS 
and Metro Alliance were women, and of the 6 individuals on the joint job training 
committee, 4 were women (Campbell, 1994, p. 13). Later in its first year of 
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operation, 65% of Project Quest participants would be women (Osterman & 
Lautsch, 1996). 
 Vision was less developed and operated differently in the PJU case despite 
reaching a strong level of collective commitment. First, there was a faintly 
determined goal and no potential strategy at the onset of the campaign. Whereas 
parents were concerned about student achievement at North High School and 
desired to have their children prepared for college, their vision for the campaign 
primary focused on incorporating youth into organizing efforts and understanding 
students’ concerns about the school via the student survey. This vision facilitated 
youth participation, brought passion and lived experience to the campaign, and 
political education helped PJU members understand the systemic and institutional 
injustices at work.  
 However, there was less attention to a holistic strategy of how PJU would 
address extremely low graduation rates, or the data showing that students desired 
to go to college, but felt underprepared to do so.  The partnership with the 
Education Trust was not an exclusive PJU strategy, but rather occurred by 
happenstance following the survey report distribution and the convening of a 
reform committee. Moreover, unclear and misaligning strategies and goals between 
PJU and school personnel led to dissatisfaction and later separation. Whereas 
teachers and administrators deemed changes in higher-level course offerings, 
summer enrichment, and gains on achievement tests as successes and progress, PJU 
perceived 5% gains as insufficient and reflective of low teacher expectations of 
youth of color.  
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 The reconfigured coalition (Coalition to Save North) provided an alliance of 
similarly thinking and powerful supporters. Race and the pursuit of racial equity 
served as a connection that fostered and sustained commitment to the common goal 
of a redesigned North High School. Warren and Mapp (2011) note, “Though the 
political ideologies of the various allies [within the coalition] differed, there is no 
doubt that race was an underpinning factor in their coming together. For PJU, race 
and class are at the heart of the matter at North [High School], and all over the 
country” (p. 120). Consequently, race served as a medium through which individual 
commitments to improving conditions for Latino/a students were connected 
towards a collective level.  
 Nonetheless, there was still an overt disconnect between PJU’s chosen 
mechanism of redesign and how this would practically lead to higher graduation 
rates and increased college preparedness. The coalition found a converging interest 
with Superintendent Bennet in a desire to pursue redesign in the short-term, but 
lacked a long-term commitment to continued partnership to ensure the health of 
North High School post-redesign. In all, PJU’s short-term vision for the campaign 
demonstrated a lack of understanding of the problem’s connection to the failure of 
multiple systems, and failed to ensure commitments endured once their goals for 
change were achieved. 
 Among the grass-high cases, vision operated in divergent ways, as Promise 
Neighborhoods had very clear outcomes and goals and PUSH/Excel struggled to 
create outcomes that truly reflected Jesse Jackson’s approach to educational reform. 
Of all the cases I examined in this study, Promise Neighborhoods had the most 
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extensive and sophisticated a priori outcomes, measurements, and overall theory 
for what Promise Neighborhoods could be and how they could get there. The 
Promise Neighborhoods Institute and its partners created and shared guidance 
documents on the theory behind neighborhoods, how to collect and analyze data, 
and the precise goals and outcomes each neighborhood would be accountable for. 
Yet many neighborhoods did/don't have the capacity to do what's necessary to 
attain goals/outcomes. Consequently, despite a well-articulated vision, the means, 
capacity, and resources for individual neighborhoods to actually implement and 
attain this vision was lacking.  
 Conversely, PUSH/Excel struggled to match the vision and strategy of the 
program with the outcomes it hoped to achieve. Although the stakeholder 
evaluation created by American Institutes for Research (AIR) attempted to 
foreground PUSH/Excel leaders’ conceptualization of matters and issues that should 
measured and evaluated, in the end there was still a mismatch between the 
capabilities of the movement turned program, and the measures that were being 
evaluated. This mismatch made it difficult to create alignment between individuals’ 
values, beliefs, and ideas about the program, and detracted from leaders’ ability to 
garner collective commitment. In all, neither grass-high case was able to foster 
collective vision, as the research revealed some Promise Neighborhoods did not 
have the capacity to do what was necessary to attain goals/outcomes, and 
PUSH/Excel’s stakeholder evaluation foreseeably did not match what was being 
done within the movement turned program. 
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 Trust.  PJU was distinctly able to create a sense of security amongst 
organization and Coalition members, and was able to foster belief that the group 
could work open and honestly with each other. Despite controversial evidence on 
school reform efforts, such as redesign that would call for all teachers to reapply for 
their jobs, individuals within the coalition were confident in the vision for the 
initiative and committed to achieving the outcome of redesign. City council and 
coalition member Judy Montero’s comments on the difficulty yet surety she felt 
supports that she, like others, had confidence in the vision of the initiative.  
"Instinctively, I just knew… You make [a decision] regardless of how much 
pain it causes you, your family, your community, you just feel strongly that 
it's the right thing to do…But my hope is that in the reform-redesign effort is 
that my daughter can go there [North High]. And today, she can’t, but maybe 
she'd be closer to being able to do that" (Warren & Mapp, 2011, p. 119). 
 Building and retaining trust also served as a contributor towards collective 
commitment within the Project Quest story. Warren (1998) argues that the 
objective behind the relational strategy is to recruit and develop “rooted leaders” 
who are then able to garner the trust and support of community members (Warren, 
1998, p. 88). This approach enables leaders to organize and channel established 
trust towards cooperative political action at the opportune time. 
 Moreover, the robust partnership and attention to the thoughts, feelings, and 
insights of those involved in the partnership further solidified trust among various 
levels of the group. Just as house meetings supported those on the grounds in 
listening to their neighbors’ concerns and opinions, the business community also 
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learned to trust the leadership and the prospect of the initiative given that Quest 
leaders provided evidence of how Project Quest was also in the best economic 
interests of businesses and the city. Rademacher et al. (2001) notes that in order “to 
create changes in employer demand, Quest first had to earn [employers’] trust…by 
understanding both employer needs and the barriers low-income individuals faced” 
(p. 41). In all, trust undergirded the commitment of many aspects of the partnership 
that was needed to bring Quest to fruition.  
 High levels of listening, sharing, acknowledgement, and lack of fear in voicing 
opinions were also evident in the PJU case, and consequently evidence of high 
collective commitment to the group’s goals and outcomes. The intergenerational 
organizing model positioned both adults and youth as critical contributors to the 
work. As youth organizers led much of the research and action items for the 
campaign, parents and adults consistently supported the distribution of their 
written report, made efforts to protect PJU students academically from teacher 
backlash, and gathered 600 signatures of other parents within the community in 
petition of forming a reform committee for North High school.  
 Youth were also heard, acknowledged, and valued in Coalition to Save North 
committee meetings. Warren et al. (2012) notes, “…it was not just the adults who 
were the decision makers in the Coalition. In fact, the adults often looked to Julieta 
[PJU youth organizer] for her input, since she was working directly with the youth at 
North and therefore had the best understanding of the current challenges facing the 
youth” (p. 11). These trust-building actions aided youth and adults in connecting 
their values, passions, and commitments towards the collective level, and 
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consequently provided a rich environmental space for collective commitment and 
action. 
 Oppositely, PUSH/Excel was not able to develop trust among its various 
partners and levels, as it was not a space where those that were a part of the 
initiative could be heard, acknowledged, and unafraid to share their thoughts.  While 
House (1988) contends that “many Black Americans looked to Jackson as their 
national leader” and “Jackson was among the most admired public figures in 
America” , as an organizational leader, House (1988) also notes that Jackson was a 
“controversial” and “despotic” manager (p. 5, 6). To this end, there were several 
accounts of PUSH/Excel personnel being laid off for dubious reasons (Cole, 1977; 
House, 1988). 
 Furthermore, there was evident mistrust between PUSH/Excel program 
workers and evaluators. In a personal interview, Charles Murray, a principal 
investigator for American Institutes for Research (AIR) spoke to how PUSH/Excel 
program leaders were brought in to help construct the stakeholder evaluation, but 
were driven to give insincere answers they believed evaluators wanted to hear.  
“'The [PUSH/Excel] program people [believed] that there were certain things 
they had to say: 'We are going to raise grades, we are going to improve test 
scores'...I said, well, this is not what you're really trying to do... And [they 
replied], 'We don’t think we are either, but we have to [say that] in order to 
make ourselves plausible'... [I said], 'We want you to help us design this 
evaluation...to hear your priorities and adapt the evaluation to that’...The 
  121 
subsequent discussion were generally very forced, very artificial" (Farrar & 
House, 1983, p. 45). 
 In all, Jackson was able to draw large crowds, and many American 
(particularly Black Americans) trusted his vision. This resulted in many signing 
commitment cards and becoming a part of local PUSH/Excel programs. However, 
there was little empowerment for organizational workers at the national level, and 
apparent suspicion between program leaders and outside evaluators. These 
dynamics made for an overall environment of mistrust.  
 Individual data reveals that building and sustaining trust in local Promise 
Neighborhoods was also difficult to do, and several local initiatives were unable to 
do so. In the Las Vegas Promise Neighborhood (LVPN), Horsford and Sampson 
(2014) note that community members (whom were predominately Black) had a 
history of community engagement and commitment. Yet this engagement had more 
recently been disrupted by radical racial and economic shifts within Las Vegas, as 
many neighborhoods that were predominately Black had now maintained a 
majority Latino/a population. The authors contend that the groundwork for LVPN 
was built on this complex history and social shift, and this “presented a unique 
challenge for building leadership, trust, and collaboration among groups who might 
feel they [were] competing for resources and community power” (Horsford & 
Sampson, 2014, p. 984). 
 Likewise, as Miller et al. (2013) investigated trends among local urban and 
tribal promise neighborhoods, they found that as "school failure was tightly 
associated with communities' very need for Promise Neighborhoods", school 
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leaders were less enthusiastic to participate in planning and “becoming immersed” 
in the initiative (p. 569)21. Moreover, some of the suggested mediums for reform in 
schools within Promise Neighborhoods were controversial and would inevitably 
lead to further mistrust. As one planner explained, “it’s hard to try and partner with 
a principal when the restructuring models call for the replacement of the principal” 
(Miller et al., 2013, p. 565). 
 Space to Learn. In addition to building trust and generating a precise vision, 
Project Quest leaders and supporters made the early stages of the initiative a space 
to learn. Although the common belief was that there were no jobs in San Antonio, 
the thought and creation of Project Quest challenged this belief, and proved that 
there was more to learn around the issue of employment dislocation in the city. PJU 
leaders and members also grew in their understanding of institutionalized barriers 
and student experiences at North High school through student surveys and political 
education. As youth and new community members were new to organizing, a well-
supported space to learn about systemic and interconnected problems was crucial 
in developing commitment and positioning both groups towards action. 
 The Quest initiative was also made a space to learn through the amount of 
time that was used to pursue what was important to the collective. Local leaders 
conducted over 300 house meetings with community members, spent months 
negotiating with the business leaders, and met bi-monthly for almost two years 
(Campbell, 1994; Osterman & Lautsch, 1996; Rademacher et al., 2001). Individuals 
within the collective group used this time to grow in their understanding of the 
                                                        
21 As a reminder, Promise Neighborhoods applicants that met the “funding eligibility” criteria had to include a 
“low-performing school” within the boundaries for its designated neighborhood (Miller et al., 2013, p. 560). 
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problem. Later, what was learned from community members was triangulated with 
the experiences of the business community and public servants, as city and state 
officials and business leaders were called on to connect, grapple, and learn from the 
others’ perspectives.  
 Moreover, power negotiation through the project development process 
challenged all participants to listen to others in spite of power differentials.  
Early committee work at the regional and local level recognized job training as the 
appropriate response to the plant closings across San Antonio (Warren, 1998). Yet 
leaders sought to challenge and strengthen this idea through learning from those 
with power (i.e. well-known economist and business leaders) and those without (i.e. 
neighbors and community members) (Campbell, 1994). The development and 
implementation of a demand-driven job-training program then reflected and 
understanding of what both powerful and less powerful individuals needed, and 
how leveraging the power of multiple sectors could collectively address San 
Antonio’s employment issues (Rademacher, 2001).   
 Although Project Quest projected potential ‘wins’ for all involved, race and 
lack of power still presented a barrier for COPS and Metro Alliance. Business leaders 
had already formed perceptions of the predominately Black and Brown organizing 
groups from their prior campaigns. Long term fiscal conservative and city banker, 
Tony Frost, acknowledged, “Even though they [Project Quest leaders and 
supporters] started out with a radical approach, the projects they were supporting 
were reasonable and they were responsible in the way they approached the 
community…I was impressed that they were correct, and that led to my involvement 
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in Project Quest” (Campbell, 1994, p. 18). Frost, like other business leaders, later 
supported the project, yet not until COPS and Metro Alliance “had done their 
homework on job training”, “earned a place at the table,” and the project was 
perceived as less fanatic (Campbell, 1994, p. 19). Interest convergence consequently 
facilitated a bridge towards collective commitment despite racialized perceptions 
between sectors. In all, the iterative processes of growing in understanding of the 
problem, learning from others despite potential power differentials, negotiating 
interests over racial perceptions, and leaders supporting and growing in their own 
beliefs around the initiative, fostered deeper individual commitment, and 
resultantly contributed to a highly committed collective space. 
 In the PJU case, political education served as the primary learning space for 
individual and collective growth in understanding of the problem. As PJU youth 
were new to the concept and processes of organizing, political education enabled 
leaders to situate problems at North High School within the context of a larger 
historic struggle.  
 In addition, PJU leaders, members, and particularly youth were willing to 
endure and risk fall out with teachers and administrators in order to realize their 
desired outcomes. Using media attention to pressure administrators to act on their 
findings undoubtedly produced feelings of mistrust and betrayal between teachers 
and PJU/PJU students. Conflict also arose as PJU collectively pursued what they 
believed was important for Chicano/a students and families, despite other 
dissenting voices in the community. Nonetheless, these conflicts made for a rich 
space for PJU youth and members to reflect and recalibrate their strategy towards 
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achieving targeted outcomes. In all, while PJU incurred a number of risks and losses, 
the group environment resultantly was an excellent space to learn through. This 
learning fostered the deep individual commitments PJU youth and members already 
maintained, and ultimately contributed to a collective commitment.  
 For Project Quest, learning space also meant room for potential conflict and 
recalibrating so the group could move toward a collective action. The relational 
organizing strategy that the community groups used emphasized both negotiation 
and confrontation (Warren, 1998). Hence, when the city council retracted their 
financial commitment to the project, leaders adjusted their strategy and called for 
COPS and Metro Alliance members to protest at city hall (Warren, 1998). When 
funding faced an additional potential barrier, organizers adapted another strategy 
and use portions of existing community block grants to supplement the funds that 
were needed (Osterman & Lautsch, 1996). The constant recalibration and pushing 
limits was a critical part of the learning space and development of collective 
commitment throughout the project’s advancement.  
 In contrast, neither grass-high case appraised to be healthy spaces to learn, 
and funding obligations drove the social and culture norms for both groups. As 
Promise Neighborhoods and PUSH/Excel both received initial external funding, 
national and local leaders were impelled to quickly organize and prove impact, and 
this led to a culture that disallowed for mistakes, risks, or learning through doing. In 
the case of PUSH/Excel, Jackson initially refused to accept the HEW funding, telling 
HEW Secretary Joseph Califano “I have no program” (Farrar & House, 1983, p. 34). 
After promising a grant writer and government technical assistance to help 
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transform Jackson’s movement into a program, Jackson accepted. Yet acceptance of 
the funding came with obligation for evaluation, and there was no sincere time to 
package movement as a program.  
 This undoubtedly impacted the implementation of local programs. As there 
was no time to grow in understanding and connection to their primary concern of 
Black youth disengagement in schools, local leaders scrambled to create local 
PUSH/Excel programs, but soon struggled to keep them afloat. House (1988) 
highlights the programmatic realities of the local agendas-  
“Financial woes and political turmoil in other districts that adopted the 
Push/Excel left few still operating after the first two years. The Chicago 
program was initiated in 10 schools. Although local philanthropy and 
national office funds provided resources for start-up, district support was 
halting, and the program was never fully implemented. Kansas City had 
programs in two high schools, but only one was endorsed by the district. 
Local infighting followed, and the district eventually lost confidence in the 
program” (p. 41). 
Hence, PUSH/Excel leaders and participants did not have the time to pursue what 
was important to the group, the opportunity to reflect and recalibrate as programs 
experienced setbacks, nor were given space to make mistakes and learn from 
missteps. This subsequently hindered PUSH/Excel from cultivating a space to learn 
within the national and local spaces.  
 Promise Neighborhoods also did not cultivate spaces to learn. One particular 
aspect that interfered with developing this critical factor was the highly competitive 
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nature of its funding structure. Competition for Promise Neighborhood planning 
grants made it hard for local communities to take risks, make mistakes, and learn 
from failure. As the grants had selection rate of 6% in first year and only 5 
communities were given implementation funds to follow up on their planning 
grants, neighborhoods were pressed to develop and implement precise and well-
tested programmatic ideas without the time to learn what would best serve the 
people within their designated neighborhoods.  
 Race, racial dynamics, and the ways in which race was (or wasn’t) negotiated 
also played a critical role in the learning space of these cases. Within Promise 
Neighborhoods, race was primarily acknowledged as a statistic. Miller et al. (2013) 
notes that neighborhoods were required to report the racial identities of those 
within the designated neighborhood. Yet very little (if any) attention is given to how 
race may interconnect to the systems and reforms they call for. Instead, the 
guidelines focus conversations, measures, and ideas around destitution and 
mobilizing the power, influence, and resources of institutions to fight the 
intergenerational poverty. This in turn created a space and norm among individual 
Promise Neighborhoods where race was decentralized, although most of the people 
that would be impacted by Promise Neighborhoods were people of color. 
 PUSH/Excel however presents an interesting case in which the racial and 
power dynamics show a challenge of ‘who was playing who’, rather than 
participants genuinely being willing to learn from others despite potential power 
differentials. Jackson focused on reaching Black youth, as Black Americans trusted 
him as a “survivor” and second-generation leader of the civil rights movement 
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(House, 1988). Yet his influence and charisma as a black leader was not enough to 
sustain the movement and local programs. On the other hand, Jackson's message 
resonated with powerful Whites, and predominately White organizations funded his 
endeavor given that Jackson’s race and rapport with the Black community gave a 
platform to voice opinions that would have been politically unacceptable for anyone 
else. As Cole (1977) noted, “what White could get away with telling black girls that 
they have fully developed bottoms and half-developed brains?” (p. 379).  
 Jackson was also very strategic, and used mechanisms such as media as a 
solution “…to control [and] support his own objectives” (House, 1988, p. 33). 
Despite this tactics, ultimately the evaluators maintained the most power, as they 
represented the steam of funding PUSH/Excel had garnered. Consequently, as 
evaluations of PUSH/Excel programs showed to be ineffective, funding rescinded 
and the national and local agendas for the program came to a halt. Jackson was 
quoted in the Chicago Tribute following the dismantling of the program expressing 
that grant funding was a trap.  
“I vehemently fought again government grants and programs. It is a trap. The 
requirements are so technical that if you don’t dot the i’s and cross the t’s, 
you can be cited for a violation. Whenever the federal government want to 
move or neutralize they do it through regulation.” ("PUSH-Excel gets low 
grades: Poor management hurts educational programs," 1983, p. 1)  
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Chapter IV. Empirical Case – Highland County My Brother’s 
Keeper 
 In this chapter, I share my findings from the empirical study I did with 
Highland County’s My Brother’s Keeper (HMBK)22. HMBK is a grass-high collective 
action group case, and the group was in its early stages when I began my 
participation and research. HMBK was a county-based response to President 
Obama’s My Brother’s Keeper (MBK) Community Challenge.  
 MBK communities were tasked with creating local action plans to address 
opportunity barriers for young men of color, as measured by outcomes in education, 
workforce development, and criminal justice. This study examines the early phases 
of HMBK, and the connections between collective action, collective commitment, 
and observed outcomes.   
Purpose and Research Questions 
 The purpose of this study was to gather an empirical understanding of how 
those working within a social-change making initiative used collective action to 
shape change for young men of color. In addition to unpacking collective action from 
a realist perspective (Pawson & Tilley, 2004), I consider if collective commitment 
was achieved or not and how collective commitment contributed to the action that 
                                                        
22 All names, institutions, and locations (both state and cities) have been anonymized to protect the 
identities of those that participated in this study.  
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was pursued. As such, the guiding research questions were-In the case of Highland 
County My Brother’s Keeper (HMBK), how does collective action work, for whom, in 
what circumstances, and why?  
1) How does collective commitment contribute to the success (or lack of 
success) of the collective action pursued by HMBK? 
a. What are the ways in which HMBK does/does not connect to 
individuals’ values, beliefs, and ideologies; and what are the 
conditions and mechanisms through which those individual 
commitments are fostered, detracted from, or sustained towards 
the collective level?  
b. How are race and power represented and negotiated in the collective 
space, particularly in the process of achieving collective action and 
commitment?  
Context of Study 
 My Brother’s Keeper Task Force and Community Challenge. President 
Obama launched the My Brother’s Keeper Initiative in 2014. Whereas the MBK Task 
Force was charged with building a framework and providing recommendations “to 
help ensure all in America are on the path to success”, the MBK Community 
Challenge was designed to bring together citizens, community, and government 
leaders with “leading experts in youth and community development to design and 
implement cradle-to-college-and-career action plans” (Force, 2014, p. 3; 5; "My 
Brother's Keeper Task Force One-Year Progress Report to the President.," 2015). 
Within six months of accepting the President’s challenge, MBK Communities would 
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commit to reviewing local policies, hosting a community summit, and developing 
and implementing a locally tailored plan to address opportunity gaps for boys and 
young men of color within the designated community23 ("My Brother's Keeper Task 
Force One-Year Progress Report to the President.," 2015). 
 The My Brother’s Keeper Community Challenge draws from multi-sector 
collective action models to engage communities in change-making spaces that 
address disparities faced by boys and young men of color in America. While the MBK 
Task Force report references collective action frameworks such as collective impact 
as an example of a promising multi-sector, “comprehensive, outcome-focused 
approach to improving the lives of young people”, the national community challenge 
technical support documents also reference other cross-section action and 
frameworks that could support MBK communities in “develop[ing] rigorous and 
well-planned strategies specifically targeted to help boys and men of color 
succeed”24 (Force, 2014, p. 16; Philpart & Bell, 2015, p. 2). Hence, collective action 
through multi-sector engagement is presented as a method that can be used to 
address complex issues.  
 Highland County My Brother’s Keeper. Highland County formally accepted 
the national MBK Community Challenge on August 31, 2015. Prior to this date, 
                                                        
23 The MBK 2016 Progress Report informs that as of 2016, nearly 250 communities have taken on the 
President’s Challenge, more than 140 local action summits have been called, and over 100 local action plans 
have been developed and/or released ("My Brother's Keeper 2016 Progress Report ", 2016).  
24 In Building Place-Based Initiatives for Boys and Men of Color and Vulnerable Populations, the primary 
community planning guide being used nationally by MBK communities, the authors state the following: “Here [in 
this document], we examine how communities can develop rigorous and well-planned strategies specifically 
targeted to help boys and men of color succeed. If done well, these efforts will enable communities to develop 
approaches that improve outcomes for all young people, including girls and boys and young people of all races 
and ethnicities…This guide provides access to those practices and is designed to help communities across the 
country get started on the important work of creating opportunity for all. The broad principles of collective 
impact provide a useful framework (cited reference to Kania & Kramer, 2012)” (Philpart et al., 2015, p. 2). 
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Congresswoman Beth Moore (a White female elected official) appointed two 
African-American men, Washington State Representative Ryan Connor and Highland 
County Sheriff Aaron Bailey, as overseers of the effort. By August 15th, it had been 
determined that the entire county would take on the challenge, and the three 
elected officials appointed an executive director, John Walters, an African-American 
professor from Northern Washington University, to oversee the daily operations of 
the initiative. At this time, the overall mission for HMBK was articulated as “to 
develop and implement an action plan, undergirded by evidence based strategies, 
that would: 
 Close the opportunity gaps concerning boys and young men of color in 
Highland County; 
 Build a sustainable pathway for their successful entry into adulthood; and 
 Secure this vital resource for the country’s future” (HMBK Policy Review, 
1/15/16). 
 This study was conducted in Highland County. Highland County is comprised 
of 27 cities, villages, and townships, and is home to approximately 354,000 
residents ("The Basics," 2017). The county also serves as home to two large 
universities- the University of Washington (Greenville) and Northern Washington 
University in Brampton, as well as five other colleges and universities.  
Study Design 
Site Selection  
 Prior to this study I worked for Highland County School District as a 
consultant on a number their strategic projects. When I came to the point of 
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designing a study for my dissertation work, I naturally sought the insight of leaders 
within the district as to questions they had and wanted to explore through research. 
These conversations led me to their initiative for young men of color in connection 
to the national My Brother’s Keeper Community Challenge. While the district fully 
supported the newly established local county effort (HMBK), they were unsure of 
how it would unfold, and the best way it could support the effort.  
 These concerns led to my hire as a partnership facilitator for the initiative 
during the summer months. In this role, I connected with stakeholders and partners 
that were a part of the effort, facilitated conversations around strategic decisions, 
and administered the work of two AmeriCorp VISTAs that were also hired to work 
on the initiative. In addition to working in this role, I also received consent to use 
this project as a research space25. My role as both facilitator during the summer 
months and researcher undoubtedly had methodological implications. I discuss how 
I attended to these implications later in this section.  
 I worked with HMBK and collected data from November 2015 – November 
2016. During the early phases of my work (November 2015- May 2016), I primarily 
served as a note taker and archivist. Meetings during this time were sporadic and 
engaged what I will continue to refer to as the steering committee. From June 2016 
– August 2016, I was contracted to be the group’s facilitator. I spent much of my 
time with key partners helping to outline common interests and agenda items 
between the organizations, as well as meeting, training, and thinking through the 
potential infrastructure of the initiative with the HMBK core team. Lastly, in 
                                                        
25 This study was IRB approved. I also obtained written consent forms from each participant before interviews, 
as well as verbal consent before each team meeting I audio recorded.  
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September 2016-November 2016, I reassumed the role as a participant researcher, 
as focusing on this role supported me in complete data collection for this project.  
 
Participants  
 Study participants occupied two groups within this study. I refer to the first 
group as the HMBK steering committee. The steering committee included (roughly) 
20 individuals that represented various sectors, organizations, and institutions 
within Highland County including (but not limited to) the county government, the 
county-level school district, universities, as well as business owners and elected 
officials (see Appendix A for list of organizations represented). HMBK’s executive 
director initiated and called HMBK steering committee meetings. While there was 
no formal protocol or ask made to these individuals to participate on the committee, 
participants on the committee represent and direct programs, organizations, or 
institutions in the county that directly serve boys and young men of color, and most 
supported the idea of a local section for My Brother’s Keeper26. I’ll note that 
although the communication list for this committee included 20 individuals, 
participation amongst group members varied during the timespan of the project. 
For this reason, I prioritized interviews and data analysis with respect to those that 
were more active members27. 
                                                        
26 I interviewed the vast majority of steering committee members and make this generalization based on the 
interview responses regarding their participation and contribution to HMBK.  
27 I considered “active” participants to be those that most frequently attend core committee meetings, were most 
responsive to electronic communications, and dedicated more time than others to HMBK work. There were 
roughly 8 committee members who displayed these behaviors.  
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 I refer to the second group of participants as the backbone group28.  This 
group represents the individuals that were dedicated to coordinating and directing 
the bulk of the work of HMBK. This group formed in the summer of 2016 following 
the hire to two AmeriCorps VISTAs, and became the administrative and executive 
support for the initiative29. The backbone ultimately included (roughly) eight 
individuals, including the HMBK executive director, the two MBK AmeriCorps VISTA 
volunteers, three NWU administrative partners, one school district partner from 
HCSD, and me30.  
 
Data Collection 
 Data collection for this project can be conceptualized through three stages 
(see Table D). During the first stage (November 2015 – May 2016), I took fieldnotes, 
as well as created and disseminated formal committee meeting notes from the 
HMBK steering committee. I took on a more formal responsibility for record keeping 
for this committee in January 2016, and used district resources to gather documents 
from the major event HMBK hosted prior to my involvement in the group.  
 During the second phase of this project (June 2016 – August 2016), my 
primary source of data I collected were the audio recordings of backbone meetings 
that were held weekly on Friday mornings. I recorded 6 meetings during this phase, 
and another 7 during the third phase. These meetings illuminated the planning, 
                                                        
28 The idea of a “backbone organization” is a tenant of the collective impact model (Kania & Kramer, 2011). 
While the group adopted the identification of being a “backbone organization”, they did not fully adopt nor use 
the collective impact model.  
29 Prior to the formation of the backbone group, the steering committee served as the forum in which decisions 
and ideas were presented. These responsibilities shifted to the backbone group once it was established.  
30 Just as with the steering committee, individuals in the backbone group shifted over time, as members moved 
out of state, disengaged, or the like during the summer and winter of the data collection.  
  136 
insight, and collective work that was done among the (~8) individuals that 
organized the administrative and executive functions of HMBK.  
 In addition, I also took fieldnotes /personal notes from HMBK events, one-
on-one meetings with HMBK backbone or steering committee members, and 
meetings with HMBK partner organizational leaders. After each individual meeting, 
I made a practice of recording what was said and done as a formal record for the 
team member and I. At the end of each week, I also wrote a reflective memo of my 
own thoughts and feelings regarding the group space, processes, and overall 
progress of the work.   
 In addition to my own fieldnotes and personal notes, one of the VISTA 
members took on the role of coordinating and note taking for the backbone 
organization. Hence, I collected her notes as another source of data to enhance 
objectivity and balance across the sources I analyzed. I also evaluated artifacts that 
were created by this group, including (but not limited to) stakeholder-meeting 
notes, online infrastructure (i.e. a website and social media presence), databases 
and interfaces created to communicate across the backbone organization, and 
documents created by and disseminated on behalf of the group. 
 During the third and final phase of data collection (September 2016-
November 2016), I conducted my interviews for this study. All members of the 
steering HMBK committee (active and less active), the backbone group, and the two 
county overseers were invited to participate in a semi-structured interview. I 
conducted 30 interviews in total. Interviews ranged from half hour discussions to an 
hour and a half. The interview protocol included large contextual questions on 
  137 
participants’ perceptions of the initiative, personal histories and reflection on 
how/what lead to their involvement, their perceptions of their contributions to the 
work being done, and their estimations of progress towards outcomes (see 
Appendix B for interview protocol). In addition to interviews, I also recorded 
backbone meetings, continued to compile fieldnotes and personal notes from major 
HMBK events, and collected artifacts created by HMBK. 
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Phase Time Frame My Role Regular Meetings Other Major Events Data Collected 
1 November 2015 – 
May 2016 
Steering 
Committee Record 
Keeper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 Steering 
Committee 
Meetings 
 1 Washington 
MBK Summit 
(Liberty) 
 Debrief of HMBK Local 
Action Summit I 
 Creation of HMBK Policy 
Review  
 Recruitment of HMBK 
VISTA 
 Fieldnotes of steering committee 
meetings and Liberty summit  
 Formal steering committee 
meeting notes 
 Artifacts created during and prior 
to my involvement 
2 June 2016 – 
August 2016 
Partnership 
Facilitator, 
Backbone Group 
Member 
 6 Backbone Group 
Meetings 
 7 VISTA Check-in 
Meetings (Me 
w/the VISTAs) 
 Points of Light 
Conference w/MBK 
Luncheon (Union City, 
WA) 
 Highland County Unity 
Town Hall Meeting 
(partly sponsored by 
HMBK) 
 Fieldnotes and personal notes of 
all major events, backbone 
meetings, and VISTA Check-in 
meetings 
 8 weekly reflective memos of my 
experience in dual role as 
facilitator and researcher 
 6 Backbone group meeting 
recordings  
 Backbone meeting minutes (from 
VISTA member)  
 Artifacts created by group during 
this period 
  
3 September 2016 – 
November 2016 
Backbone Group 
Member 
 10 Backbone 
Group Meetings 
 1 Steering 
Committee 
Meeting 
 3 Young 
Brothers/Youth 
Meetings 
 Awarded Youth Voice 
Grant from Neutral Zone 
 HMBK Local Action 
Summit II  
 Creation of young men of 
color youth council 
(Young Brothers) 
 30 interviews  
 7 Backbone group meetings 
recordings 
 Fieldnotes and personal notes of 
all major events, backbone 
meetings, steering committee 
meeting, and youth meetings  
 Backbone meeting notes (from 
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Table D. Forms of Data and Researcher Role Outline
VISTA member) 
 Artifacts created by group during 
this period 
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Data Analysis  
 The analysis for this portion of the dissertation mirrors the analysis done for 
the prior systematic review in chapter 3. For this reason, I use the same analytic 
questions developed through work analysis of cases within that review. I began my 
analysis with two analytic outlines that were constructed during the systematic 
review. The first outline was crafted and used to investigate the data through a 
realist lens (see Chart B, Chapter 3). Specifically, I delineated the four major features 
of realist evaluation (context, mechanisms, outcomes, and the theory of change) and 
shaped particular questions around each feature using resources on the theory 
including Pawson (2013), Pawson and Tilley (1997), and Pawson and Tilley (2004). 
This outline was then tested and used on the synthesis cases and empirical work 
presented here.  
 Whereas each case I examined in Chapter 3 maintained different goals and 
outcomes, I determined that collective commitment was an outcome I was 
interested in tracking and understanding across all cases and my empirical work. 
Consequently, I created a framework around patterns of commitment that could be 
observed or traced in both cases where collective commitment was both positively 
and unsuccessfully developed.  Using information from both the cases and my 
experience in the field as a participant and facilitator for HMBK, I identified these 
patterns as environmental factors that contributed, detracted, and sustained 
collective commitment. This framework led to the creation of the second outline 
(see Chart C in Chapter 3).  
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 Once these sets of analytic questions were crafted, I used an electronic data 
analysis program to program questions from both outlines as a priori codes. I then 
coded all interviews using the imported codes. I also created emergent codes 
throughout the process, and delineated these codes from the others. I refined both 
the analytic outline and theory on collective commitment throughout the coding 
process as informed by the data. I went through each interview using this coding 
schema.  
 I followed a similar process for the recordings of the group meetings as well 
as field notes. For group recordings, I took fieldnotes and annotated each recorded 
meeting. I then went through these annotated memos with my two analytic outlines, 
looking for evidence of the questions within the outline, and also noting emergent 
codes relating to collective commitment. I applied this process to field notes from 
HMBK events, large committee meetings, and meeting artifacts as well.  
 In addition to using the analytic outlines, I also coded for race and power 
across all the data. I began with three large a priori codes (race, gender, power) and 
highlighted each time there was an explicit mention of these ideas. I speak rather 
explicitly about how race and power are negotiated in my reflective memos, and I 
coded these memos as well. After general coding, I then went back into each code 
using the second analytic outline as a guide (Collective Commitment Contributors, 
Chart C, Chapter 3) and crafted analytic memos on the cross-section between the 
code and the forming of collective commitment. 
 These processes aided me in addressing research question 1, as it separated 
the data with respect to the four main elements of realist evaluation (context, 
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mechanisms, outcomes, and theory of change). I then used the parsed data to 
reconstruct the narrative of this case. I divided the narrative into the three phases of 
work focus on (see Chart A, column 1). I used field notes, interviews, audio 
recordings, and other data I collected for this project to reconstruct and support this 
narrative. At the end of each narrative phase I also summarized aspects of contexts 
and mechanisms that were present.  
 I then went back in each phase and considered how the contexts, mechanism, 
and later outcomes were being represented, and what observed theory of action 
could be at work in driving emergent patterns amidst these features. Given that I 
was also participant in the group space for this project, I had keen insight from 
conversations, what was repeated in meetings, and what I documented in memos 
regarding how group members (and particularly leadership) seemed to enact how 
change would be pursued and made during these particular phases. I then placed 
these observed theories at the beginning of each phase as to provide a reference and 
lens reflecting group participants’ approach to change making during this phase.   
 I then created an analytic matrix that aided me in evaluating the group’s 
progress towards collective commitment, and how this connected to the 
outcomes/collective action that was observed. I first looked at how those within the 
core group spoke of vision, space to learn, and the trust within the group. I also 
looked at how opinions on leadership and the idea (or mention) of commitment 
were referenced. I also looked for how individual values, beliefs, and commitments 
were expressed, and I looked for similarities, distinctions, and tensions across race 
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and gender on all these areas. I examined and referenced these across interviews, 
meeting recordings, field notes, and my reflective memos. 
 I then summarized how each person reflected on these areas and placed 
these summaries in the matrix. Once I completed this process for the backbone 
group, I complete the same process for the steering committee. Lastly, I noted the 
engagement of each individual (as signaled by attendance and participation over 
time), and I analyze similarities and differences between similarly engaged 
individuals. These analyses aided in my assessment of HMBK’s collective 
commitment, and how each environmental factor (vision, space to learn, and trust) 
connected to the collective action that was pursued31.
                                                        
31 My final analysis of the empirical data was conducted through the lens of critical race theory (CRT). I provide 
this analysis within my discussion in Chapter 5.  
 
 
 144 
Research Question 1 
In the case of Highland County My Brother’s Keeper (HMBK), how does collective 
action work, for whom, in what circumstances, and why? How are the intended and 
observed theories of change for a My Brother’s Keeper community reflected in the 
early phases of collective work? 
 
 As mentioned, President Obama made an appeal for the formation of MBK 
communities in February 2014 after the MBK Task Force completed their analysis of 
what could be done to develop opportunities for young men of color in the US. The 
Task Force Report presented “cross-cutting recommendations and areas of 
opportunity”, advocating for comprehensives cradle-to-career strategies, learning 
and doing what works, and tracking progress; all in effort to addressing opportunity 
barriers for young men of color (Force, 2014). This report also outlined six focus 
areas, or milestones, where communities could focus efforts and use as outcome 
goals. The six milestones included:  
1. Entering School Ready to Learn 
2. Reading at Grade Level by Third Grade  
3. Graduating from High School Ready for College and Career  
4. Completing Postsecondary Education or Training  
5. Entering the Workforce 
6. Reducing Violence and Providing Second Chances (Force, 2014) 
 In addition, the administration and partners provided various resources and 
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guides about creating MBK communities32.  These support documents aim to help 
support MBK communities in “develop[ing] rigorous and well-planned strategies 
specifically targeted to help boys and men of color succeed” (Philpart & Bell, 2015, 
p. 2). These documents draw from various principles of collective action, and 
provide further instruction as to how groups can approach implementing an MBK 
community. 
 MBK Theory of Change (Realist Evaluation). Realist evaluation diverges 
from other forms of program evaluation in a number of ways. One area of departure 
is in the framing of a theory, as Pawson and Tilley (1997) propose “theories must be 
framed in terms of propositions about how mechanisms are fired in contexts to 
produce outcomes” (p. 85). Pawson and Tilley (2004) also suggest “mechanisms 
describe what it is about programs and interventions that bring about any effects” 
(p. 6). Moreover, the contexts in which these mechanisms are triggered, the 
interpretation and carrying out of mechanisms, and the patterns that produce 
observed outcomes reflect the theory of change operating behind the program.  
 The theory of change presented by the national MBK initiative outlines a 4-
step process to laying the groundwork for an MBK community. These include (1) 
Accepting the President’s Challenge; (2) Convening a local action community 
summit; (3) Conducting a policy review and for recommendations for action; and 
(4) Launching a plan of action, next steps, and a timetable for review. At a high-level, 
these steps serve as the mechanism through which MBK communities are formed. 
                                                        
32 These resources include an MBK Executive Playbook, the MBK Task Force report, MBK annual reports, and a 
community-planning guide published by PolicyLink (see Philpart & Bell, 2015).  All of these resources were 
nationally distributed.  
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Yet in moving down a level of abstraction, there are clearly multiple other 
mechanisms at work.   
 While HMBK accepted the MBK challenge and consequently subscribed to the 
larger theory of action driving the national initiative, the simple four steps as 
outlined by the challenge weren’t taken up in ways the national MBK theory might 
have suggested. In the following section, I provide a narrative of what occurred 
during the three phases of data collection and participation I was a part of (see 
Chart A for distinction of these phases). As with the historical cases, each theory of 
action statement at the beginning represents observed theory that is confronted by 
an account of the mechanisms, areas of context, and outcomes that illustrate the 
fruition of the particular theory statement.  In addition, in Table E I’ve included a list 
of participants that are mentioned in the following narrative.  
Name Role, Organization Role in HMBK Phases of 
Participation 
Race Gender 
Aaron Bailey Sheriff, Highland County 
Co-Chair I Black/African-
American Male 
Amanda Saul 
Director, Highland Early 
Start Collaborative (Early 
Childhood) 
Steering 
Committee 
I, II 
White Female 
Anita Jackson 
HMBK VISTA for 
Infrastructure and Budget 
Backbone Team III Black/African-
American Female 
Beth Moore 
Congresswoman for 
Washington's 12th 
District, House of 
Representatives 
Legislative 
Supporter 
I, III 
White Female 
Bobby 
McQueen 
Local Business Owner, 
Brampton 
Community 
Member 
I, III Black/African-
American Male 
Linda Bay Professor, NWU 
Steering 
Committee; 
Backbone Team 
I, II, III 
Black/African-
American Female 
Harry 
Kennedy 
Superintendent, Highland 
County School District 
Steering 
Committee; 
Backbone Team 
I, II, III 
White Male 
Jay Johnson 
Director of Community 
Engagement, Highland 
County Sheriff's Office 
Steering 
Committee 
I, III 
Black/African-
American Male 
John Walters 
Professor, NWU; 
Executive Director of MBK 
Executive 
Director 
I, II, III Black/African-
American Male 
Josh Hill Director of Diversity and HMBK I Black/African- Male 
 
 
 147 
Community Engagement, 
NWU 
Leadership American 
Juan Ruiz 
Professor, NWU; Director 
of NWU Brotherhood 
Initiative 
Steering 
Committee 
I, III 
Latino Male 
Meghan 
Andrews 
Executive Director of 
School and Community 
Partnerships, Highland 
County School District 
1st Working 
Group; 
Milestone Group 
Facilitator Local 
Action Summit I 
& II 
I, III 
White Female 
Michael 
Johnson 
Assistant Director for 
Community Relations 
Steering 
Committee; 
Backbone Team 
I, II, III 
Black/African-
American Male 
Richard 
Olson 
Professor and Director of 
the Institute for the Study 
of Children, Families, and 
Communities (ISCFC) 
NWU Support II 
White Male 
Ruth Nicole 
Assistant Superintendent, 
Highland County School 
District 
1st Working 
Group; 
Milestone Group 
Facilitator Local 
Action Summit I 
& II 
I, II, III 
White Female 
Ryan Connor 
Washington State 
Representative 
Legislative 
Supporter 
I, III Black/African-
American Male 
Samuel Davis 
HMBK VISTA for Local 
Action Planning 
HMBK VISTA II, III Black/African-
American Male 
Sean Worth 
Director,  
Washington at Work 
Steering 
Committee 
I, III Black/African-
American Male 
Seth Rutters 
Washington State 
Representative 
Legislative 
Supporter 
I 
White Male 
Sharena 
Johns 
Achievement Initiatives 
Supervisor, Highland 
County School District 
Milestone Group 
Facilitator Local 
Action Summit II 
II, III 
Black/African-
American Female 
Derrick Bell 
Director, Washington 
State My Brother’s Keeper 
Speaker, Local 
Action Summit II 
III 
Black/African-
American 
Male 
 
Table E. List of Participants mentioned in Narrative  
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Phase I (November 2015 – May 2016) 
 
TOC: Bringing strategic partners to the table and engagement with and 
between community stakeholders will lead to progress towards change for 
young men of color. 
 Accepting the Challenge.33 Highland County completed the first step in 
becoming a My Brother’s Keeper (MBK) Community by formally accepting the MBK 
Challenge on August 15, 201534. Congresswoman Beth Moore and Washington State 
Representative Ryan Connor convened a meeting with representative stakeholders 
at Northern Washington University, and during this meeting, they agreed that-  
• Highland would accept the challenge at the county level as Highland My 
Brother’s Keeper (HMBK) 
• Northern Washington University would serve as an anchor institution for 
HMBK 
• Washington State Representative Ryan Connor, and Highland County 
Sheriff Aaron Bailey should serve as Co-Chairs for the effort; and  
•Josh Hill, and John Walters would provide the day-to day operational 
direction for the effort [with John Walters as the Executive Director]. (HMBK 
Policy Review, 1/15/16). 
 The First HMBK Working Group. Following the county’s formal acceptance 
                                                        
33 Some of the events described during this phase occurred prior to my involvement with HMBK. Hence, what I 
recount comes from interview data with others that were a part of the group during this time, and other 
artifacts. I will later signal where I enter the group as a participant.  
34 Prior to taking on the MBK Community Challenge, different personnel and streams at Northern Washington 
University were pointing to working on an initiative for young men of color. The university’s Brotherhood 
Initiative and Men of Color Degree Completion Program were presented at the White House as a best practice 
for higher education institutions prior to the countywide effort. John Walters and Josh Hill were integral parts of 
the presentations and conversations, and continued this involvement into county effort.  
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of the challenge, the first working group for HMBK included John Walters (Executive 
Director, HMBK), Josh Hill (Director of Diversity and Community Involvement, NWU, 
Black male), as well as a strong contingency of employees from Highland County 
School District who were appointed by superintendent Harry Kennedy (White 
male), a strong supporter of the effort. This group took on the organization and 
planning for the second step of the national MBK Challenge, convening a local action 
summit3536. According to the national playbook, “MBK community challenge for 
action” (2014), the local action summit called for “…a coalition of partners with an 
ownership stake in the strategy, and a sense of empowerment to help lead the 
effort”, and aimed to  “…assess needs and assets, determine priorities, and set 
concrete goals” (np).  
 Despite the array of resources the working group partners brought to the 
table, and guidance from the MBK national playbook on the objectives of convening 
and building partnerships and coalitions, there were no direct instructions as to 
how to do this, to what end, and how these actions could carry into addressing 
barriers of opportunity for young men of color. Consequently, group members 
scrambled in attempt to thoughtfully organize the first local action summit. Asst. 
Superintendent Ruth Nicole commented- 
“I became involved [in HMBK] two weeks prior to the first summit, when 
                                                        
35 I did not attend nor was a part of the initiative for the completion of the first two steps the group completed as 
outlined by the national MBK Community Challenge. I joined the effort in November. Hence, evidence from these 
events do not include my perspective.  
36 I must note that race of some study participants was self-identified, and I identified the race of others 
(particularly those of Black members). While ensuring self-identification would have been ideal, it was often 
challenging (and some times did not occur) for me, a Black participant researcher, to ask how an individual 
identified, as we often already knew each other and knew we shared the commonality of identifying as Black. 
Later, the only interviewee that would present a question as to their racial identification (based on interview 
responses) would be Samuel Davis. I address this concern in my response to Research Question 2.  
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Harry said, ‘Somehow, we need to have tabletop discussions – how do we do 
that?’ And so, we had, like, a couple days to kind of figure out what it might 
look like, and rally the troops, and figure out who could possibly facilitate at 
the tabletop locations, and give people a little background on that…” 
(Interview). 
 Despite the dash to organize, the first summit maintained a half-day program 
(8am-12pm) and drew a crowd of over 200 individuals, including non-profit 
professionals, students, community activists, public officials, faith-based leaders, 
entrepreneurs, and educators. The event’s programming included ‘state of the 
problem’ presentations, a panel of high school males of color, and breakout groups 
around all six MBK milestones (HMBK Policy Review, 1/15/16). In addition to the 
notable attendance of people from a wide range of sectors, reflections of the summit 
also pointed to the energy that was generated and expressed during the convening. 
Megan Andrews (Executive Director of School and Community Partnerships, HCSD; 
White female) commented-  
“The energy I saw from the first summit was probably the first time that we 
gathered together people from this community that were I would say 
predominantly African-American that were very passionate, that had a lot of 
opinion, expertise, and perspective that do not traditionally engage in other 
ways of engaging. And that was really exciting for me.” (Interview) 
Following the summit, Meghan Andrews (Executive Director of School and 
Community Partnerships,) and Ruth Nicole (Asst. Superintendent, HCSD) worked to 
create a document that outlined the notes from the tabletop discussions, including 
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community members’ thoughts related to the six MBK milestones, and their ideas on 
“quick-wins” and “game-changers” that could be pursued to address barriers for 
young men of color in the county. This document was circulated, yet was not used in 
a further instance.  
 This first initial planning group met three weeks later at Northern 
Washington University. While the agenda for this meeting was sparse, the group did 
propose creating a steering committee for the HMBK effort, and noted that 
developing MBK communities in Washington would be convening in Liberty, 
Washington in December to share insights, resources, and connect at the state level.  
 Mixing with the State Level Effort37. Despite the energy shown during the 
first local action summit, commitment and action focused on advancing local change 
appeared to be fleeting, as members from the initial planning group and other 
stakeholders reconvened two months later at a statewide convening for local MBK 
communities in Liberty (the state capital). The Washington MBK Summit in Liberty 
drew 6 MBK communities, and HMBK had the largest contingency with over 30 
people representing (HMBK Policy Review, 1/15/16).  
 While the event was advertised as a space to connect to resources and idea 
possibilities around MBK communities, attendees and I were met with ambiguity 
and uncertainty during sessions, and what seemed to be a reflection of the progress 
and condition of the initiative at the state-level. The individual MBK communities 
had no data, and were unsure of what data needed to be collected to have 
                                                        
37 My participation with HMBK begins in late November with an initial orientation to the space with Ruth Nicole. 
My first interaction with others that had attended the local summit and had been a part of the first working 
group was at the MBK Summit in Liberty.  
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meaningful conversations around the milestones as it related to their communities 
(TB Reflective Memo, 12/2/15).  
 Back in Highland, a new steering committee had been designated, and met 
weeks later to discuss the third step of MBK Community Challenge, creating a policy 
review document38. Linda Bay (Professor, NWU; Black female) volunteered to take 
the initial step in crafting the document, and would later circulate it among the team 
for comments. During the first the second half of the meeting, John Walters 
(Executive Director, HMBK) informed attendees about the summit in Liberty. Josh 
Hill (Director of Diversity and Community Engagement, NWU) spoke on the 
possibility of acquiring full-time VISTA workers for HMBK. While there were 
questions around where the VISTAs would be stationed and their cultural 
proficiency, Josh volunteered to continue to look into the opportunity (TB Meeting 
Minutes, 12/14/15).  
 HMBK and MLK Day. Linda Bay (Professor, NWU) organized a panel session 
and roundtable discussion during Northern Washington’s Martin Luther King 
Celebration with a focus on the HMBK effort later the next month. As advertised, 
HMBK leaders would provide the community with an update on the initiative, and 
host a forum in which communities members could  “Let their voice be heard!” as to 
opinions on what the work of HMBK should entail (Josh Hill c/o HMBK, Electronic 
Communication, 1/11/17). 
                                                        
38 There isn’t clear evidence on how the new steering committee came to be. Interviews later revealed that some 
individuals stepped back from engagement on their own, and other individuals attended ‘steering committee 
meetings’ but did not identify as a ‘steering committee member’. There were some members from the initial 
group that carried over (i.e. Harry Kennedy, Josh Hill, John Walters); and representatives from Congresswoman 
Beth Moore and Representative Ryan Connor remained symbolic members. Nonetheless, the ‘steering 
committee’ is the group I engaged with when I began working with HMBK in November.  
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 Although the session was advertised as this, the actual event proved to be 
different. As none of the HMBK leaders had been solicited to be a panelist prior to 
the event, new steering committee member, Amanda Saul (Director, Highland Early 
Start Collaborative; White woman), John Walters, State Representative Ryan Connor 
and I were asked to join the panel minutes before it started. As there was no time to 
create continuity or a common theme through the panel discussion, we all just 
spoke on how we were contributing to the effort thus far (TB, Reflective Memo, 
1/17/18). 
 I later joined a roundtable conversation around the 2nd MBK milestone- 
ensuring all youth are reading at grade level by third grade (see Image 1). We were 
given a scenario that reflected the milestone, and then were tasked with generating 
ideas and policies (both immediate and long term) that could address that issue. 
Each milestone table/group was given a similar task, and presented out their ideas 
to the large group after 40 minutes of discussion. I later asked for the artifacts from 
these discussion and share-outs as we had advertised that they would be considered 
in future planning for HMBK. The artifacts could not be found. Consequently, the 
steering committee and other group members did not return to these ideas after the 
event.  
 Completing the Policy Review. The steering committee used email 
communication to draft and finalize a HMBK policy review, the third step in the MBK 
Community Challenge. The review included a foreword by State Representative 
Ryan Connor and an initial policy review which HMBK planned to use as a base for 
its local action plan (HMBK Policy Review, 1/15/16). The progress report section 
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also presented the first iteration of HMBK’s mission-  
“The overall mission of Highland MBK is to develop and implement an action 
plan, undergirded by evidence based strategies, that will: 
• Close the opportunity gaps concerning boys and young men of color 
in Highland County; 
• Build a sustainable pathway for their successful entry into 
adulthood; and  
• Secure this vital resource for the country’s future."  
(HMBK Policy Review, 1/15/16). 
 The policy review section included a description, analysis, and policy review 
of a policy related to each of the MBK 6 milestones. For example, the review for 
Milestone 2 (ensuring all children read at grade level by third grade) outlined the 
contextual issues, target population, and systems involved in attaining the milestone 
goal. It then provided a brief review of a selected policy (for Milestone 2 this was the 
Every Student Succeeds Act), and an analysis of the policy’s impact on African 
American young men. Each milestone section then concluded with a policy 
recommendation- 
[Milestone 2] Policy Recommendation: That the recently passed federal 
legislation, Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), the successor to No Child Left 
Behind (NCLB), be implemented with a targeted eye to eliminating the 
statistical disproportionalities pertaining to young males of color in their 
engagement with public education. (HMBK Policy Review, 1/15/16] 
The review was electronically submitted to Broderick Johnson, Cabinet Secretary 
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and MBK Task Force Chair, and Michael Smith, Special Assistant to the President and 
Senior Director of Cabinet Affairs for My Brother’s Keeper in mid-January. There 
was no further follow-up on the document from the steering committee or White 
House.  
 Stalled. After submitting of the policy review, communication and work on 
the initiative was sporadic. In interviews, some steering committee members 
retrospectively mentioned being willing to participate but were unsure of how to 
engage or how to move the initiative further along.  
“But I will say that since [the first summit], I’ve been coming to steering 
committee meetings, I haven't been clear about what my role is…But I don’t 
know how to engage… because I think there hasn’t been work done to be 
clear on what the process would be going forward.” (Amanda Saul, Director, 
Early Start Collaborative, Interview) 
Even Josh Hill (Director of Diversity and Community Engagement, NWU), who was 
appointed and a recognized leader within the initiative, was also unsure of how to 
engage when momentum lacked. He recognized the conversations that were being 
had, yet was unable to see how he could continue to be involved. He felt in the times 
he “faded out”, the initiative lost momentum. This dynamic and changes within the 
university’s leadership ultimately led him to determine that he “needed to step back 
even further from involvement” (Josh Hill, Interview).  
  The various HMBK groups (i.e. the first working group, and later the new 
steering committee) met a combined total of three times following the first local 
action summit. On March 18th, 2016, the nascent steering committee held its first 
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meeting of the New Year. During the meeting John Walters (Executive Director, 
HMBK) stated that “Work [was] being done on each milestone” (Meeting Notes, 
3/18/16)39. While this may have been true, most committee members felt like this 
was work that they were already doing, and it could not be accredited to HMBK 
efforts. Moreover, the local action plan (the fourth step for creating an MBK 
community as set by the national MBK initiative) remained incomplete. To this end, 
professor, steering committee member, and director of NWU’s Brotherhood 
Initiative Juan Ruiz (Latino male) commented- 
“All those things [the work being mentioned in meetings] are moving 
because of that program or unit or organization, they’re not moving because 
MBK... I think MBK works as an umbrella, but the work that they are doing 
does not go back to MBK to report, to talk, to challenge, to account. It’s just 
they’re two different systems and now they’re talking to each other.” 
(Interview) 
 At the March 18th meeting, John Walters (Executive Director, HMBK) also 
informed steering committee participants that the Washington Community Service 
Commission (WCSC) had been granted money to appoint AmeriCorps VISTAs in 
MBK communities. As a new MBK community, HMBK was eligible to host one VISTA, 
and John was considering how the group could attain two. As progress of the group 
had been slow, the possibility of having two full-time VISTA workers was appealing 
to core group members.  
                                                        
39 I should note here that I made a short presentation to the steering committee at this meeting about my study 
and participation as researcher. At this point, my research focus was on the use of a collective impact model 
within cross-sector partnerships. I carried this lens throughout the first phase and a portion of the second. I then 
realized that the collective impact model intrigued people (including leadership), but the group (particularly 
leadership) was not in a position to nor looking to truly take on the model.  
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 VISTA host sites were required to pay $4000 upfront to establish their 
commitment to hosting. Whereas NWU agreed to support the first VISTA, HCSD 
agreed to commit to being the second host site and put forward the financial 
support to do so. Around this time, the district was also reconstructing their 
institutional framework, organizational values, and engagement with community 
partners. Subsequently, the district affirmed their partnership with HMBK not only 
with sponsorship of the second VISTA, but also contributed to the thinking as to 
how HMBK and HCSD could continue to align and pursue similar outcomes and 
potentially embed HMBK into its work. Harry Kennedy (Superintendent, HCSD) 
drafted a written communication to this end with rationale as to how embedding 
the MBK initiative within the district’s larger Cradle to Career work “would provide 
access to additional resources and allow the MBK leadership to influence the larger 
system in a way that wouldn’t be possible if the initiative stood alone or attempted 
to re-create a comparable structure” (Harry Kennedy, Written Communication, 
4/6/16). While I followed up with John Walters (Executive Director, HMBK) to see 
“…if [he’d] circled back to linking the HCSD/ Cradle to Career Collaborative work 
with HMBK”, HMBK leadership never formally reaffirmed this partnership (TB, 
electronic communication, 4/26/17). 
 In the following weeks, conversations about linking and partnerships were 
silenced by the challenge of acquiring two full-time VISTAs within a two-week turn 
around. John Walters (Executive Director, HMBK) worked with NWU to secure 
candidates and a space for interviews. John (Executive Director, HMBK), Harry 
(Superintendent; HCSD), Michael Johnson (Assistant Director Of Intra-Governmental 
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Affairs, NWU; Black male), and I served as the interview team for the first round of 
interviews for the local action planner VISTA. There was a clear top choice of the 
three candidates we interviewed that day. John (Executive Director), Dr. Bay 
(Professor, NWU), and I then served as the interview team for the second round of 
interviews we conducted five days later with one candidate who applied for the 
resource and budget development VISTA. We decided to move forward with the top 
choice from the first round, Samuel Davis, and the applicant that interviewed during 
the second round, Anita Jackson.  
 While there were concerns of experience (particularly with community 
organizing for the local action planning position) and possible skill set (particularly 
with creating budgets and financial plans for the budget and resource position), we 
still believed both candidates were appropriate selections for the positions. In a 
communication to WCSC with our recommendations for the positions, John Walters 
conveyed that Anita Jackson and Samuel Davis as a team “possessed the skill sets 
and the work ethic to give shape and direction” to the foundational work HMBK 
would pursue in the coming months (John Walters, Written Communication, 
5/4/16).  
 Phase I Summary. In reviewing the mechanisms at play during this first 
phase, one could see that having underutilized and loosely coupled working groups 
created an unstable foundation for HMBK. Both the first group and the new steering 
committee were called sporadically, and like Amanda Saul, many steering 
committee members later echoed an apprehension of not knowing how to engage in 
the steering committee and/or planning group. Furthermore, as the data were 
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inconspicuous around how the new steering committee was formed, issues of race, 
representation, and how power would be negotiated in this group were looming. 
While the steering meetings attracted racially and organizationally diverse 
participants, they did not include (and also were not organized) by Black and Brown 
men in the county that could (or were) to be impacted by the milestone areas. This 
jarring intersection of power, racial, and experiential representation is not 
uncommon to grass-high initiatives, and the HMBK group working space was 
becoming no exception40.  
 In addition, organizational leaders and steering committee members 
attempted to solidify partnerships with HMBK through contracts or memos of 
understanding, as well as engage the broader community through strategies such as 
round tables. HMBK’s summit participants and organizers also attempted to engage 
with other local MBK communities and state level organizers. There was a great 
assumption that the state level could provide direction and support, and aid in 
building the capacity of local groups. Yet this expectation was not met. Furthermore, 
personal choices also created shifts and questions regarding who would be 
responsible for leading the various levels of engagement41. All in all, while 
individuals were evidently willing to contribute and participate, impending 
questions of ‘how does one participate in HMBK?’ and ‘how will HMBK urge 
                                                        
40 As mentioned, Kania et al. (2014) acknowledge that when using grass-high frameworks (i.e. multi-stakeholder 
initiatives, collective impact, etc.), “people who will ultimately benefit from program or policy changes are 
excluded form the process of understanding the problem and then identifying and implementing solutions” (p. 
3). McAfee et al. (2015) further acknowledge that such choices and practices push poor Black and Brown 
community members out of these potentially powerful spaces. As such, McAfee et al. (2015) suggests that those 
using the model ensure “… that low-income communities and communities of color are included as equal 
partners in planning, implementing, and governing initiatives” (p.4). 
41 One particular impactful shift was Josh Hill’s (Director of Diversity and Community Engagement, NWU) 
departure from NWU two months after the March 18th meeting. Given that Josh had be a designated leader and 
partnership facilitator during HMBK’s first year, his departure was significantly felt.  
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productive conversations at the local and state level?’ still remained.  
 Here, HMBK also began to forge a pattern of producing documents and 
artifacts, yet never referencing or using these documents after they were created. 
For example, the policy review was a required step groups took towards becoming 
an MBK community. Although HMBK steering committee members employed a 
significant amount of personal time to create the document, it was not used after it 
was submitted to the White House. Whether the review’s significance or use was a 
matter of neglect or the document’s usefulness, the pattern of creating but not using 
was later seen with the MLK table conversation artifacts, and in instances in 
upcoming phases.  
 In all, this phase challenged the notion that simply bringing strategic 
partners to the table and engaging with community stakeholders in some way 
would led HMBK towards progress in change for young men of color. While people 
came to meetings and community conversation, many still did not know where they 
fit in and how (or if) they would be engaged further. Engagement at the state level 
effort also seemed to be ineffective. Furthermore, initiative leaders and participants 
had yet to unpack the power and racial dynamics that were recurrent in similar 
power-led initiatives, and these undercurrents were playing true for HMBK as well.  
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Phase II (June 2016-August 2016) 
 
TOC: If additional personnel are dedicated to the initiative full-time, HMBK 
will make further progress in addressing barriers of opportunity for young 
men of color. 
 New Personnel and Points of Light. Hiring the VISTA volunteers was 
perceived as a significant win for HMBK. Those who were a part of the steering 
committee and had participated in HMBK meetings thus far were all full-time 
employees of partnering institutions. John Walters commented that this 
arrangement led to leaders and HMBK participants “simply sort of carving out from 
[their] own overcommitted [schedules] and carving out time to try to get this done” 
(Interview). Hence, having two full-time staff that would be working on HMBK 
seemed to be a large step towards building the initiative and ultimately making 
change for young men of color in the county.  
 Prior to the VISTAs’ start date, they were required to attend the Points of 
Light Conference, an annual 4-day volunteer prep conference that is hosted in 
various cities across the county. The conference was being held in Union City 
(Washington’s largest metropolitan area) this year, and all VISTA volunteers were 
sponsored to attend and learn tactics and tools on how to work within communities 
as a volunteer. This year’s conference was particularly unique, as the kick-off lunch 
was being sponsored by the national MBK initiative, and was dedicated to rallying 
local MBK communities around the state.  
 The lunch was a space for MBK local and national leaders, organizational 
partners, and youth to connect and solidify their commitment to the MBK cause. City 
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leaders, and state and federal legislators were in attendance, including 
Congresswoman Beth Moore and Michael Smith, an African-American male who was 
the national MBK Senior Director42. Local MBK Communities were encouraged to 
bring youth to the event. Given that HMBK had not established direct work with 
youth to this point, Michael Johnson (Assistant Director Of Intra-Governmental 
Affairs, NWU; Black male) and I came to the conference with a contingency of Black 
young men whom he worked with for another organization. The lunch started with 
a focus on connecting the young and older men through their attire, as they all 
received red untied bow ties, and had to help each other assemble and tie their ties 
(TB, Field Note, 6/27/16). 
 The lunch resembled a merge between a rally and formal dinner. While the 
program maintained a number of speakers such as Lonnie Ali, wife of former 
Muhammad Ali, as a keynote, there was a constant crowd recitation of “I am my 
Brother’s Keeper” throughout the lunch. Although the event attracted a seemingly 
equal number of Black and White attendees, I noted that the majority of the local 
MBK community participants (including me) and Black youth from these 
communities were seated in the back of the event facility. Policymakers, 
organizational leaders, and other powerful guests remained at the front of the room 
(TB, field notes, 6/27/16).  
 On our way home, Michael and I asked the young men what sparked their 
interest at the event. A couple mentioned the food, and others said learning how to 
                                                        
42 I later found out that day that Congresswoman Beth Moore had been on the MBK Task Force that released the 
MBK Task Force Report ("My Brother's Keeper Task Force One-Year Progress Report to the President.," 2015). 
This discovery was significant, as it helped to explain her deep interest in the local effort.  
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tie the bowtie and the food were most memorable. Kasey, an African-American 
freshman at one of the county high schools acknowledged, “seeing other Black boys 
from other cities that wanted to come together was cool. It was nice to feel a part of 
something” (TB, field notes, 6/27/16).  
 Who Directs? Once John Walters (Executive Director, HMBK) confirmed the 
VISTA hires, Harry Kennedy (Superintendent, HCSD) and I quickly realized that 
there wasn’t an organized structure for the VISTAs’ work. While they would 
technically be John Walter’s employees, the school district had also financially 
invested in the VISTAs’ position. Consequently, I was hired as a contractor during 
the summer months (June – August). My job description included facilitating and 
aiding in agenda setting for HMBK, reconnecting with stakeholders and partners 
who had been a part of the initiative, and most importantly training and directing 
the work of the two VISTAs.  
 Clarity and Preparation. I quickly set up meetings with John Walters 
(Executive Director, HMBK) and a few other integral stakeholders prior to the 
VISTAs start date in order to gather a pulse and vision for how both leadership and 
stakeholders were envisioning and conceptualizing HMBK. In my meeting with John 
on June 23rd, I attempted to get a scope of the work he envisioned the VISTAs 
accomplishing during the summer (while I was on-board in a greater capacity) and 
over the next year.  
 While this question wasn’t answered, I was asked to write out my 
perspective on this question. Two days later, I submitted a memo to John on my 
vision for HMBK. Within the memo, I stated that I saw him, Samuel, Anita, me, and 
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possibly Michael (depending on how he’d like to engage) as the backbone 
organization for HMBK, and thus we’d be responsible for the operation and 
activities of the organization. Moreover, our goal as an organization would be “to 
understand what is already being done for our boys and young men of color, align 
the work across these initiatives to both our MBK milestones and to/across the 
organizations that are working in that milestone area, and help these programs 
work on mutually reinforcing activities that lead towards our collective goals…” (TB, 
Memo to JW, 6/28/17). Yet I did not receive a response to this memo. 
 The First Weeks. The day before the VISTAs’ first day, John (Executive 
Director, HMBK) sent a communication to Anita (HMBK VISTA), Samuel (HMBK 
VISTA), Michael (Assistant Director Of Intra-Governmental Affairs, NWU), me, and 
the director of a community center in the largest predominantly Black 
neighborhood in the county43. Whereas the steering committee, me, and other 
participants hadn’t formally spoken or planned around the specific tasks the VISTAs 
would taken on, John’s electronic communication relayed that Anita and Samuel 
would observe and engage with students in a summer program taking place at one 
of Ashton Community Center which Michael Johnson (Assistant Director Of Intra-
Governmental Affairs, NWU) had coordinated. Their engagement here would “…be 
an early installment of one of the core goals of the AmeriCorps MBK initiative --
youth organization mobilization” (John Walters, Email Communication, 7/4/16). 
 I met Anita (HMBK VISTA) at the community center her second day there, as 
I was later informed that Samuel (HMBK VISTA) would not be able to come. She and 
                                                        
43The city of Brampton retained Highland County’s largest population of Black residents, and Ashton Community 
Center was located in one of the largest predominantly Black neighborhoods within Brampton.  
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I observed some of the morning classwork the youth were involved, and also helped 
the course coordinators with facilitating the course, as the youth became increasing 
disinterested as time passed. All the youth and facilitators (including me and Anita) 
could identify as Black.  
  John Walters (Executive Director, HMBK) sent an electronic communication 
later that evening indicating that Samuel’s (HMBK VISTA) availability to work on the 
initiative would be hampered by another employment commitment. Samuel’s 
second commitment required him to be away from HMBK “for the better part of the 
day on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday”, yet John assured he was working with 
Samuel “ to resolve this conflict [and] to clear the way for fulfilling the full time 
obligations of the AmeriCorps VISTA program” (John Walters, Electronic 
Communication, 7/5/16).  
 This news impeded Anita’s enthusiasm, and she and I scheduled a check-in 
for later that day. Given Samuel’s time restrictions and the fact that there was no 
central ‘team’ space, she preferred having a schedule on hand so we’d all know who 
to expect when44.  We spent the beginning of our meeting crafting a schedule, 
talking about collective impact model and the idea of a ‘backbone’ organization. 
When we came to a conversation about the needs at the Ashton Summer Program, I 
sensed her hesitation. Although she had ideas on programming HMBK could offer 
there, she made clear that providing direct service was not in the VISTA job 
description (TB, Meeting Notes, 7/6/16).  
                                                        
44 HMBK was given a cubicle space in the Institute for the Study of Children, Families, and Communities at 
Northern Washington University. Highland County School District also prepared a dual desk space for Anita and 
Samuel with a computer, phone, and printing access. While I already had work space at the district, there still 
wasn’t a physical space that had room for the VISTAs, John Walters (as the executive director), and I. Lack of 
collective space for everyone proved to be a challenge throughout the second and third phase.  
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 Two days later, Samuel (HMBK VISTA), Anita (HMBK VISTA), and I met to 
solidify our schedules and talk about meeting expectations moving forward. I was 
seeing a potential danger in only having Friday group meetings with no in-person or 
phone conferences in between, and was hoping to set a more consistent meeting 
schedule. We collectively decided on a schedule and shared it with John Walters 
(Executive Director, HMBK) and Michael Johnson (Assistant Director Of Intra-
Governmental Affairs, NWU). Ultimately, we decided we’d be in contact three times 
a week (Monday, Wednesday, Friday) and hoped this would prevent future 
communication challenges. We would all participate in a direction-setting phone 
meeting on Mondays, and later in the week have our weekly team meeting in-person 
(Anita Jackson, Meeting Minutes, 7/8/16).  
 The next day after our Monday phone meeting, John Walters (Executive 
Director, HMBK) sent an electronic communication indicating he would only commit 
to a once a week meeting on Fridays at 10am  (John Walters, Email Communication, 
7/11/16). In a subsequent electronic communication, Anita (HMBK VISTA), Samuel 
(HMBK VISTA), and I decided that we would continue to meet and use the schedule 
we created, yet would only expect John Walters (Executive Director, HMBK) to be a 
part of the Friday team meetings.  
 Our week’s work was later brought to halt when Anita (HMBK VISTA) sent a 
concerning electronic communication relaying her discomfort with the 
responsibilities at the community center and Samuel’s (HMBK VISTA) additional 
employment commitment that left her to run programming alone. Anita spent her 
week crafting a community-centered curriculum for the youth at the center for 
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Tuesdays and Thursday mornings. However, without Samuel’s help, she would be 
responsible for both spearheading and implementing the curriculum. She believed 
spending time at Ashton “doing direct programming” was taking away from “what is 
in [her] job description” and what “[she] agreed to do for this position”. In all, she 
was “rather stressed from the situation “and “[had] tried to accommodate” (Anita 
Jackson, Electronic Communication, 7/13/16). 
 John Walters (Executive Director, HMBK) and I met with Anita (HMBK 
VISTA) later that day to work through her concerns. We concluded on a compromise 
that Anita felt comfortable with, and what we hoped would not breach ties and 
future work with the community center. John later outlined this compromise to all 
involved, which stated the VISTAs and I would develop and deliver a “two-part 
series with one of the youth groups at the Ashton summer camp” that would 
“discuss their community and neighborhood, and their personal sense of their 
role…as young stewards of Brampton's future” (John Walters, Electronic 
Communication, 7/15/16). The HMBK group did not follow up on the two-part 
session or community center programming after this communication.  
 Working with the New Team. Additional work conflicts, as well as job and 
work expectations created an undertone of conflict throughout the VISTAs first 
weeks with HMBK. Yet one personal goal I set in the process was establishing a 
consistent meeting schedule and culture of constant communication, which we 
eventually maintained.  
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 The first full team meeting was on July 1545. Prior to the meeting, I attempted 
to start a practice of creating collective agendas for team meetings by inviting group 
members to make changes to a list of agenda items I had started (TB, Electronic 
Communication, 7/14/16). While both Samuel and Anita went into the document 
and added agenda items later that day, the team did not use this agenda for the 
meeting. Instead, John Walters arrived and started with passing out a paper labeled 
‘Director’s Items’. This set the tone of the meeting and others that followed (TB, 
Meeting Field Notes, 7/15/15).  
 Samuel (HMBK VISTA), Anita (HMBK VISTA), John (Executive Director, 
HMBK), and I were the meeting attendees. The points on the director’s items 
included a discussion of a Black Lives Matter forum (that took place on the Friday 
prior), a conversation on the communication with Ashton community center, and 
preliminary planning for a second local action summit. I noted here (and in 
subsequent memos regarding agendas) that John Walters often attempted to begin 
with a discussion on recent national or local events that involved Black communities 
or leaders (i.e. the Black Lives Matter forum) (TB, Meeting Field Notes, 7/15/15). 
 Despite the new agenda items, the lack of clarity around tasks, vision, and 
organizational identity moved the conversation to many of the original agenda items 
such as a mission statement and understanding. In particular, Anita wanted clarity 
                                                        
45 The full team referred to here would later be known as the Backbone Team/Group. HMBK members adopted 
the term ‘backbone group/team’ to refer to those on the team that were dedicating a significant amount of time 
on the initiative’s efforts. The term was derived from the collective impact (Kania & Kramer, 2011) tenant of a 
‘backbone organization’. During Phase Two, John, Samuel, Anita, Michael, Harry, and I were considered the 
backbone. Group members shifted in Phase Three, and John, Samuel, Anita, Harry, Linda Bay, and I were 
considered the backbone team. The initial steering committee from Phase I met once during Phase Two and 
Phase Three of this project. However, there was never any structure or decision made as to how or if the 
backbone group would interact, work with, or receive guidance from the initial steering committee. 
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on the mission and direction of HMBK before the group further engaged outside 
organizations. As the discussion unfolds, it becomes clear that each group member 
has their own perspective on what HMBK is and does, and the group fails to reach a 
consensus on what the purpose and priorities of the organization are.  
Anita (HMBK VISTA): Here’s what I don’t understand. As an organization, 
how, what are we providing other organizations? So…we’re asking them- 
let’s work together to develop concepts around these milestones, but then 
when they develop those, how are we supporting them, with their goals, with 
their plans?  
 
Samuel (HMBK VISTA): That comes with us seeing what their needs are. We 
can kinda of decide and go over what expectations we have of them…. 
 
Anita (WBMK VISTA): Right…. So essentially we don’t know, as an 
organization, how we’re supporting this initiative. What’s our mission?  
 
Tabitha: So, our biggest support to organizations is tracking progress… 
Because the goals that we’re creating collectively, everyone’s already 
working on them in some way. We’re just articulating them from a collective 
standpoint… 
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Anita (HMBK VISTA): Right, so it’s like a research project? So, before we go 
interviewing people, how are we collecting the data? How are we tracking it? 
What research model are we following?  
 
John (Executive Director): Well, before we do that, in the interest of time... My 
sense was that when we bring everybody together, in October [for the local 
action summit], this would sort of be their marching orders; that they go out 
in these milestones and develop these kind of plans… 
… 
Anita (HMBK VISTA): But that’s why I think we need a clearer understanding 
of what we do before we go and ask people to do things with us…  
(Meeting Audio, 7/15/16) 
 The dialogue revealed clear ambiguity in the HMBK’s objectives, how HMBK 
would relate to other organizations, and how future events would reflect this 
purpose46.  While there were new personnel who were now dedicating full-time 
support to HMBK, the lack of clarity around what HMBK was seemed to impede the 
group’s ability to progress. Moreover, the seeming disjointedness (or lack of a 
connected plan) around the VISTAs’ tasks (i.e. the work with the community center, 
the work of engaging stakeholders with HMBK) appeared to be impacting their 
personal advancement in their work, as well as the collective work. This in turn 
                                                        
46 The first meeting was also significant in discussing those that would be working on HMBK. Josh Hill was no 
longer at NWU, and Anita was interested in knowing if HMBK was going to replace him/fill his role. John Walters 
was hesitant to answer, and replied that he was much more interested in “Samuel and Anita working more as a 
team than in a hierarchal way” (TB, Meeting Fieldnotes, 7/1516).  
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challenged a belief that additional full-time personnel would advance HMBK’s 
overall progress.  
 Identity Issues. The latter summer weeks were filled with a myriad of 
achievements and setbacks. At the second group meeting, John, Samuel, Anita, and I 
were joined by supporters from HCSD- Harry Kennedy (Superintendent), Ruth 
Nicole (Assistant Superintendent), and Sharena Johns (Achievement Initiatives 
Supervisor; Black female) as well as representatives from Northern Washington 
University- Richard Olson (NWU Professor and Director of ISCFC; White male) and 
Michael Johnson (Assistant Director Of Intra-Governmental Affairs)47. Anita’s 
summarized transcription of the meeting revealed similar themes of uncertainty 
about the role of the VISTAs, HMBK’s mission as an organization, and how HMBK 
would achieve their mission.  
 This meeting was the first and last time these nine participants would meet 
all together for a backbone meeting, and this group and conversation space was 
peculiar. The majority (6/9) were Black professionals and leaders, many whom 
were a part of initiatives focused on Black youth and community and who managed 
significant resources for the institutions they represented (i.e. Sharena, Michael, 
John). Ruth, Harry, and Richard, were positioned as senior, White, and potentially 
powerful allies. Yet after a two-hour inconclusive meeting, transcripts, meeting 
audio, and a reflective memo revealed meeting participants’ vocal yet distant 
commitment to the effort. Richard (NWU Professor and Director of ISCFC) stated 
                                                        
47 Michael Johnson’s position as a backbone group member was fluid. While he was heavily involved at the 
beginning of the summer and other points, he slowly disengaged from the group through Phase 2 and was nearly 
completely disengaged by Phase 3. He continued to receive email communications as a backbone member 
throughout the summer. His fluidity caused tension between he and Anita (HMBK VISTA) on several occasions.  
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that he wanted to see the initiative succeed, and “anything [he] could do, let [him] 
know” (AJ Meeting Summary & Transcript, 7/22/16). Likewise, Sharena stated that 
she was “committed to bringing Black youth to the table”, yet questioned if HMBK 
would be recreating a space and line of work that already existed (Meeting Audio, 
7/22/16). In all, this meeting presented an intellectually and resource-rich cadre of 
Black and White leaders who had seemingly different understandings, ideas, and 
concerns about HMBK.  
 After these first two meetings, the backbone team continued with a 
consistent weekly meeting date and time. Attendance at these meeting varied, yet 
were most often attended by the VISTAs and I. I also set up a consistent Monday 
phone call with the VISTAs, during which we’d set our goals and direction for our 
workweek. Despite the success of establishing consistent meeting times, questions 
about vision, mission, the strategies or framework HMBK would or could use to 
accomplish its goals lingered, as well as unanswered questions regarding the role 
and work of the two VISTAs. Both Harry Kennedy (Superintendent, HCSD) and Linda 
Bay (Professor, NWU) reflected on HMBK’s indeterminate identity during these 
early stages- 
Harry Kennedy: I think we have struggled related to conversations around 
the milestones in policy, versus what are we going to actually do? (Interview) 
Furthermore, Linda Bay questioned the very existence of an HMBK, as necessary 
structures weren’t in place.  
Linda Bay: There really isn't a HMBK. There's an advisory… The structures 
for HMBK needed to address the six milestones don't exist. So it's hard to say 
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if there's a HMBK… There has to be – in order for an organization to exist - 
people in different structures of the system. (Interview) 
  July and early August backbone meetings continued to reveal a circular 
discussion of what HMBK would dedicate its time to, who and how it would partner 
with existing organizations, and how HMBK would utilize the time and effort of the 
AmeriCorps VISTAs. However, by mid August, the team began to come to a 
consensus on one idea- that in some way, HMBK needed to incorporate the voice of 
young men of color in the county. Michael Johnson (Assistant Director Of Intra-
Governmental Affairs, NWU) mentioned he was one of the first to advocate for the 
bringing youth into the initiative, as adults don’t always question what’s best for 
them.  
Michael Johnson: I think that sometimes we don't always ask how is this best 
for the youth, and I think that that's where the problem [is]… I think that I 
have been persistent in pushing youth voice. (Interview)  
 Michael noted further that Neutral Zone, a teen center in Highland County, 
received a grant to “support 5-6 community-based organizations across Southeast 
Washington” to help selected organizations build or expand their youth advisory 
councils over the course of 14 months through an intensive 2-day residential 
institute, coaching/site visits, and a one-day reconvening summit. I volunteered to 
complete the Neutral Zone application and send it out for feedback from the rest of 
the team. In my reflection, I noted that “I consciously crafted the grant application 
knowing that we truly didn’t have anything built for the youth council “ (TB, 
Reflective Memo, 9/15/16). Although this was seemingly putting the cart before the 
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horse, I hoped that the grant would help to motivate and push the group in to 
solidifying our program and recruiting youth to be a part of our initiative. 
 This was yet another challenging process. Samuel (HMBK VISTA), Anita 
(HMBK VISTA), Michael (Assistant Director Of Intra-Governmental Affairs, NWU) 
and I first attempted to create the structure for engaging youth in our August 17th 
backbone meeting. We’d conceptualize the youth arm of HMBK to incorporate four 
areas- training and development, brotherhood building, service and service 
learning, and HMBK/MBK events (AJ, Meeting Minutes, 8/10/16). We also set an 
initial recruitment strategy, in which we’d target youth ages 14-24, host recruitment 
events at local district high schools, and gather the support of superintendents and 
principals. Our goal was to recruit 50 youth across the county (AJ, Meeting Minutes, 
8/10/16).  
 Yet conflict arose when role ambiguity and a discussion of principles guiding 
the program surfaced. The group had spent an hour crating the vision and 
recruitment strategy for the youth council. However, Anita suspected much of the 
recruitment work would fall on her, and she thought it important for Black men and 
youth to be in the forefront of recruitment given that the initiative was about young 
men of color.  
Anita (HMBK VISTA): But Michael, you’re a [member of historically Black 
Fraternity]. Do you send [members historically Black sorority] to get young 
men into [your fraternity]? No you do not. You send [members of the 
fraternity]. So you need representative looks and faces. I’m a woman! I’m a 
Black woman! I just want young men with me. (Meeting Audio, 8/17/16) 
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Anita’s concerns were tabled, and Michael then volunteered to bring in a pre-
existing group he worked with as the new HMBK Youth Council, as this would 
eliminate the need for a recruitment plan. While Samuel did not object, Anita was 
strong against the idea as she was fearful that Michael’s group would not “be 
representative of the county. After an antagonistic dialogue, Michael relayed that 
Anita and Samuel could “do [their] county thing, and tell [him] how that works out”. 
This infuriated Anita, who walked out and slammed the door. By the end of the 
conversation, group members were ready to completely abandon the plan, which 
made others extremely frustrated.  
 Phase II Summary. In reviewing the mechanisms at play during this phase, 
one could see that a lack of clarity around where HMBK was heading, what the 
organization was created to do, and how the group would accomplish its goals 
continued to produce friction between Anita, a Black woman now employed to 
participate in the initiative, and John and Michael, two Black men who were 
perceived leaders in the initiative. This conflict led to high tension and debates 
during meetings, Anita’s disenchantment with the VISTA position, and her 
noticeable disengagement. The third Black male backbone member, Samuel, 
maintained another work commitment during this phase. While he was present at 
most meetings, Anita did most of the follow-up work and this continued to build 
tension between him and Anita. HMBK had secured full-time help to aid the 
initiative in moving forward, and having more hands on deck was alleged to be 
significant mechanism. Yet the theory of having committed full-time workers was 
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being undermined by the initiative’s nascent status, ambiguous organizational 
strategy, and conflict among personnel. 
 Role ambiguity and fluidity also proved to be a mechanism that did not 
support the collective work and action during this phase. Anita and Michael’s clash 
and the conflict with the community center programming were evidence of this. 
HMBK did have titles (i.e. executive director) and the VISTA recruitment process 
required HMBK to create job descriptions for the VISTA positions. However there 
were no formal or informal, mutually shared roles or responsibilities outlined for 
John, Michael, and me.  
 Consequently, there were no mechanisms to ensure Anita and Samuel were 
oriented and on-boarded to the group work in a coherent way. My contract with the 
district was a foreshadow and attempt to address this, as it explicitly listed 
managing the work of the VISTAs. However, both VISTAs were technically still 
John’s employees. Thus, as a Black woman navigating an ambiguous middle space, I 
first had to understand how John and I would (or could) collaboratively manage the 
roles and tasks. I never gained full clarity on this, as my June 23rd meeting and 
memo with John didn’t result in any follow-up.   
 Establishing a consistent meeting schedule was helpful towards creating 
individual identification with the organization. As John, Anita, Samuel, and I were 
most often attending backbone meetings, we knew the four of us would be working 
most on the initiative. However, our individual connection to the work and our 
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identification with HMBK did not inherently create an organizational identity. We 
were still individuals attempting to create and relate at a collective level48.  
 I suspect that more consistent meetings could have allowed group members 
to build better and stronger relationships and formulate trust. Yet this act would 
have had to be intentional. I personally found building relationships and trust with 
Anita and Samuel to be an important part of working together with them on the 
HMBK initiative. This did not eliminate all tensions, even between Anita and me. We 
were two Black women working on an agenda for boys and men of color, having 
different working styles and experiences, yet we were both passionate about 
building Black communities. Given this, touching base on Monday via phone 
meetings, during Wednesday backbone meetings, and through out the week on 
email and text was a small mechanism that helped me to build rapport with her and 
with Samuel. The three of us did not always agree on everything, however we were 
often able to find a compromise that would suit all of us.  
 Yet it was evident that John had less trust and rapport built, particularly with 
Anita. Although John was the designated leader of the initiative, there were a 
number of meetings during this phase (7/15/16, 8/3/16, 8/10/16 Backbone 
meetings) where Anita starkly pushed back on his direction or challenged his 
thinking. In a later interview and analyses, this point proves to be significant.  
 This phase of HMBK proved that additional personnel and more hours 
towards the initiative as a primary mechanism was not a sustainable or completely 
reliable mechanism for collective action. There were other mechanisms (defining 
                                                        
48 I provide more evidence of individual connections to the HMBK work and the group’s inability to harness 
these connections at a collective level in my response to Research Question 2 (p. 208).  
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roles and responsibilities for those in the group, providing organizational direction, 
building trust and rapport) that were poorly engaged or inconsistently applied by 
group members. Yet at this phase of the work, these mechanisms were just as 
necessary. Obstacles across race, gender, and those with and without power also 
emerged throughout this phase. However not all were willing to intentionally 
address them. 
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Phase III (September 2016 – November 2016) 
 
TOC: If others county partners see what HMBK has done, they’ll be inspired to 
work towards addressing barriers for young men of color. 
 A Shifting Backbone Group. The start of a new school year brought about a 
number of shifts in availability and engagement for members of HMBK backbone 
group. John Walters (NWU Professor, HMBK Executive Director) was given a quarter 
release from his teaching commitments at NWU, yet still picked up a demanding 
teaching schedule. Anita (HMBK VISTA) was also a graduate student and began her 
coursework during the fall. Samuel (HMBK VISTA) maintained other employment, 
and this continued to hamper his availability. Michael (Asst. Director of Intra-
Government Affairs, NWU) maintained multiple organizational positions and 
consequently had chosen to focus attention on other projects. Harry Kennedy 
(Superintendent, HCSD) attended meetings regularly, but was also constrained by 
his duties as a superintendent. Linda Bay (Professor, NWU) became more engaged 
in backbone meetings in late summer, as she “sensed there was conflict between 
Anita and John Walters” (Linda Bay, Interview). Since that time, she attempted to be 
a part of meetings via phone. I was also no longer under contract with school 
district, and had resumed other schooling commitments in addition to working with 
the group. In all, by early September, the most consistent participants of backbone 
group were John, Anita, Samuel, Harry, Linda, and I.  
 We had developed a meeting routine where John Walters (Executive 
Director, HMBK) would create an agenda, send it out via email the night before the 
meeting, and the group would meet using this agenda as a conversation guide. 
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However, the VISTAs would often use agenda items or space in between items to 
introduce their ideas around how HMBK could be structured, the work the 
organization should take on, and how it could go about engaging in this work. These 
ideas were often met with skepticism, or belief that they were “aspirational”.  
 For example, an August 24th meeting agenda item was: 
3. Ashton Community Center  - Joe Dulin Day – Saturday, August 27, 11am-
6pm. Planning and logistics (Meeting artifact, 8/24/16) 
HMBK had committed to manning a table at this event to curate a list of community 
member names and contact information of those that would be interested in 
engaging in the initiative in some way. Samuel drafted flyers for the table that 
included language on who and what HMBK was, as well as an advertisement for 
young men of color to join the (developing) youth council. In this ad, Samuel had a 
bullet point mentioning that young brothers (participants of the youth council) 
“would be provided an opportunity to represent Washington in attendance at 
professional events such as National Congressional Black Caucus, etc.” The group 
had never discussed this idea before.   
 While Anita (HMBK VISTA) and I were willing to endorse the idea given that 
we’d commit and hold true to it as a group, Harry (Superintendent, HCSD) suggested 
more tentative wording such as “maybe”, and also endorsed Anita’s idea of not being 
specific about conferences. John, however, framed the idea as “aspirational” and said 
that a formal proposal and “vetting” process would be necessary in order to move 
such an idea forward (Meeting Audio, 8/24/16).  
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 Given this reaction to new ideas was not uncommon, I scheduled to meet 
with John during his office hours in early September to talk about his thoughts 
around the initiative and backbone group, his concerns, and how he envisioned the 
backbone and initiative moving forward. I met with John on September 2nd. While I 
expected this meeting to be uncomfortable and even challenging due to the 
disruptive groups meetings we’d had. Instead, following some sharing about his role 
in the department, he even asked for my evaluation of his leadership thus far 
(Meeting Notes, TB, 9/2/16).   
 I learned John sensed that the things he felt were important (i.e. policy and 
advocacy) were not important or worked on by the VISTAs, yet they were 
technically his employees (Meeting Notes, TB, 9/2/16). I learned that he wanted 
backbone team members to be engaged at the table of other organizations “just to 
learn”, and “be a strong collaborating partner in the work that [was] already taking 
place” (Meeting Notes, TB, 9/2/16). Nonetheless, he felt that the most needful work 
within HMBK at the moment was youth engagement and the development the youth 
council. I left this meeting feeling hopeful, as we seemingly had found a common 
vision and strategy to pursue.  
 Incorporating Youth Voice. HMBK submitted their application to Neutral 
Zone for the youth council development grant in late August. During the second 
week in September, the backbone learned that HMBK was selected to be one of six 
organizations that would partner with Neutral Zone for the grant. While this news 
was welcomed and celebrated by group members, I knew the award presented 
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HMBK with a challenge because we as yet had no relevant structure in place to 
recruit youth or even to say what we were recruiting them to do. 
 Hence, the development of the youth council started as a challenge and 
continued to be a challenge in the months to come. Given that I was no longer under 
contact with the district, Anita (HMBK VISTA), Samuel (HMBK VISTA), and I did not 
continue with our check-in Monday meetings/phone calls, and weekly Wednesday 
backbone meetings became the only consistent point of contact we maintained. 
Although the weekly meeting agendas always maintained an agenda item for “Youth 
Driven Space Updates”, there was not time at the meeting to actually develop the 
curriculum for the youth council trainings or plan for recruiting and solidifying 
youth participants. Consequently, most of the needed work was done 
independently, then later brought to the group.  
 This work model proved to be problematic, as it exacerbated existing 
tensions among team members, and also created new issues. The preparation for 
the 1st Youth Council meeting and orientation provided a clear example of this. The 
grant from Neutral Zone sponsored an overnight retreat for the youth council 
leaders and youth participants of the six organizations receiving the grant. Given 
that this retreat was planned for the second weekend in October, the backbone 
group decided it had to work with organizational and personal contacts to find and 
invite young men of color to participate in a Young Brothers (the HMBK youth 
council) introduction and orientation day prior to the retreat. In an electronic 
communication to backbone members and other leaders, Anita (HMBK VISTA) 
attempted to engage in a recruitment effort, but her effort was stifled by a response 
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from John.  
Greeting HMBK Team and Extended Partners, 
Please review the attached letter and share with persons you may know who 
may have youth interested in joining the newly forming Highland County My 
Brother's Keeper Youth Council - to be known as Young Brothers. The online 
interest form link is here… Please contact me if you have any questions. 
(Anita Jackson, Electronic Communication, 9/26/16) 
…. 
Greetings all: 
Let me ask that you not send either the letter or the attached form as yet.   
There is more vetting needed. I will send a note shortly that will clarify my 
request, and provide more detailed observations… (John Walters, Electronic 
Communication, 9/26/16) 
In addition to hampered recruitment efforts, Samuel (HMBK VISTA) and Anita 
(HMBK VISTA) also began to get wires crossed, as lack of communication between 
the two caused ambiguity in the roles they would each play in solidifying the 
upcoming youth council information session. As Samuel (HMBK VISTA) had not 
heard from Anita regarding a room reservation, he attempted to reserve a room on 
his own. However, the room he requested maintained a meeting fee, and the unpaid 
cost triggered an electronic communication from an NWU administrator.  
 The communication from the administrator frustrated Anita (HMBK VISTA), 
and showed a discrepancy in role assumption, as she emphasized she was formally 
charged with budget coordinating.  
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Hello,  
I was working on room reservations prior to my departure…There are much 
costs ($400) associated with the McKenny room…Since we do not have a 
budget for these costs, we cannot complete the contract…Also, as budget 
coordinator, I too was blindsided the details of this that I was already 
navigating. I think there are some overlap of duties and lack of 
communication that is causing a huge disturbance in our workflow.  
Our free room will be on the ground floor of the Wilson Library. (Anita 
Jackson, Email Communication, 9/27/26) 
In spite of disagreements, Samuel and Anita (HMBK VISTAs) continued to plan for 
the event. John (Executive Director, HMBK) agreed to sponsor food costs for the 
event, as the youth council had no funding. The VISTAs anticipated 30-40 meeting 
attendees (Samuel Davis, Electronic Communication, 9/30/16). 
 On the day of orientation, six young Black men attended and expressed 
interest in the council. Richard Olson (NWU Professor and Director of ISCFC) and 
Bobby McQueen (Local business owner, Brampton; Black male) also attended to 
support. Three of the young men that expressed interest in the group that day 
attended the Neutral Zone retreat later the next weekend. Four other young men 
were later recruited to participate and attend the retreat.  
 Yet the challenges on the front end of developing the Young Brothers youth 
council remained throughout the year and course of the Neutral Zone grant. Samuel 
(HMBK VISTA) and Anita (HMBK VISTA) led the council and met with the Young 
Brothers on Saturdays twice each month. Youth attendance was often spotty (as 
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many of them had many other commitments and jobs), and meetings seemed to lack 
engaging activities49.  
 Funding also continued to be a challenge. While the VISTAs wanted to 
provide food at meetings and take the youth on outings, the backbone or the council 
hadn’t acquired funds to do so. Other resources such as dedicated time and the 
ability to draw community capital to support the council also waned. Both Harry 
Kennedy (Superintendent, HCSD), and John Walters (Executive Director, HMBK) 
later reflected on the challenges of establishing the youth leadership council work in 
their interviews with me.  
Harry Kennedy: We are not at scale.  So we haven’t been able to recruit and 
sustain enough young men for a youth council to really produce the impact 
that we want, but I think it’s the right kind of conversation. (Interview)  
Likewise, John was disappointed that the work had not gotten off the ground as he 
anticipated.  
John: We also have the issue of our youth leadership cohort that hasn't quite 
come together in the way that I would like to have seen it come together by 
this time, and again – but I think we can get these things done.  (John Walters, 
interview)  
Yet establishing the council and the push of the Neutral Zone grant inevitably give 
HMBK a greater sense of purpose. Later, I also discovered in interviews with other 
backbone and steering committee members that many saw the creation of the youth 
                                                        
49 While I did not coordinate meetings for the Young Brothers, I often stopped by their Saturday morning 
meetings to develop a relationship with the young men in the program and to support Samuel and Anita in their 
efforts. My statements about the meetings are connected to my experience attending them.   
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council and receiving the Neutral Zone grant as one of HMBK’s successes.  
 Towards Local Action Summit II. While the backbone group spent much of 
the month of September working towards acquiring the youth council grant and 
establishing the council, the group also began talks of executing a second local 
action summit. HMBK had completed 3 of the 4 steps associated with the national 
guide in becoming an MBK community. Yet the initiative still lacked identity, 
purpose, and mission50. As the fourth step (launching a plan of action, next steps, 
and timetable for review) spoke many of these issues, HMBK was still an entity that 
lacked a concrete plan and vision.   
 The idea of hosting another local action summit was first presented as an 
agenda item at the August 10th backbone meeting. In addition to circulating a 
meeting agenda, John Walters (Executive Director, HMBK) also circulated a Mission 
Goals, Structure, and Summit, Vision document. This document laid out a mission 
statement, Year One Goal, Year Two Goals, Structure, and Operations for HMBK. 
While I assumed John Walters crafted this document to help the group overcome the 
challenge of lack of clarity, the items on the document were never discussed prior to 
its creation, nor were they discussed at the 8/10/16 meeting to which were 
brought. 
 Nonetheless, this document did define John Walters’ (Executive Director, 
HMBK) goals for the prospective local action summit II-  
Highland County My Brother’s Keeper Local Action Summit II  
                                                        
50 Again, the steps to becoming an MBK community as outlined by the "MBK community challenge for action" 
2014) include 1) Accepting the President’s Challenge; (2) Convening a local action community summit; (3) 
Conducting a policy review and for recommendations for action; and (4) Launching a plan of action, next steps, 
and a timetable for review. 
 
 
 187 
 Project date- Monday, November 14, 2016, 8:30am – 12:30, NWU 
Student Center Ballroom  
 Goals  
1) Provide update to the county on the progress to date in launching 
the MBK collaborative in Highland County;  
2) Increase awareness of the state and nation MBK mission and on 
plans to sustain the MBK initiative following the Obama 
Presidency  
3) Launch the Milestone Working Groups and enlist the involvement 
of new stakeholders: charge, composition, leadership  
4) Introduce feature Youth Council  
5) Discuss Programming for the year 
6) Identify policy imperatives for 2016-2017 
(JW, Artifact, 8/10/16) 
 We revisited discussion and planning for the summit in September. Given 
that a second or annual summit was not a part of the national guidelines, the 
backbone group was completely on its own as to creating a plan for its purpose and 
its execution. Despite John Walters’ written goals, group members questioned and 
considered what the summit (and particularly the proposed milestone breakout 
sessions) would actually entail. During meetings these questions largely went 
unanswered, and the group did not turn to John Walter’s artifact to help answer 
them.  
 Furthermore, Samuel and Anita (HMBK VISTAs) would be required to joggle 
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two large tasks- planning and implementation for the youth council and planning 
and implementation of the summit. In our September 14th meeting, I addressed the 
workload and focus issue for Anita and Samuel, and also put forward a vision for 
what the summit could look like.  
 I suggest that we use the local action summit space to create goals around 
each other milestones, “giving folks some idea of where we want to head… whatever 
the measure is…and allowing them to figure out how we’re going to get there based 
on their commitment to those goals” (Meeting Audio, 9/14/16). I noted that this 
would give “space to do what they’re already doing”, “but give them somewhere to 
go”, and place the onus on the community by putting it “in their hands” (Meeting 
Audio, 9/14/16). 
 Anita agreed, and stated that this was how it was suppose to be “if it’s 
collective action” (Meeting Audio, 9/14/16). Samuel also agreed that this strategy 
could work, and suggested we organize the goals around the milestones, and give 
each milestone breakout group a vision to work towards. As Samuel, Anita, and I 
played around with the idea, John Walters presented a hesitation-  
Now, I would hesitate to present the folks with a vision... These are folks who 
go to work everyday advancing these milestones, so they’re already doing 
this. I think we just need to let the milestone advisory groups figure this one 
out… [and] let the praxis work, and it will get there… (Meeting Audio, 
9/14/16). 
 This meeting dialogue was significant in a couple ways. First, it highlighted 
Anita, Samuel, and my attempt to fully understand the purpose and vision of a large 
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meeting that would likely attract key community stakeholders. Secondly, the 
meeting culture we set often did not allot time for group members to grapple with 
ideas, and come to a collective decision about what action should be taken. 
Furthermore, it also demonstrated how such ideas were often obstructed and 
significant questions (such as what the summit would actually entail) were largely 
left unanswered.  
 The front end of the summit program soon overshadowed the challenge of 
vision and purpose for the summit and milestone breakout groups. By the 
November 2nd backbone meeting, Samuel (HMBK VISTA) presented a run of 
program for the summit, which he’d gathered from conversations with John Walters 
(HMBK, Executive Director). The program included a heavy front-end with greetings 
and presentations on the current landscape of Highland County (an hour and a half), 
yet less time for milestone discussion groups (only 45 minutes) where the core 
work of (i.e. problem identification, goal and vision creation) would supposedly be 
done (see Image A).  
TIME ACTIVITY PRESENTER/FACILITATOR 
8:00am Youth Arrive 
Refreshments 
Youth Check-in & Greeting Activity 
8:30am  Introduction 
& Greetings 
HMBK Executive Director Dr. Walters 
8:35am Words of 
Welcome 
Congresswoman Beth Moore 
8:45 Words of 
Welcome  
Derrick Bell, Director of MBK, State of Washington 
8:55 HMBK Year 
One Overview  
HMBK Executive Director- John Walters  
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Image A. Meeting Artifact, 11/2/16 
 In addition, John Walters presented a document that stated what milestone 
advisory groups would be doing. His vision included reviewing work that was being 
done around each milestone, creating action steps, and setting a follow-up meeting 
to solidify this action plan.  
Operation of the Milestone Advisory Groups, et al.  
Charge:  
 Review briefly the milestone in question, and collaborative work 
undertaken in pursuance of the milestones;  
 Identify feasible and workable action steps that will expand upon or 
9:05 Vista 
Experience  
Anita Jackson 
9:15 Young 
Brothers 
Introduction 
Samuel Davis – Who are the Young Brothers?  
(7 minutes) 
Young Brothers Spoken Word – poems  
9:30 The Policy 
and Equity 
Landscape 
Health- Highland County Public Health Department  
(Confirmed)  
 
Education and Equity- HCSD (confirmed) 
 
Housing and Economic Equity- Highland County 
Office of Community and Economic Development 
(confirmed) 
 
Youth Workforce Develop and Criminal Justice (TBD) 
 
10:05  Milestone 
Group 
Explanation 
 
10:15 Milestone 
Advisory 
Groups 
(breakout) 
M
1 
M2 M3 M
4 
M5 Resources 
and Budget 
Development 
Policy 
Analysis 
and 
Advocacy 
11:10  Reconvene   
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complement activity underway and that will help Highland County 
move toward a comprehensive plan for addressing the milestone in 
question 
 Discuss the plan to meet over the next six months to solidify a next 
step action plan  
  (Meeting Artifact, 11/2/16) 
 In noticing that the there wasn’t much structure in the back-end of the 
program or thought to how the groups would accomplish the charge presented, I 
questioned who would be facilitating the milestone conversations, if there would be 
data to inform the conversations, what protocol facilitators would use, the take-
away expectations for groups/facilitators, and how the backbone group was 
planning to use the information and artifacts from the group conversations. Most of 
these questions were left unanswered. Yet after attending prior MBK summits with 
no data and facilitators with poor skills, I knew not answering these questions could 
hinder the success of the summit.  
 Following the meeting, I worked with Anita (HMBK VISTA) to enhance the 
back end of the program. I worked with K-12 program leaders within HCSD to 
gather data for the first four milestone conversations. Anita agreed to work on 
gathering data for the last two milestones. Ultimately, we created data sheets for 
each milestone that would be given to every person that attended the milestone 
discussion (see Image B). Anita (HMBK VISTA) and I had a phone conference on 
11/4/16 to come up with a protocol that facilitators could use to guide their 
milestone discussions (see Image C). We later circulated these to the backbone 
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group for feedback and comments. I recommended a list of seasoned facilitators for 
the milestone conversations, conferred with the VISTAs, and Samuel sent invitations 
to ask if they would be willing to participate. After receiving confirmation, we 
secured 8 facilitators- 3 Black males, 1 Black woman, 3 White women, and an Asian-
American woman. All in all, invitations, data, and the protocol were given to 
facilitators two days before the summit.  
Image B. Example Data Sheet from Milestone 2 for Local Action Summit II 
MBK Milestone Two: 
Ensuring all children read at grade level by 3 rd grade 
Salient Issues 
 District PreK-3 literacy 
 Attendance 
 In-home literacy 
 District and State retention policies 
 Social networks of support (barbershops) 
 
Target Population 
 African American young men in elementary school 
 Caregivers/parents of school-aged boys 
 School leaders – Boards of Education 
 Barbershop owners 
 
Departments/Systems Involved 
 Education – Schools and Districts 
 Library system 
 Barbershops 
 Health and Human Services  
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Image C. Protocol for Millstone Facilitators for Local Action Summit II  
 
 Summit II Results. By the day of the summit, 153 people were registered for 
the event via Event Brite (online event planning tool). On the day of the event, 80 
people registered during the first part of the program. Modifications were made at 
the beginning of the program, as Congresswoman Beth Moore could only mingle 
prior to the event (8am – 8:20am), and was unable to do the welcome address. The 
10-minute HMBK Year One overview lasted a half hour, which tightened the time 
and space for the presenters that follow. Given that the summit was being held the 
morning on a school day, only one young man from the Young Brother’s Youth 
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Council was able to attend in the morning, and preferred not to present by himself51. 
By the milestone breakout group sessions, attendees were noticeably weary from 
sitting through two hours of presentations.  
 During the milestone breakout groups I was busy working between breakout 
sessions to check-in with facilitators. After the sessions and summit, the facilitators 
for the first 4 milestones commented to me about the time constraint they faced 
during the session, and how the actual group make-up for each milestone made it 
difficult for the group leaders to follow the protocol. Instead, most simply had a 
discussion around the milestone topic.  
 In a recap meeting regarding the summit, meeting notes captured overall 
attendance and individual millstone group attendance. We learned that overall, 88 
people attended the summit (not including backbone members). Yet there was a 
drop in attendance for the milestone breakout groups, as each breakout group 
averaged around 8 attendees (Anita Jackson, Meeting Notes, 12/30/17). 
 Some interviewees retrospectively commented on their experience at or 
planning for local action summit II during their interviews. Linda Bay (HMBK 
Backbone Team Member & Professor, NWU) had occasionally been involved in 
planning for the summit, and was concerned about the structure people would be 
presented with at the summit, and if this structure would “enable them, require of 
them, insist on their contribution” (Interview).  
 Sean Worth (Director, Washington at Work) participated in the summit as a 
                                                        
51 At the end of the summit program that day (during the reconvening), 3 other Young Brothers members (all 
who were in college) were in attendance. John Walters gave them a few minutes during the end to present. One 
Young Brother presented a poem he created during a session with Samuel, Anita, a Neutral Zone leader, and I. 
Another young brother presented original rap lyrics from his recent album.  
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speaker and milestone group facilitator. He found out he was speaking the day 
before, and assumed it would be to a small subgroup of the participants. Yet after 
Jay Johnson (Director of Community Engagement, Highland County Sheriff's Office) 
sent an email about a PowerPoint, he realized he needed to use an existing 
slideshow, as there was no time to specialize his presentation to the needs of a MBK 
crowd (Sean Worth, Interview).  
 Michael Johnson (Assistant Director Of Intra-Governmental Affairs, NWU)  
also mentioned the summit in his interview. When I asked him how much progress 
HMBK had made towards its goals, he stated “Very little”, and referenced attendance 
at the summit as proof of this. Moreover, he believed the work that was highlighted 
during the summit could not be attributed to the work of HMBK. 
“…I've been away from the table for some time…but based on the summit 
[local action summit II], I didn't see any numbers. The project that got the 
light [at the summit] was our Second Grade Reading initiative that me and 
you worked on together, and that did not come out of the MBK.”  
(Michael Johnson, Interview)  
The last email in my data collection for this project included a communication from 
John Walters (Executive Director, HMBK) to the backbone team relaying his thanks 
for their towards the summit-  
Greetings, all: 
Just a note to say thank you to everyone for Monday's Local Action Summit II. 
I think that the our gathering, coming on a day when many other related 
events were happening on campus and in the region, was productive. It met 
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our expectations in a way that will allow us to recalibrate as we enter this 
last month of the year and ready ourselves for 2017. 
I was particularly glad to see the turnout among our youth and young 
professionals-in-training. 
Asante sana--thank you--to everyone.  
(John Walters, Electronic Communication, 11/18/16) 
 
 Phase III Summary. This final phase of research brought several smaller 
mechanisms into the HMBK routine: a consistent meeting schedule and agenda-
setting routine. John Walters had established a routine in which he as a leader 
crafted an agenda that was sent out the night before a meeting. Others could pass on 
additional items to him, yet often, new items would simply be introduced in actual 
meetings, but not pursued. This mechanism created a form of structure for the 
group, yet the consistent distance (physically and communicatively) between group 
members pushed back on the potential efficiency the routine agenda setting.  
 Yet two larger mechanisms were also presented and developed and intended 
to add purpose to the HMBK work. These included the development of the youth 
council and the convening of Local Action Summit II. Both mechanisms became a 
core aspect of the initiative, as (1) all group members believed youth of color 
needed to have a voice and space within HMBK, and (2) national and local 
leadership maintained a theory of attaining commitment through and from 
convening community members.   
 However this theory and the development of the council was challenged in 
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number of ways. First, as I disclosed in my reflection, I was aware HMBK did not 
have structures built to support the youth council, and hoped the grant would help 
to direct a strategy for developing this structure. However, the group’s disjointed 
communication and working style hampered recruiting effort. Moreover, the low 
number of young men of color who attended the first meeting seemed to not only 
reflect stunted recruitment efforts, but also a disinterest in the idea of a youth 
council for young men of color among youth. As low number continued through the 
council meetings that followed, there was less hope that a youth council could 
potentially be a powerful mechanism for HMBK.  
 Secondly, convening Local Action Summit II entailed its own challenges as 
well. While Anita and I spent a great deal of time creating protocols and data sheets, 
John Walters spent time and energy securing the participation of institutional 
leaders within the county (i.e. elected officials, directors within education, health, 
housing, workforce development, etc.). These actions helped HMBK to accomplish 
the summit goals of increasing awareness about the initiative and updating 
attendees about the initiative’s progress (Artifact, 8/10/16). However, summit II 
failed to enlist the involvement and commitment of men of color within the 
community/county. While several men of color who held more prominent positions 
within local organizations attended the summit, there were few men of color who 
simply represented the community, and the population that would experience or be 
impacted by the milestone areas and goals. Hence, summit II resulted in low(er) 
attendance than summit I, and little (if any) commitment from attendees to 
participate in future work. 
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 In all, phase III of the research proved that convening and displaying the 
work HMBK had done to date did not inspire county partners to join the effort in 
addressing barriers for young men of color. As many of HMBK’s mechanisms and 
efforts were challenged by a myriad of contextual features, lack of structure, and 
inability to capture authentic community voice, it became harder for HMBK to 
substantiate its progress, and consequently inspire further collaborative work.
 
 
 199 
 
Research Question 2 
How does collective commitment contribute to the success (or lack of success) of 
the collective action pursued by HMBK? 
a. What are the ways in which HMBK does/does not connect to 
individuals’ values, beliefs, and ideologies; and what are the 
conditions and mechanisms through which those individual 
commitments are fostered, detracted from, or sustained towards 
the collective level?  
b. How are race and power represented and negotiated in the collective 
space, particularly in the process of achieving collective action and 
commitment?  
  
 I believe there is enough evidence from the events documented during my 
year with HMBK to conclude that the HMBK was unsuccessful in reaching a level of 
collective commitment that would support significant collective action. Again, I’m 
adopting Gardner, et al.’s (2011) definition of collective commitment, which states 
that collective commitment is “a shared mindset and shared psychological state 
among a delineated collective of individuals regarding their employer, typified by 
feelings of loyalty and a desire to invest mental and physical energy in helping the 
organization achieve its goals” (p. 318)52.  
                                                        
52 While HMBK only served as an employer for the two VISTAs that worked on the initiative, this definition still 
presents an insightful perspective as to the connection between the individual and collective levels of 
commitment, and commitment as it’s directed towards collective action.  
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 As I’m conceptualizing individual commitments to be the values, beliefs, 
passions, and personal ideologies that individuals use to orient their personal 
pursuits and decisions, here I use interview data to first consider how HMBK 
struggled to connect to these individual commitments. I then use interview data to 
examine the conditions (or, environmental factors) that were not developed as a 
means to foster and sustain a collective level of commitment. I show how the lack of 
attending to these environmental factors also led to a breach between commitment 
and collective action. In addition, I illuminate how race and power were represented 
and negotiated the process of HMBK’s attempt to achieve collective action. I present 
a more critical analysis of this process in Chapter 5.  
 
What values, beliefs, passions, and ideologies drew participants to the table? 
 Black Members of HMBK Backbone Group. Prior to assessing the collective 
level, I believe it’s imperative to first understand the values, beliefs, passions, and 
ideologies that led individuals to participating in HMBK as a leader, VISTA, 
backbone group member, or steering committee member. One the most prevailing 
ideologies and values that impelled individuals and particularly the leaders and 
backbone group was an intentional personal and professional history of working 
within/on behalf of Black communities.  
 As a lawyer by profession, John Walters (Executive Director, HMBK) was 
driven by a political consciousness of advancing the Black community. During our 
interview he recalled having conversations at the age of eight or nine in which the 
community was “talking about the things that the black community would need to 
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do in order to counter efforts by the sort of White political structure to avoid our 
having our first black mayor in Cincinnati” (John Walters, Interview). His bond with 
other Black male professional organizations also led him to be a part of HMBK.  He 
had participated in the development of the Black Lawyers Association of Cincinnati, 
an organization that “involves African-American men, professional men, who are 
somewhat at significant point in their careers” (John Walters, Interview). This 
history developing organization that attended to the professional needs of Black 
men contributed to his desire to be involved in HMBK.  
  Working with and for Black communities/ young men of color was also a 
passion and value for Michael Johnson (Assistant Director Of Intra-Governmental 
Affairs, NWU), Anita Jackson (HMBK VISTA), Linda Bay (Professor, NWU), and Josh 
Hill (Director of Diversity and Community Engagement, NWU), all whom had been a 
part of the backbone group or HMBK leadership53. These participants had studied 
and worked with Black communities in different ways, and it was evident 
participating in HMBK was an extension on this value and commitment.  
 Specifically, Michael Johnson (Assistant Director Of Intra-Governmental 
Affairs, NWU) saw “the need for a solution, or several solutions, to kind of support 
young men of color”. Given that he had a master’s in social work and community 
organizing, he saw the “community piece” of HMBK as a place where he wanted “to 
roll up [his] sleeves” and “engage” (Interview).  Similarly, Anita Jackson (HMBK 
VISTA) identified as a sociologist, and had a bachelor’s degree is in community 
                                                        
53 Samuel Davis (HMBK VISTA) was the only backbone group member that did not mention a passion or value 
for Black community work or engagement. I identified him as a Black male in the project based on his reference 
to being a Black man in many of my other interactions. In addition, Samuel is member of a historically Black 
fraternity, and was the youngest member of the team.  
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studies. She was initially attracted to HMBK because she felt it was “African 
American initiative”, and thought “it would be great to work professionally with 
other African Americans to solve problems in the African American community” 
(Interview).  
 Prior to becoming a faculty member at NWU, Linda Bay was a school 
principal, and intentionally chose to work in “high-poverty communities”. She noted 
this was her personal choice, as she “knew nobody with [her] education was gonna 
influence or come to the projects and work with kids of color, because all [her] 
contemporaries… had different aspirations” (Interview). Josh Hill’s (Director of 
Diversity and Community Engagement, NWU) work was also deeply rooted in the 
concept of community as well. He stated that “[his] knowledge and passion in 
infusing very Afro-centric views of community” within his work helped him to see 
many connections to the collective action model HMBK was aiming to build 
(Interview).  
 In probing further, I was able to understand Michael (Asst. Director Of Intra-
Governmental Affairs, NWU) and John’s (Executive Director, HMBK) race, gender, 
and position led them to feel conscientious of their influence in relation to other 
men of color. Although Michael and John were about a generation a part, both were 
Black men who considered themselves to have some influence in their professional 
setting, and perceived that this positionality came with responsibility.  
“So, in this particular county…there are very few organizations or agencies 
where there are people of color in places of power to effect change…Because 
they’re especially limited spaces where men of color have leadership roles, 
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and can make an impact…And so I kind of feel that, as a result of me being a 
black male who has some influence and some experience in this community, 
it’s up to individuals like myself...” (Michael Johnson, Interview) 
Likewise, John believed he, as a Black male leader, had to leverage the influence he 
had towards the betterment of fellow Black men.  
“There's a reason that I'm in this space, you know, geographic space, social 
space, and it's not just here to have a good time and say hello…I gotta be 
accountable for all that I've been blessed with to be able to do, and that's 
where a sense of ownership, I think, flows for me.” (John Walters, Interview) 
 White Members of HMBK Backbone and Steering Committee. Some 
participants, backbone and steering committee members that were not Black also 
had a strong passion for working communities of color (although not always Black 
communities in particular). Harry Kennedy (Superintendent, HCSD) explained that 
the social justice lens that he used in his professional work was shaped by his youth 
experiences and being a part of a multi-racial faith-based organization. Yet as a 
“White male that [felt] passionately about HMBK work”, he valued the HMBK 
workspace because it brings “people who have a common commitment to that 
conversation to be able to move the agenda forward” (Harry Kennedy, Interview).  
 Amanda Saul (Director, Highland Early Start Collaborative) had been a 
consistent participant of the steering committee, and Ruth Nicole (Asst. 
Superintendent, HCSD) and Meghan Andrews (Executive Director of School and 
Community Partnerships, HCSD) had both participated in backbone meetings and 
played important roles in facilitating both local action summits. As three White 
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women who had been deeply involved at particular points in the initiative, I wanted 
to learn what individual commitments were drawing them to participate. I learned 
that their commitment to HMBK was driven by their professional dedication, and 
also racial equity for some. In particular, Amanda’s background as a social worker 
with a focus in community organizing led her to specifically consider children of 
color and the consequences of not ensuring inequitable opportunities.  
“…I sort of have now come to this part of my career thinking about how 
critical it is that we focus on young children, and particularly young children 
of color, because we’ve not given them the opportunities to be successful in 
school, and that just starts this whole downward spiral.” (Amanda Saul, 
Interview) 
Meghan’s professional work also led her to similar spaces. In particular, it led her to 
considering how community could be leveraged to work across sectors.   
“….I worked part time here and part time on the high school reform project. 
But I really began to develop this kind of conceptualization around how do 
we work with courts, how do we work with community mental health, how 
do we work with our youth nonprofits? Our neighborhood associations, our 
faith based leaders. What’s a framework for that?” (Meghan Andrews, 
Interview) 
Ruth’s passions and values that led her to being a part of the HMBK conversation 
were more personal. While her professional skill drew her to working on systematic 
problems (such as inequity), her point of reference was own experience in seeing 
inequity unfold.  
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“I chose the profession because of my experience growing up in a very 
educated well-to-do family, for a portion of my life, and then moving to a 
community with an Indian reservation that was very, very, very, very 
poor…And so, when I went to college and realized that what I was coming to 
college with, and all my Native American friends- from this really low-income 
community… how the system disadvantaged us- it wasn’t because we 
weren’t hard workers [or] we weren’t smart [or] because we didn’t have 
great perspective and supportive families. It was a system thing.” (Ruth 
Nicole, Interview) 
 Other Personal Commitments and Perspectives. In addition to the 
aforementioned commitments, interview participants also spoke to other personal 
commitments that led to their participation in HMBK. Linda Bay mentioned that 
working within HMBK initiative was “the right thing to do” (Interview). Jay Johnson 
recognized there were few spaces where positive and productive national attention 
was given to young men of color, and he was grateful for President Obama’s idea of 
creating “a vehicle or mechanism to talk about young black boys” (Interview). Juan 
Ruiz also noted his commitment to the progress of the next generations, he like Jay 
Johnson, was appreciative of a “calling for action in an area for which we owe young 
people” (Interview).  
 Summary. In sum, participants at the HMBK table were individually 
committed to ideas and passions around community. Black participants were drawn 
to the table by their commitment to working with and for Black communities and 
initiatives, having a political consciousness around advancing the Black community, 
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and feelings of ownership and responsibility in being a Black man or color. Some of 
the more consistent White participants also alluded to being dedicated to concepts 
of community. Yet this was not always a distinct commitment to Black communities 
(i.e. often social justice or equity as opposed to Black community initiatives). 
Moreover, some of the White participants were guided by professional desires to 
work with individuals who were committed to addressing social issues. This was 
different (and later shows to be significant) than other Black participants who were 
intentional in working with other Black individuals to build and help Black 
communities.  
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Why was HMBK unable to connect to individuals’ values, beliefs, and 
ideologies?  
  There were many similarities in the individual commitments drawing 
individuals to participate and work within the HMBK initiative, and many of those 
commitments pertained to working for the advancement of people of color. Yet 
HMBK was unable to connect and foster these individual commitments towards a 
collective and sustainable level. Here I use the three critical environmental 
indicators for collective commitment in early-staged collective action to evaluate 
why the collaborative was unable to achieve collective commitment, and the role 
commitment played in its inability to reach many of its desired outcomes.    
Vision 
 No Clear Outcomes or Goals.  One reason HMBK was unable to foster 
collective commitment towards collective action was because the outcomes or goals 
that the group was aiming towards were unclear and lofty. From a definitional 
perspective, collective commitment is a commitment directed towards outcomes 
and goals54. At the national level, the MBK Community Challenge put forward 6 
milestones which communities could focus efforts towards and use as outcome 
goals55. Interviews revealed that most individuals that had been involved in the 
initiative were aware that these 6 milestones existed. In fact, when asked, “From 
                                                        
54 Again, I’m using Gardner et al.’s (2011) definition of collective commitment, which states that collective 
commitment is “a shared mindset and shared psychological state among a delineated collective of individuals 
regarding their employer typified by feelings of loyalty and a desire to invest mental and physical energy in 
helping the organization achieve its goals” [emphasis added] (p. 318). 
55 Again, the six national MBK milestone are (1) Entering School Ready to Learn; (2) Reading at Grade Level by 
Third Grade; (3) Graduating from High School Ready for College and Career; (4) Completing Postsecondary 
Education or Training; (5) Entering the Workforce; (6) Reducing Violence and Providing Second Chances (Force, 
2014).  
 
 
 
 208 
your perspective, what are the outcomes HMBK hopes to achieve?”, 26 of 30 
interviewees made some reference to the six milestones as the outcome(s) HMBK 
was hoping to achieve. Hence, it was evident that most knew the general aims of the 
local initiative (HMBK) were reflective of the national agenda.  
 In addition, empirical evidence from the historical cases I’ve studied show 
that vision is a critical environmental factor that contributes and sustains collective 
commitment. Having a clear idea of what the initiative is about, why it exists, and 
what the group is attempting to do to reach its desired outcomes not only enables 
individuals to connect and see their personal ideas and values as part of a greater 
concept, but also keeps the collective group inspired and impassioned about the 
change they are attempting to accomplish.  
 As mentioned, HMBK brought together passionate people who were 
interested in working with and for Black communities and young men of color, 
dedicated to concepts of community, and committed to addressing social issues 
Furthermore, those working within HMBK saw the initiative as “the right thing to 
do” (Linda Bay, Interview), saw “the urgency in helping to support young men of 
color” (Michael Johnson, Interview), and were grateful for President Obama’s idea of 
creating “a vehicle or mechanism to talk about young black boys” and “calling for 
action in an area for which we owe young people” (Jay Johnson, Interview; Juan 
Ruiz, Interview). Despite similar individual values, beliefs, and passions, HMBK 
could not connect their individual commitments into collective commitment that 
would allow for collective action. During my interviews, I asked each interviewee, 
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“Does HMBK have a clear collective vision?” Of the 30 interviewees, 29 responded 
“No”.  
 Specific responses to questions around outcomes, goals, and vision support 
this claim as well. Interestingly, key leaders within the backbone group commented 
on how the initiative lacked well-defined outcomes.  When asked what outcomes 
HMBK hoped to achieve, Linda Bay (Professor, NWU) relayed that although she 
knew of the six milestones, she was unsure if “that’s what we [HMBK] need[ed] to 
achieve (Interview). Likewise, Harry Kennedy (Superintendent, HCSD) pointed to 
the illusive nature of the milestones and that the group hadn’t adopted them.  
Harry Kennedy: …Entering kindergarten ready [Milestone 1], what does that 
mean? So I think there are some touch points that we could identify but I 
don’t know that they have been formally adopted yet. (Interview)  
 This lack of well-defined outcomes and ambiguity as to what the initiative 
was attempting to do to make progress on the milestones turned out to be a reason 
for Aaron Bailey’s (County Sheriff) sparse participation in HMBK despite being a 
HMBK Co-Chair56. Although he acknowledged being a supporter of the initiative, 
HMBK’s inability to create clarity around the vision prevented him from connecting 
and committing to the group. 
Aaron Bailey: So I am amazed, not only in this effort, but in efforts all up and 
down line, we always talk about certain things, but we never really define the 
outcome…And I think that you can only achieve things by identifying that 
                                                        
56 Sheriff Andrew Bailey was appointed Co-Chair of HMBK along with State Representative Ryan Connor when 
HMBK officially accepted the challenge to become an MBK Community on August 15, 2015 (see Accepting the 
Challenge, p.). Yet he was not an active member of steering committee or backbone group. In my interview with 
Jay Johnson (Director of Community Engagement, Highland County Sheriff's Office), Jay mentioned that the 
sheriff had asked him to be more involved in the HMBK as a representative from the sheriff’s office.  
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first, and then working your way back…This is a frustration for me…because 
I can get behind this 100 percent… I just don’t want to just be another one of 
those things that sounds good that we can say we do, then there are no 
changes in outcomes. (Interview) 
 
 Lack of Strategy. In the narrative of phase two, I give an example of how the 
lack of clarity around goals and outcomes for HMBK was reflected in the questions 
and frustrations posed by the VISTAs. In one particular meeting, Anita (HMBK 
VISTA) asks for a “…clearer understanding of what we do before we go and ask 
people to do things with us” (Meeting Audio, 7/15/16). She would often pose this 
question, or ask what the group was doing and how it was actually planning to 
accomplish certain tasks. Samuel Davis (HMBK VISTA) also suggested that the group 
lacked a more comprehensive plan, and wished the national MBK directors had 
provided local communities with this.  
Samuel Davis: I think they [the national MBK entity] should've been provided 
with something to kind of go forward with? …I know they have the four or 
five steps [the four steps to becoming an MBK Community]. I feel like those 
steps kind of just solidify the existence…(Interview) 
 The data also presented an emerging trend of each individual having their 
own personal strategy and/or vision for HMBK. Hence, the vision for HMBK was not 
clear or collective due to the fact that everyone had their own idea in mind of how 
the collective was suppose to go about making change for young men of color, and 
the vast majority of these ideas did not overlap. During my interviews, I asked 
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interviewees, “If you were given the task of working with a collective group of people 
to make change for young men of color, what would you do? What strategies would 
you use?” 19 respondents (the majority of those interviewed) responded that they 
weren’t sure of what they’d do or the strategies that they’d use. 8 others responded 
with idiosyncratic ideas and strategies, including ideas around mentorship, 
engaging with parents and families, and empowering the community/young men of 
color to demand things for themselves.  
 Competing Visions and Strategies/Vision for Space Isn’t Inclusive. In 
tandem to the belief that there was no clear and collective vision, there was also a 
strong belief that similar to the concept of having multiple strategies, HMBK 
contained too many individual visions, and the group’s inability to select or 
synthesize these visions resulted in there not being a vision. John Walters 
(Executive Director, HMBK) was aware that there could have been multiple visions 
around HMBK’s existence and desired outcomes, as well as multiple strategies on 
how to accomplish these visions. While he did not see this as a significant barrier, he 
did see that competing visions frustrated the process of creating organizational 
structure.  
John Walters: …I think we sometimes have a bit of competing visions – and 
never anything wrong with that, but between whether or not we need to be 
able to show some immediate wins to do what we need to do versus more 
attention to organizational structure, that [creating organizational structure] 
could be sometimes like watching paint dry on a wall… (Interview) 
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In contrast, Anita Jackson (HMBK VISTA) believed having multiple visions, and 
furthermore, having multiple visionaries, was a significant problem within in the 
collective. The fusion of such issues proved to be a challenge for her.  
Anita Jackson: …The grand vision of our org isn't clear, and there's a lot of 
visionaries, but not a lot of strategic persons…When it comes to backbone, 
we need more strategy; we need more breakdown of what that vision looks 
like… (Interview) 
When I probed further and asked if her vision for HMBK was similar or dissimilar to 
other in the group, she indicated that her vision was “similar to other people in the 
group, except for the main person that it needs to be similar with”, and this led her 
to believe that there were “some hierarchal structural challenges that need to be 
addressed.”  (Anita Jackson, Interview) 
 Similarly, Harry Kennedy (Superintendent, HCSD) considered leadership and 
the current structure as a limitation towards solidifying and pursuing a common 
vision. Harry often championed for creating a space that incorporated the visions 
and conceptualization of all group members, not just leaders’. Yet given that 
executive leadership of HMBK set the agenda, what HMBK pursued or left undecided 
was concluded at that level. 
Harry Kennedy: What I feel like in our current role is that we [HMBK] have a 
lid on what we can do.  We can’t really push because we have a structure that 
designates one person as the lead and everything else has to fall in line with 
that. …That’s uncomfortable for me because I’m a doer. (Interview) 
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 Individuals seeing themselves as part of realizing the vision. As 
interviews revealed that most believed that HMBK lacked vision, I proceeded to ask 
interviewees to elaborate on their responses as well as look for empirical evidence 
as to why individuals might see the vision as unclear or perhaps non-existent. I 
found a number of interesting trends. One trend was how and if they saw 
themselves as part of the vision. These ideas often fell along gender and racial lines. 
Hence, if individuals couldn’t see their gender or race as playing a part in HMBK’s 
existence, it was unlikely that they believed the group had a clear and collective 
vision.  
 Gendered Perspectives on Vision. In my interview with Anita, we talked about 
how not having organizational structure, framework, and vision (i.e. how the group 
would work together and with community partners) impacted HMBK’s ability to 
progress on particular things. While the backbone had visited the ideas of 
possibilities for an organizational structure in our early meetings (i.e. exploring the 
collective impact model, attempting to solidify an appointed steering committee, 
etc.), however there was never any follow up on these conversations.  
 Anita and I presumed there was more we could contribute to the 
organizational, structural, and overall progress of HMBK, yet we both seemed to 
realize the true limitations of our contributions. We both seemed conscious that the 
initiative was about young men of color, and as women we were still being 
challenged on how to support the work especially given the lack of structure.  
During our interview time, Anita also commented on how I was often the woman 
who did not push back. This led us to talking about my learning to “work around” 
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leadership and lack of structure within HMBK, and how it was also a challenge for 
me to work within especially as a woman.  
Tabitha: …I think I realized that, especially as one of few women at the table, 
if the leadership doesn't embrace [an idea], and you're not in a position to 
change that, you have to learn how to work around some things until you are 
in a position to do that.  
Anita Jackson: Yeah – and that's something I'm learning, is that workaround, 
actually. And that's why I said, it's easier to ask for forgiveness than 
permission…. We are not just coming at you with things that we just pull it 
out of the side our neck, you know, we're well-researched, we've been 
trained to do this. I've got all this information, and I present something that's 
coming from a place of passion, of care, you know. (Interview) 
 Amanda Saul (Director, Highland Early Start Collaborative), Ruth Nicole (Asst. 
Superintendent, HCSD), and Meghan Andrews (Executive Director of School and 
Community Partnerships, HCSD) were women who had also been involved in 
steering committee meetings, backbone meetings, and all aided in facilitating 
milestone breakout groups at the second local action summit. They had been less 
involved than Anita, Linda Bay, and I (all Black women), yet were consistently at the 
table when invited to participate. In my interview with each of them, I learned that 
they each had chosen to remain ‘a step behind’ those that were highly involved as 
they were uncertain of what role they should play within the group. Moreover, I 
perceived that as White women, they were attempting to navigate their 
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participation and engagement without wanting to overstep presumed gender and 
racial boundaries.  
Amanda Saul: …I want to be sensitive as a white woman that I am committed 
and that I'm willing and anxious to be involved, but it's not ownership in that 
– it's not for me to say, ‘This is the direction that things should go,’ or Why 
don't we do it this way?’ (Interview)  
In one instance, Meghan decided to diverge from the facilitator’s protocol during the 
summit, as she was conscious of how her race and gender might have hindered 
connections between the men of color that were in her group.  
Meaghan Andrews: I was charged with facilitating that group [Milestone 3 
breakout group at the Local Action Summit II] and I had very specific 
deliverables of what I was supposed to accomplish…I intentionally did not do 
that because I felt this group was using the dialogue to build community and 
relationship across institution and across space with a group of 
predominantly African American males who had not ever come together 
before. And I didn't feel it was my place as the white, female facilitator to 
make the judgment call that that was more important than honoring their 
connectivity and their voices. (Interview) 
 
In the case with Ruth, she was conscientious of the power her voice carried in 
comparison to men of color, and accounted for this in her engagement and 
participation- 
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Ruth Nicole: …I am sometimes cautious, as a white woman taking on a 
perceived mantle of something for black men. Like, I don't wanna speak for a 
Black man, because my voice is the one that has power, right? I'd rather find 
a way to create a space for that black man to have his voice heard directly. So 
I am conscious of that, but I don't, like, exclude myself because of that, if that 
makes sense. I just am careful, maybe, not to talk [laughs], but to make space 
for someone else to talk, or something. (Interview) 
 
 Racial Boundaries and Political Correctness. As HMBK struggled to foster an 
environment that formed and sustained collective commitment, part of this 
challenge was explained by racial boundaries and “political correctness” that 
hindered individuals within the group from seeing themselves as part of realizing 
that vision. Just as women within the group attempted to understand how they 
could contribute as women within an initiative for young men of color, there were 
also questions among male participants within the initiative as to how race could or 
should create a boundary as for who could be involved. The group had never 
endeavored to dissect or address this boundary collectively. 
 I asked Jay Johnson (Director of Community Engagement, Highland County 
Sheriff's Office), a steering committee member, about race and its bearing on his 
participation in HMBK. He mentioned that others saw him (being a Black male) as a 
critical part of the conversation.  
Jay Johnson: I want to say no, race hasn’t [played a role how he had engaged], 
but I think yes. In that I had several people come to me and say, "Jay, you 
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need to be at MBK meetings." I've had several women say it. I've had several 
white individuals say it. And this was before I was actually coming to the 
meetings. When I asked them why, they, I think, put a lot into it should be 
black men as a core piece of this conversation around black boys. 
As mentioned before, Michael Johnson (Asst. Director Of Intra-Governmental Affairs, 
NWU), John Walters (Executive Director, HMBK), and Josh Hill (Director of Diversity 
and Community Engagement, NWU) had all alluded feeling responsible for engaging 
in HMBK as Black men, and having some influence within a sizable institution. 
 Nonetheless, Harry Kennedy (Superintendent, HCSD) brought to light a racial 
barrier that highlighted people’s desire to be politically correct. Just as Michael, 
John, Josh, and Jay were being positioned (whether by others or by themselves) in 
the work of HMBK because they were Black men and the initiative was for men of 
color, Harry questioned who was endorsed to be a part the HMBK effort, and how 
race seemed to play as a boundary for political correctness.  
Harry Kennedy: Here is my wonder… does the group believe that this is work 
that has to be done by African American leaders for African American young 
boys…. Because no one wants to undermine the potential for this to work.  
The problem is that I think that there are concerns about who can say what 
to whom and worries about offending people in the process. (Interview).  
 Concluding Thoughts. In sum, interviews revealed that while people were 
familiar with the 6 Millstones identified by the national MBK effort, those working 
and connected to HMBK were still unclear of what outcomes HMBK was targeting. 
Even leaders and those in the backbone group that consistently sat at the table were 
 
 
 218 
unsure of which strategies HMBK was using to tackle the larger milestone outcomes. 
Not having defined outcomes and goals was a poignant breakdown for HMBK, as it 
also pointed to an inability to identify strategies towards tackling the larger 
Milestone goals, and also served as a barrier for participation for others that were 
less active in the effort. Not seeing oneself as part of realizing HMBK’s goals 
(whether because of gender or race) also served as an obstruction in developing a 
collective vision. 
 Hence, while the mission and cause of HMBK may have aligned with 
individuals’ personal values, beliefs, and ideologies, not having a clear vision 
impeded on individuals’ ability (and for some their desire) to work within the 
collective group.  All in all, not only did environmental factors restrict HMBK from 
attaining collective commitment, ascertaining collective commitment via definition 
was also unfeasible as the group showed there was no clearly defined outcome or 
goal to commit to.  
Trust 
 My analysis of the historical cases as well as reflection on the HMBK effort 
led me to identify trust as critical factor towards developing collective commitment. 
Individuals’ feeling of security in the group/overall initiative, and the belief that 
they can work openly and honestly within the group space has significant bearing 
on a group’s ability to connect to individual values, beliefs, and commitments 
towards collective commitment.  
 I spoke to Meghan Andrews (Executive Director of School and Community 
Partnerships, HCSD) about the idea of trust in collective spaces during her 
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interview.  As having developed an expertise in community partnerships and 
organizing, she acknowledged that trust was one of the strongest factors in creating 
community and collective spaces57.  
Meghan Andrews: So one of the things that I learned and if you look at some 
of the community organizing literature and this came true in our work was 
relational trust. So it really wasn't about money, it wasn't about resources. In 
the end, kind of one of the single most, the strongest factors were relational 
trust… (Interview) 
Moreover, Meghan agreed with me in that MBK hadn’t developed trust within the 
collective space. She also saw race and power impeding the group’s development of 
trust and its progression as a collective.  
Meghan Andrews: …When I look at the MBK work, there isn't deep relational 
trust…I see this as playing nice in the sandbox a little bit right now but 
developing norms where we can call each other out on issues of race and 
positional power so that we can move the work forward. (Meghan Andrews, 
Interview) 
 Meghan wasn’t the only interviewee that explicitly mentioned a lack of trust 
within the HMBK group. In my interview with State Representative Ryan Connnor 
(Black male), the issue of trust reemerged. Whereas he and Congresswoman Beth 
Moore had appointed John Walters as the executive director of HMBK, he had been 
drawn to the initiative given his personal educational experience. While he valued 
                                                        
57 Meghan studied community-based school reform efforts for her doctorate degree, and her position at HCSD 
has driven her to be a part and also lead community-based initiatives that necessitate collective commitment 
and collective action. As she had been a part of the early stages of planning for HMBK and facilitated a milestone 
conversation during Local Action Summit II, it was affirming to hear her thoughts regarding the lack of trust 
within the HMBK group space. 
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the diversity of ideas that came from partnerships and collective initiatives such as 
HMBK, he also recognized that there were drawbacks to these spaces as well. One 
such drawback was the underdevelopment of trust that ironically was necessary for 
this type of work to move forward. Hence, when I pushed him to decide on whether 
HMBK had become a space where opinions were valued and people were open to 
listening and grappling with different perspectives, he responded, “No”. He 
elaborated-  
Representative Connor: So you've gotta have that trust level, and you've 
gotta have… each person valuing each person that's there and where they 
come from. And then, out of that, I think will come a trust… If you don't have 
that element, then people [are] gonna turn each other off… (Interview) 
 Meghan and Representative Connor’s references to developing trust within 
spaces to where people are acknowledged, valued, and are able to have difficult 
conversations reflected a concern and theme across the meeting audio. Anita and 
Samuel (HMBK VISTAs) had spent much of their first weeks introducing new ideas 
to the backbone group on how HMBK might structure and organize itself, how it 
could engage its stakeholders, and how the initiative could add value within the 
context of Highland County. However, patterns within meetings pointed their 
(VISTAs) being unheard, and plausibly devalued. Of the 13 backbone meetings I 
recorded, 9 provide examples in which she or Samuel proposed ideas, and these 
ideas were either dismissed overtly or never taken up post meeting.  
 As I had concerns about how the VISTAs felt about being (or not being 
heard), as well as their thoughts on consequences for voicing their opinions, I made 
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a point to speak to them about this during their interviews. I learned that Samuel 
(HMBK VISTA) saw reporting out as a responsibility all group members had, and he 
felt heard in this way. Yet he was more concerned about listening.  
Samuel Davis: So [in meetings] you kind of share your updates. But, I think I 
also try to listen a lot, and I try to understand why people suggest how they 
want to do things or try to understand what they're trying to convey. I think 
sometimes people can say things, and they may not come out exactly how 
they think them. So, you've kind of got to really listen to kind of get to the 
core of what people are trying to say. (Interview) 
Samuel believed his engagement in the group was highly characterized by sharing 
out and making a strong effort to listen to others and understand their concerns 
even if they weren’t always presented in the finest way. Given my work with 
Samuel, I agreed with his self-assessment, as I often saw Samuel as the team 
member who was more willing to listen and hear out others’ concerns in order to 
foster a more harmonizing group space.  
 Anita (HMBK VISTA) felt differently, given she was less concerned about 
listening and more concerned about being heard. As a self-identified strong, Black 
woman, she acknowledged that she was more engaged when she was heard, but felt 
silenced at times and wondered why this was the case. Even when she and Samuel 
worked collectively to problem-solve and develop things they both believed HMBK 
needed, she believed their answers were dismissed, leading her to perceive that the 
group was “half-stepping”.  
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Anita Jackson: I like to engage when I'm being heard, and I disengage when 
I'm being shut down. And so, as a visionary, I get all these great ideas, and 
kind of we're put in a position to drive this thing, but we're not given all the 
tools we need to drive, you know? …So, I saw a lot needed to be done…and 
my colleague, Samuel [HMBK VISTA], he was the same way…And so now 
we've got, like, this tag team, and that happened for, like, the first three 
weeks and [we’re] solving problems left and right.  
 
So then, we presented [to the group at backbone meetings], like, you know, 
those problems being solved, and they were, like, "No, those aren't the 
answers”…But all these problems need to be solved in order for us to do this 
right; otherwise, we're kind of half-stepping…(Interview) 
Anita also spoke on how gender, particularly being a woman, intersected with her 
feelings of not being heard and acknowledged. Although she admitted that she didn’t 
“hold back very well” and “let it be known” when things bothered her, she believed 
her womanhood, particularly in a space for and being steered by men, led to her 
being silenced.  
Anita Jackson: And so, partly, I feel like part boils down to me being a woman 
in the space, and trying to fight for that – even though I wanna create that 
opportunity for males to be this head of the table, you know, as their place 
may be, biblically, I don't diminish the role of a female being in that space 
doing exactly the same thing. But sometimes I start, and I look, like, "Why am 
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I being squashed, at this moment? Why am I being silenced? Why am I not 
being heard? (Interview) 
 Anita mentions a number of factors that illuminate how the HMBK 
environment did not foster a sense of trust amongst group members. In particular, 
she highlights that the group often was not open to grappling with her thoughts and 
concerns regarding the initiative.  Moreover, her experience as a thinker and woman 
in a space where she was consistently silenced alluded to distrust that others would 
even be open to her ideas and thoughts.  
 Group lacks confidence in leadership and vision of the initiative. Harry 
was aware that the VISTAs would often share their insights, and their thoughts 
weren’t always met with the group’s willingness to listen and grapple with their 
ideas. He mentioned this as a concern during his interview as well.  
Harry Kennedy: Of the small group [backbone]…we get PowerPoints that are 
thrown up that the VISTAS create that either does or doesn’t get any traction, 
there is one person who ultimately gets to decide yes or no [John Walters].  
So that’s our structure… (Interview)  
Harry’s comments showed a concern for how others on the team (i.e. the VISTAs) 
were not being heard or acknowledged, as well as a concern about leadership and 
structure for the initiative. Linda Bay (Professor, NWU), who was also a backbone 
group member and frequently participated in meetings via phone, also noted 
apprehension about the leadership for the initiative. As the initiative was about men 
of color, she’d trusted that men of color would have created the structures needed to 
move the work forward. Yet after she perceived that the initiative was missing 
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structure and that there was mistrust between group members, she increased 
engagement in HMBK although she truly was not looking to be involved.  
Linda Bay: …I was really hoping that the men who were involved in the work 
would have created the structure and get the thing going.  I would not have 
intervened at all had I not sensed that there was conflict between Anita and 
John…. I don't wanna be involved, one, because I just fundamentally think it 
needs to be led by men, and because African-American women historically 
carry the burden…(Interview) 
 Furthermore, as lack of progress and inaction became the norm, some began 
to develop more mistrust, as they did not understand why their contributions were 
not being reflected in some show of progress. Michael Johnson (Asst. Director of 
Intra-Government Relations, NWU) suggested a similar idea during my interview 
with him. When I asked him what he had learned about working in the group, he 
relayed that his challenge was having many other obligation besides HMBK and 
trusting “that our vision as a team [would] be carried forward”, only to find that this 
rarely the case (Michael Johnson, Interview). Consequently, he found that the group 
was “spending hours of time talking about a plan, and then only to meet again and to 
see that that plan didn't come to fruition…”  (Michael Johnson, Interview).  
 Concluding Thoughts. Feelings about not being received or acknowledged, 
lack of confidence regarding the leadership and structure of the initiative, feeling 
silenced- all contributed to mistrust among group members. This in turn made it 
challenging to establish the relational trust that both Meghan Andrews (Executive 
Director of School and Community Partnerships, HCSD) and Representative Connor 
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stated was missing. Consequently, finding evidence of trust within the HMBK was 
difficult to do. As trust is a critical environmental factor for developing collective 
commitment, empirical data reveals that lack of trust within the group made 
collective commitment hard to attain. 
Space to Learn 
 I define space to learn (STL) as the time and capacity [resources, human 
capital] for the group to grow (individually and collectively) in knowledge and 
understanding of the problem, context, barriers, self, and each other. STL 
encompasses the meaning individuals attribute to the collective space, as 
relationships and interactions contribute to individuals’ development of personal 
and group identity. STL allows for the individuals and the group to learn through 
doing, make missteps without harsh consequences, and come to informed and 
consensus-based decisions. In all, STL includes the social and cultural norms 
developed within the collective space, meaning individuals attribute to the collective 
space, and the cultural and social knowledge surrounding the work of the initiative 
(Walker, 2012). 
 Lack of Support for Personal and Collective Growth. Undoubtedly, the 
majority of interviewees mentioned that the primary value of collective spaces such 
as HMBK was the opportunity it gave them to learn from others and gain 
perspective from a diverse group of people. As Juan Ruiz  (Professor & Director of 
NWU Brotherhood Initiative, NWU) explained, those involved in collective action 
spaces were “…called upon to participate because they have some expertise in their 
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area that is helpful to learn or see or to hear”, and individuals then leverage what 
they learn, see, and feel towards a collective effort (Interview). 
 Accordingly, Samuel (HMBK VISTA) noted that spaces like HMBK needed to 
strategically include people who would bring a variety of perspectives and 
experiences to the table. He believed HMBK was doing this, as he stated the HMBK 
group space allowed him to learn, grow, and change as a person.  
“It's helping me develop and me grow because I learn from you, and this is 
kind of the environment that we are in, we all learn from each other…I hope 
that's happening to everyone, that they're all learning so that we can be 
better…” (Samuel Davis, Interview). 
 Yet this experience of personal growth through learning from one another 
was not happening for everyone. In contrast, Anita’s (HMBK VISTA) experience 
within HMBK did not lead to personal growth. Instead, it led her to feel that the 
collective space was not a place where she would be allowed to take risks, another 
important aspect of STL. Rather, Anita felt that while she had risked sharing her new 
ideas, she was often met with a harsh consequence of being “dismissed” and told not 
to “do it that way” (Interview).  
 Data from meeting audio point to reoccurring instances in which risks were 
taken and met with harsh consequences. A classic example occurred during the 
8/10/16 backbone meeting. At the prior backbone meeting (8/3/16; attended by 
John, the VISTAs, and I), there were several polemic moments between John and 
Anita, and the meeting had lasted 5 hours. In my check-in meeting with the VISTAs 
the following Monday, Anita mentioned using some of the next full backbone 
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meeting time to create working agreements as a response to the conflict. I agreed 
that that could be a productive way for us to work together and encouraged her to 
bring the idea to our next meeting on Wednesday.  
 At the next meeting, Anita takes the risk in leading a discussion about 
potential working arrangements our group could agree on in response to the events 
of the prior meeting. John Walters (Executive Director, HMBK), Samuel Davis 
(HMBK VISTA), Anita Jackson (HMBK VISTA), Michael Johnson (Asst. Director Of 
Intra-Governmental Affairs, NWU), Harry Kennedy (Superintendent, HCSD) and 
Richard Olson (Professor and Director of the Institute for the Study of Children, 
Families, and Communities, NWU), and I were in attendance. The discussion around 
potential working agreements proceeded for nearly 15 minutes. Anita spent time 
attempting to justify the idea and need for creating working agreements given that 
“HMBK was learning community” and group members were “learning how to do this 
together”. She also gave the group examples of agreements the HMBK group could 
take on collectively, and writes these ideas on the board.  
 Anita then attempts to engage Michael in the conversation, but Michael 
challenges the premise and practice of creating working agreements.  
Anita: Michael, do you have any working agreements to add?  
 
Michael. No… I just have a question. Is this a best practice, or where is this 
coming from? I’ve never seen, or had working agreements. So I just want to 
know what it’s grounded in.  
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Anita: Oh, this is grounded in developing a professional learning community. 
And so, given that there’s a lot of developments that we’ll be doing as an 
organization, that we’re learning as we’re producing them, coming up with a 
list on how we’d like to work together so that we don’t step on each other’s 
toes, hurt each other’s feelings, uh, have a 5 hour meeting, (background 
laughter), things like that… (Meeting Audio, 8/10/16) 
Whereas the discussion had been already been difficult and group members were 
disengaging, Michael’s comments ignited further skepticism, as other group 
members began to challenge the idea as well. After several minutes, John Walters 
(Executive Director, HMBK) stifles the conversation and signals the group to move 
forward with other affairs.  
John Walters: Let me say also, I do understand the model that’s being 
developed here. I’ve always been of the view that if …everybody is respectful 
or everybody else, the meeting will run, and that these things will fall in 
place. And if they don’t fall into place, then someone…from the leadership 
perspective… will have that handled… But I do understand. (Meeting Audio, 
8/10/16) 
 Anita’s attempt to set up working agreements reflected multiple aspects of 
the SPTL concept, including (1) an attempt to reflect and productively recalibrate 
with the group after having learned from her experience in the meeting the week 
before; (2) an attempt to learn through doing and the process of development; and 
(3) an attempt to take a risk and learn. Yet of these attempts were met with 
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challenge, questioning of the validity of the idea, and ultimately the harsh 
consequence of dismissal.  
 Consequently, the group never formally created working agreements, and 
began to establish a social norm for the consequences of taking risks within the 
collective space, and attempts to grow and learn collectively. Moreover, Michael and 
John’s attempts to move the conversation forward without a clear cut decision on if 
the group would truly take up working agreements intersected with other power 
and gender dynamics, as both were Black men with more positional power than 
Anita (a Black woman). It also seemed that their attempt to move on without 
definitively creating working agreements was also an attempt to maintain order in 
the meeting given Harry and Richard’s attendance58.  
 Peculiar Dynamics between Power, Race, and STL. Administratively, John 
Walters was given the task and role of Executive Director for HMBK. This role 
predictably gave him authority to lead and set the agenda, have influence in 
determining the players at the table, and even make decisions on behalf of the 
group. Nonetheless, achieving developed and sustained collective commitment 
within collective action initiatives requires a space where individuals are willing to 
learn from group members despite potential power differentials, and leadership 
supports and encourages deeper knowledge of the social problem promotes a 
wanting to learn through the process, and these two aspects are critical to STL.  
 Both Ruth Nicole (Asst. Superintendent, HCSD) and Meghan Andrews 
(Executive Director of School and Community Partnerships, HCSD) inadvertently 
                                                        
58 Harry and Richard (both White men) were not always able to attend meetings. However, when they did, the 
group dynamic seemed to encourage more efficiency and productivity. I speak more on this in a latter section.  
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mentioned and supported this concept during my interview with them. Ruth 
believed that collective spaces required leaders to make space for reflection and 
shared power, and this was often hard to do.  
Ruth Nicole: And sometimes that's the hardest work, because it's all this 
reflective inside work, and, "How do I have to grow as a leader, to create 
space for other people to step into these positions? Can I give up my power a 
little bit, to make space for a different voice to have it?" (Interview) 
Likewise, Meghan contended that those with “positional power have to use their 
privilege to create the space” for conversation and learning (Interview).  
 Harry Kennedy (Superintendent, HCSD) was one with such positional power. 
As Harry had been on both the steering committee and the backbone committee, his 
position (primary leader of his organization) and race (White) allotted him 
significant influence within the group, and he acknowledged that “what [he brought] 
to the table is positional power, authority, and ability to talk about how [HMBK  
could] address resources” (Interview). Yet Harry also mentioned that he was 
“…working very hard to keep [his positional power] in check and not just impose 
what I think is the right solution”, as he believed co-creation and learning with 
others were important to the group’s development (Interview).  
 Learning about and with others was a characteristic that many of the White 
participants deferred to within the HMBK space. Of the 7 white participants I 
interviewed, 4 mentioned working in the background and/or being cautious in 
effort to learn from others, and how and where they could contribute within the 
initiative, as they acknowledged the position of power their race attributed to them. 
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This was less the case for Black participants, and particularly Black leaders holding 
power within the initiative.  
 In fact, it was not uncommon for the Black leaders to seek validation from 
White members and participants, or defer to the thoughts and opinions of White 
political leaders. John Walters (Executive Director, HMBK) repeatedly referred to 
wanting “to hear what the congresswoman [had] to say” (referring to 
Congresswoman Beth Moore) or acceding to Harry Kennedy’s (Superintendent, 
HCSD) suggestions in meetings (Meeting Audio, 7/15/16). Of the 13 recorded 
backbone meetings, Harry Kennedy (Superintendent, HCSD) and Richard Olson 
(Professor & Director of the Institute for the Study of Children, Families, and 
Communities, NWU) participated in five meetings. At each of these meetings, Samuel 
and Anita (HMBK VISTAs) explicitly ask or signal for presentation time to discuss 
ideas or things they have been working on. In one particular meeting (8/3/16), 
Richard joined John Walters, Samuel, Anita, and I during the latter portion of our 
backbone meeting. The group had met, discussed, and debated for 4 hours prior to 
Richard’s arrival. Yet once Richard arrived, Anita asked for time to present her ideas 
on possible infrastructural designs for HMBK. While she presented for an additional 
30 minutes, there was no further discussions of her proposed ideas. These instances 
reflected a developed and reinforced social norm in which HMBK leaders were 
willing to learn from those with positional power, yet struggled to support and 
encourage their own learning and others’ knowledge, as well as the growth of those 
without power.  Moreover, Samuel and Anita’s (HMBK VISTAs) actions of wanting to 
 
 
 232 
present and display their work to those with positional power demonstrated a 
learned social pattern.  
 Concluding Thoughts. Space to learn presents nascent groups with a measure 
of how the group grows (individually and collectively), attributes meaning to the 
collective space, and develops social and cultural norms. As the data suggests, HMBK 
struggled with creating a space in which individuals were encouraged to take risks, 
supported in personal and collective growth through learning, and were willing to 
learn from group members despite potential power differentials. The data revealed 
how leadership didn’t aid in creating a learning space, but also how race and power 
were critical contributors as to how less or more powerful individuals experienced 
the social and cultural norms the group soon developed and enacted.  
 In all, developing and sustain collective commitment without a strong space 
to learn was a difficult task. While the two VISTAs differed on their perspectives of 
WBMK being a space to learn, the constant discouragement towards taking risks 
and sharing ideas, lack of genuine listening between those with and without power, 
and a racially driven practice of seeking validation cultivated a space that was not 
inclined to learning and growth. This is turn presented a barrier towards achieving 
collective commitment, and ultimately achieving collection action.  
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Chapter V.  Critical Race Theory Analysis 
 
 The historical cases and HMBK case illustrate what it takes to develop 
collective commitment towards collective action in spaces that desire social change. 
While I will detail and explore more general conclusions across all cases in Chapter 
6, here, I illuminate another social dynamic that further complicates the narrative of 
developing of collective commitment- race.  
 Pawson and Tilley (2004) argue that “social circumstances” determine the 
extent of transformation that can/will be made by a program (p. 4). The authors 
acknowledge that in using a realist approach, researchers aim to unpack and 
understand the individual capacities, participant relationships, economic conditions, 
organizational position, as well as infrastructures and systems that make for the 
layers of social reality in which any program is situated (Pawson, 2013; Pawson & 
Tilley, 2004).  
 To this end, race (particularly how race was negotiated in the process of 
seeking collective commitment and action) was a social factor that became 
increasingly important to this study. I initially suspected race would be a potential 
factor in exchanges between key stakeholders in collective spaces. Subsequently, 
one of my criteria for selecting the historical cases focused on race, and one 
interview question for my empirical case highlighted race.  
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 Yet I did not anticipate that racial dynamics and the peculiar ways in which 
stakeholders would negotiate race and power would play a crucial role in how 
participants and leaders approached change-making work and the outcomes they 
experienced. Hence, after coding for race and looking for convergent and divergent 
themes across and between racial groups in relation to my research sub question, I 
recognized I needed to apply a more critical lens to my analysis. Racial dynamics 
revealed to be a significant part of interactions and partnership formation in both 
the historical and empirical cases, and there were nuances in the ways in which race 
was negotiated within these spaces. Moreover, after having been immersed in the 
field and witnessing these racial dynamics first-hand, I found it necessary to center 
an analysis of race and racial dynamics using a framework that could appropriately 
name a root cause for discrepancies in what and how collective action was pursued. 
 Thus, I turn to critical race theory (CRT), and use CRT here to challenge the 
narratives of these cases. I do this by highlighting details and raising questions that 
build from the tenets of CRT, including a premise of the prevalence of race and the 
continued existence of racism. I focus in particular on the racial negotiation strategy 
of White interest-convergence, and a potential belief that using White interest-
convergence as strategy could help the collective make progress on the outcomes 
they desired to achieve. Whereas White interest-convergence can be read in all 
cases, it did not yield the outcomes (particularly the long-term outcomes) leaders 
and participants believed it would.  
 I also illuminate another mechanism that was only present in cases that were 
more successful in developing collective commitment (both grassroots cases). These 
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cases created spaces that privileged the voice, needs, and desires of communities of 
color, and this strategy seemed to have made a difference in the outcomes these 
cases exhibited.  
 The Premise of Critical Race Theory. CRT proves to be the most 
appropriate theoretical framework to use in an analysis of the dynamics of race in 
these cases as it offers a multidimensional view of the ways that race produces 
multiple forms of social oppression (Alemán & Alemán, 2010; Howard, 2008; 
Matsuda, 1991; Solórzano & Yosso, 2002). Briscoe and Khalifa (2015) summarize 
the premise of CRT, contending that as racialized groups within the US were 
enslaved and oppressed, “complexes of ideologies, discourses, practices, and policies 
were developed to justify and maintain their oppression” (p. 741). Hence, CRT was 
first developed in the legal field as the work of legal scholars who were attempting 
to “develop a jurisprudence that accounts for the role of racism in American 
law…” (Matsuda, 1991, p. 1331). Since then, CRT has been taken up by scholars in 
various fields, all whom assert that “racism is and has been an integral feature of 
American life, law, and culture, and any attempt to eradicate racial inequities has to 
be centered on the socio-historical legacy of racism” (Howard, 2008, p. 963). 
Moreover, CRT recognizes that “racism is often well disguised in the rhetoric of 
shared ‘normative’ values and ‘neutral’ social scientific and educational principles 
and practices”, and as such challenges both conservative and liberal ideologies that 
normalize the persistence of White supremacy (Solórzano & Yosso, 2002, p. 27).  
 Given this premise, in what other ways can one understand how race, racial 
dynamics, and power were negotiated in these cases? Moreover, as I have focused 
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this study on the development of collective commitment, what key tools and 
strategies seem to be present as individuals attempt to navigate racial dynamics in 
effort to develop collective commitment and ultimately achieve their desired 
outcomes? How do these strategies contribute to a more complete understanding of 
achieving collective action and commitment? To help explore these questions, I turn 
to CRT’s theory of White interest convergence. 
 The Theory of White Interest Convergence. Bell (1980), a legal scholar 
and founder of critical race theory first presented the theory of White interest 
convergence as  “a critical way of understanding the dynamics of racism and social 
policy at key points, especially where a landmark event appears to have advanced 
the cause of race equality” (Gillborn, 2013, p. 135). Consequently, as a case may 
appear to have made a significant victory for the social, political, and economic 
advancement of people of color, Bell (1980) argues that this advancement was not 
attained without being converged with White interests, as White policymakers and 
power holders saw it in their best interests to accommodate these victories in order 
to preserve their power and White hegemony. To this end, he claims, “the interests 
of Blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges 
with the interest of Whites” (Bell, 1980, p. 523).  
 His most popular example and argument to support this theory is Brown v. 
Board (1956), the quintessential educational equity decision that ruled the 
separation of Black and White children towards alleged equal schools 
unconstitutional. Although Brown v. Board (1954) is hailed as a critical victory in 
dismantling educational barriers faced by Black children, Bell (1980) contends that 
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one must not just consider the altruistic, moral, and empathetic reasoning of Whites 
concerned with equality, but consider “whites in policymaking positions able to see 
the economic and political advances at home and abroad that would follow 
abandonment of segregation” (p. 524). Furthermore, Taylor (1998) suggests that 
the theory interest convergence is most likely to be contested by liberal Whites who 
support goals of racial equity, but may quickly retract when “Black progress exacts 
or imposes a personal cost to their potion of power and privilege” (p. 1).  
 Yet Bell’s (1980) case around Brown v. Board (1954) presents White interest 
convergence as an analytical tool, as he demonstrated how larger economic and 
socio-political interest of White elites arguably played into the court’s decision. 
Other CRT scholars have followed suit and employed the theory as “a model of 
explanatory power”, using it to frame, contextualize, and analyze (Taylor, 2000, p. 
552). 
 For example, scholars such as David Stovall (2016) use interest convergence 
to contextualize and explain education reform in Chicago. He illuminates that 
although the city’s education reforms have been publicized as creating positive 
change among schools within Black and Brown neighborhoods within the city, real 
results provide evidence of White interest convergence, particularly pointing to the 
advancement for Chicago’s predominately White political elite, and further 
marginalization of Chicago’s communities of color. In higher education, Aguirre Jr 
(2010) presents a CRT counter narrative to explain how diversity can used to serve 
White interests. Although diversity is often touted as a concept and practice that 
enriches and sustains students and faculty of color, Aguirre shows how instead, 
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White faculty within academia can privilege themselves in discourses regarding 
diversity.  
 Yet Alemán and Alemán (2010) suggests that in addition to being an 
explanatory tool, White interest-convergence has also been used as a strategic tool. 
Although the authors note that Civil Rights and Chicano/a activists and leaders 
documented deliberate attempts to bring about social change by allying with White 
elite long before Bell’s conceptualization of interest-convergence (i.e. Williams 
(2013) and García (2002)), they contend that several contemporary scholars have 
argued for “producing social change by deliberately aligning the social justice 
interests of communities of color with those of Whites” (Alemán & Alemán, 2010, p. 
6).  
 The use of interest-convergence as a tool undoubtedly supports the 
contention that “in order to convince the majoritarian community to ally with 
historically marginalized communities on a social issue, White interests must get 
served, leaving out implications of race and racism or the discomfort of a discussion 
of White privilege” (Alemán & Alemán, 2010, p. 17; Bell, 1980)59. This concept 
presents a challenging thought, and means to question the five cases I examine 
within this dissertation.  
 I contend that at some level, all five cases I studied reflect the tactical use of 
White interest-convergence as a means to achieve outcomes set by the collective 
group. This notion is especially compelling given that four of the five cases I 
                                                        
59 It is important to note that Bell’s (1980) original concept does not envision interest-convergence as “a 
rational and balanced negotiation between minoritized groups and White power holders, where change is 
achieved through the mere force of reason and logic” (Gillborn, 2013, p. 135). This view has been pressed by 
more contemporary scholars (Cashin, 2005; Ramirez, 2004). 
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presented were led and organized by people of color, and suggests that leaders of 
color believed White interest-convergence had to be employed in order for the 
initiative to make progress on their respective goals. Nevertheless, the cases also 
provide evidence that employing White interest-convergence as a generative 
strategy was insufficient and unsustainable in many ways.  
 To demonstrate this idea, the following section provides insight as to how the 
tactic of White interest-convergence played out at the macro-level across all five 
cases, particularly as an advancing strategy in garnering individual and 
organizational commitments. However, in some way, collectives all had to contend 
with the consequences of interest-convergence that Bell (1980) illuminates. 
Furthermore, long-term results of using this strategy illuminates some form of 
fragmentation, and it is these breakdowns that reasserted and maintained existing 
systemic inequities. In addition, I state my misgivings that remain for further 
research as to what this suggests given Bell’s (1980) and Aleman & Aleman’s (2010) 
argument, and consider implications for the interconnections among collective 
commitment, collective action, and race60.  
 I also recognize that the data from the HMBK case (which allowed a more 
micro analysis) show that employment of White interest-convergence was 
confounded by a myriad of other matters. These complications not only challenge 
the extent to which White interest convergence can be considered an intentional 
strategy, but also encourage one to consider the complex intersectionalities of race, 
                                                        
60 I have specifically chosen to use misgivings to challenge the narratives of the historic cases as I recognize that 
the mezzo-level data for each case lends to inclusive conclusions, and the individual-level data to verify the 
intent and rationalization behind use of the strategies and tactics I reference is unavailable. 
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gender, and power. To this end, I discuss how issues such as gender, power, and 
other racial dynamics problematized the conscious, subconscious, or unconscious 
use of this tool.  
 Lastly, despite interest-convergence being evident in every case, my earlier 
findings demonstrate that the grassroots cases were more successful in developing 
collective commitment, and this collective commitment was employed towards 
achieving collective action. Hence, their efforts appeared more sustainable. I point to 
an additional racial negotiation strategy that highlighted race and racism, and 
appeared to make a difference in the outcomes of the grassroots cases.  
 
Reflection On the Cases  
 Project Quest.  In the case of Project Quest, Black and Brown community 
leaders and members first organized to understand how job displacement was 
impacting economically disadvantaged communities of color within San Antonio. 
They also researched San Antonio’s economic trends, including previous and 
existing local job training efforts. As I noted: As local leaders’ findings showed the 
city’s loss of low-skilled jobs was being accompanied by new high-waged jobs that 
required high-skill, regional leaders organized meetings with leading economists 
whose data corroborated their findings on the shift of industry and job availability 
within the city (Rademacher et al., 2001; Warren, 1998). Project Quest leaders then 
used this economic data and appeal to initiate and attract predominately White 
business elite to the conversation of creating a new job-training program.  
 Hence, the predominately minority community organization leaders (COPS & 
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Metro Alliance) sought to make an appeal for a jobs training program to San 
Antonio’s predominately White business community on the grounds of its potential 
economic benefits to predominately White businesses. Campbell (1994) notes that 
business leaders were reluctant to agree to the program, yet after the Black and 
Brown COPS and Metro Alliance leaders “had done their homework on job training”, 
“earned a place at the table”, and proved the program could also serve the interest 
White business leaders and organizations, the business sector supported the idea 
and committed jobs to Quest graduates61 (p. 19).  
 It is plausible that COPS and Metro Alliance leaders would not have received 
the support of the business community and their commitment to providing jobs for 
Project Quest graduates had COPS and Metro Alliance leaders not strategically use 
interest-convergence to appeal to the economic concerns of predominately White 
business leaders. Yet there was undoubtedly a mismatch in values and beliefs of 
participating partners, given White business elites were engaged because of the 
economic appeal, and communities of color supported the project because they 
believed it would provide the holistic support and approach to training they desired. 
 In the long run, utilizing interest-convergence tactics did not prove to be a 
successful strategy and foundation for partnership, as program funding and support 
was cut back within the first three years of the project. Yet Bell (1980) predicts this 
                                                        
61 Campbell (1994) also interestingly notes a historical dissent between predominately minority COPS and 
Metro Alliance and Tony Frost (White local banker who was the first business leader to support Project Quest) 
and Charles Cheever (another White local banker), as COPS had protested a city economic venture in 1970 that 
would have put off higher-waged jobs. Yet Cheever is quoted saying he later “got to know some of the people in 
COPS and Metro Alliance, and saw that they were intelligent, sincere people who had a conscientious agenda and 
could work with the business community” (Campbell, 1994, p. 18). Frost is quoted saying he thought COPS and 
Metro Alliance “started out with a radical approach”, but later believed “the project hey were supporting were 
reasonable and responsible” (Campbell, 1994, p. 19). 
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turn of event as a consequence to interest-convergence. He contends that valiant 
victories won through White interest-convergence present “uncertain and short-
lived” impact, and in the long run, “may further protect the racial status quo” (Bell, 
1980). Consequently, the long-term outcomes of challenges in programmatic 
funding and program downsizing bring to question if Quest leaders’ utilization of 
White interest-convergence as a strategy truly rendered the outcome they hoped to 
achieve (Gillborn, 2013, p. 134).  
 Padres y Jóvenes Unidos (PJU). In the final segment within PJU’s North High 
School campaign, the grassroots organizers called together a coalition of 
predominately Latino/a and Chicano/a cross-sector leaders throughout Denver 
whom they believed were allies “in the larger struggle around the Chicano and civil 
rights movements“, and “understood that brown people were being systematically 
underserved” (Warren & Mapp, 2011, p. 133; Warren et al., 2012, p. 11). This 
coalition (the Coalition to Save North) called for the redesign of North High School, 
and self-contained coalition meetings were used to craft the group’s vision for what 
a resigned North High would look like.  
 Yet each account of the North High Campaign explicitly discusses the 
partnership PJU/the Coalition to Save North solidified with Denver Public Schools 
superintendent, Michael Bennet, during this phase of the campaign. Bennet, a White 
male, ultimately held the power to formally call for the redesign of North High 
School. The DPS education reform agenda during this time included the redesign of 
a number of DPS schools, and in the prior year Bennet’s administration had closed 
Manual High school as part of a year long redesign effort (Shirley, 2016). Manual’s 
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achievement data deemed it a chronically low-performing school, and the school 
student population was predominately Black and Latino/a. As the school was closed 
without community input, “students and parents denounced Bennet as a racist at 
raucous school and community meetings” (Shirley, 2016, p. 54; Warren & Mapp, 
2011).  
 Despite the historical precedent which hinted that Bennet needed PJU’s 
social and political capital to pursue DPS’ larger agenda for redesign, Warren and 
Mapp (2011) depict PJU’s solidified partnership with Bennet as “mutually 
beneficial” (p. 122). Given this depiction and the mere undertaking of strengthening 
ties with a White administration to secure the outcome the coalition was aiming for, 
it is evident that PJU used white convergence as a strategic tool to ensure Bennet’s 
commitment to redesign of North High School.  
 At an aerial view, it may seem that aligning with Bennet, a White power-
holder, and his reform agenda for redesign consequently helped the Latino/a-based 
organizing group accomplish their goal of achieving redesign for North High School. 
Yet as one considers Bell’s (1980) argument on white interest-convergence’s 
ephemeral impact, we observe that this exact consequence was reflected in this 
initiative’s long term outcomes, as the seemingly large victory of redesign of North 
was quickly cut back by student under enrollment, a school culture reflecting 
mistrust and disdain post redesign, and fallen achievement scores.  
 PUSH/Excel. The PUSH/Excel case begins with Jesse Jackson’s grassroots 
crusade across the nation, assembling rallies, making appearances in stadiums, high 
schools, and conferences with the financial support of foundations and dedicated 
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staff from Operation PUSH. As a Black leader, Jackson’s message was directed to 
Black youth, urging them to “strive toward solid, middle-class virtues”, and avoid 
the “‘diversionary’ evils of alcohol, drugs, and lack of discipline that prevent black 
people from keeping pressure for change on white society” (Cole, 1977, p. 378). 
 Yet the case presents an interesting unfolding of the use of interest-
convergence, as Jackson was approached by predominately White organizations (the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare [HEW] and the National Institution 
for Education [NIE]), and given the opportunity to converge his agenda with theirs. 
Yet Jackson’s mere acceptance of support from HEW and NIE, and aligning 
PUSH/Excel with a performance evaluation as a condition for support of his agenda 
demonstrated a convergence of interests between the two agendas. To this end, 
newspaper editorials were first to identify the HEW and NIE funding as “good 
news/bad news”, as it potentially represented “the federalization of Jesse Jackson”, 
and the propensity for a more “bureaucratic” and “orthodox” program (Farrar & 
House, 1983, p. 32).  
 Perhaps the greatest irony of this case, however, lies in the placement of race 
and racism within the PUSH/Excel movement and later program. Jackson’s message 
was undoubtedly directed towards Black youth, Black parents, and the Black 
community at large. Moreover, Jackson was a trusted figure in both Black and White 
communities, and had access to both. Yet Jackson’s trust within the Black 
community exonerated his hard-hitting message to Black people, which pushed for 
an individual response to oppression through a commitment to excellence. Jesse 
Jackson’s message coincided with conservative Whites, and the message 
 
 
 245 
decentralized racism, although he, as a Black man, was the face of the movement- an 
approach that yet again highlighted his use of interest convergence. White 
organizations, systems, and leaders recognized they would confront harsh backlash 
for disseminating the same message Jackson was marketing62. However, as Jackson’s 
message aligned with traditional, White American, “Calvinist” values, both Jackson’s 
interests in program expansion and the interest of White American value holders 
were aligned and served to increase PUSH/Excel’s funding and expansion (House, 
1988).  
 Yet secondary sources speculate how Jackson’s crusade and collective action 
would have impacted Black youth and communities differently had Jackson 
continued the movement without aligning to White interest and funding stipulations 
(Farrar & House, 1983; House, 1988). Moreover, it is hard to imagine that Jackson 
would have received similar commitment and funding from HEW and NIE had he 
turned the conversation / message to focus on the funding structures and resource 
disparities that Black students experienced in the urban schools he toured and gave 
speeches in. Furthermore, given that the majority of local PUSH/Excel programs 
collapsed within the first five years, the long-term outcomes of PUSH/Excel 
associate with Bell’s (1980) contention regarding successes attained through the 
use of White interest-convergence.  
 Promise Neighborhoods. The case of Promise Neighborhoods presents a 
                                                        
62 Cole (1977) explicitly speaks to the trust Jackson sustained with the Black community as a Black man and 
civil rights survivor, as well the harsh reality of what this trust and racial identify afforded him. He writes, "At 
the heart of Jackson's apparent effectiveness as an educational change agent, in addition to the carte blanche he 
derives from his color (what White could get away with telling Black girls that they have “fully developed 
bottoms and half-developed brains”?), are his magic in the pulpit and his credentials as a 'survivor' of the 1960's 
civil rights movement" (Cole, 1977, pp. 379-380).  
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policy that tactfully engages interest-convergence strategies. Former President 
Obama, a Black president, introduced the concept of Promise Neighborhoods during 
his 2008 campaign for the presidency as key to remedying interconnections 
between generational poverty and educational achievement. Modeled after the 
Harlem Children’s Zone (a neighborhood-based education model that serves 
predominately serves Black and Latino/a families and students; HCZ), Promise 
Neighborhoods would use cradle-to-career strategies that coordinate cross-sectorial 
support across health, social, educational entities “to provide children and families 
with comprehensive, coordinated support to improve results and reverse the cycle 
of generational poverty” (Comey, 2013; McAfee & Torre, 2015, p. 37)63.  
 Yet, from the onset of the proposal for the policy, one had only to look at the 
language used to recognize that race (and all the more, racism) had been 
decentralized, despite the fact that the model it attempted to replicate 
predominately served (and still serves) people of color, and Promise Neighborhoods 
(given the program guidelines) would likely do the same.  
 Whereas the policy leaves out implications of race and racism and avoids the 
discomfort of confronting the systematic and institutionalized devices that 
contribute/d to the formation and continued marginalization of poor communities 
of color, it centralizes schools, a conversation of poverty, and neoliberal values such 
as competition and rigorous evaluation (or assessment). Moreover, Promise 
Neighborhood stipulated that committed funding from a predominately White and 
conservative legislature would only be granted to applicants that adopted the US 
                                                        
63 Harlem Children’s Zone Promise Academies student demographics have historically reflected a 90%< of 
students of color (http://schools.nyc.gov/SchoolPortals/05/M284/AboutUs/Statistics/default.htm). 
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Department of Education’s Government Performance and Results Act indicators 
(GPRA), indictors that have been critiqued for the alignment with White, corporate 
and neoliberal-driven educational reform agenda (Person, 2011). Consequently, 
there is indication that White interest-convergence was strategically used to engage 
federal funding and passage in the legislature as the program sought to benefit poor 
communities of color.  
 Yet it is difficult to believe that Promise Neighborhoods policy architects 
would have received committed federal funds had they not supported and 
perpetuated an education reform agenda that fundamentally tied to the economic 
self-interests of White political and capitalist elites. Moreover, additional funding for 
Promise Neighborhood planning or implementation grants have not been allocated 
since 2014, and critics have projected that “it is not likely that [Promise 
Neighborhoods] will make progress or expand in the future, essentially making it a 
failed agenda” (Person, 2011, p. 34). This predicted “failed agenda” and maintenance 
of the status quo in turn parallels the predicted long-term outcomes and 
consequences of interest-convergence Bell (1980) proposes.  
 
HMBK and Complications to the Employment of an Interest-Convergence 
Strategy 
 The case of HMBK provides an intriguing complication to the contention of 
White interest-convergence across all five cases. Given that Highland County 
residents and elected officials were more liberal and progressive, there was a 
general endorsement for HMBK and support of the belief that young men of color 
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faced many barriers to opportunity. Hence, the conversation around HMBK was not 
about ‘if’ something should be done; instead, the pertinent question was ‘how’ 
HMBK would get done.  
 Here, I explain the complexity of HMBK case, as the mezzo-level data 
illuminates the ways in which White interest-convergence was used by Black 
leaders and participants to move the initiative forward. Yet similar to the historic 
cases, using White interest-convergence as a strategy within HMBK proved 
insufficient and problematic. I point to additional empirical evidence that shows 
how other complexities and intersectionalities hindered the group and ultimately 
disabled HMBK from developing collective commitment towards collective action.  
 White Interest-Convergence in HMBK. At the national level, My Brother’s 
Keeper (MBK) illustrates an interesting application and conceptualization of 
interest-convergence. The initiative clearly centers race, was initiated by a Black 
president, and the national call specifically challenges local communities to address 
barriers of opportunity for young men of color. This fusion was unprecedented, as 
men of color had never received an executive spotlight explicitly intended to attract 
diverse forms of capital towards preemptive educational and economic measures. 
While this attraction was embedded in the potential work of MBK communities, the 
initiative was nonetheless unfunded, which caused local communities to look for 
and depend on external resources.  
 Although Highland County My Brother’s Keeper (HMBK) was initiated in a 
resource-rich and notably progressive county, it is critical to note that much of the 
county’s resources are housed in businesses and predominately White universities 
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and colleges (PWIs). Hence, in a pursuit for resources and support (financial, 
institutional, etc.), it was likely that the local initiative would have attracted 
powerful (and often White) partners to the table.  
 Yet the use of interest-convergence as a tactic and practice unfolds at the 
individual and group levels of HMBK. Whereas leadership maintained a theory that 
bringing powerful (and often White) individuals and institutions to the table would 
create the space for change for young men of color within the county, there was no 
clear vision of what could/should be done to advance young men of color that was 
set or articulated by men of color that lived in the county and would be most 
impacted by the milestone goals. Consequently, it became ordinary for 
predominately Black leadership to foreground the insight and interests of White 
legislators, institutional leaders, and power holders.  
 It is important to note that White legislators originally initiated and endorsed 
HMBK. As I noted, “Congresswoman Beth Moore appointed two African-American 
men, Washington State Representative Ryan Connor and Highland County Sheriff 
Aaron Bailey as overseers [of HMBK]…and by August 15th…the three elected officials 
appointed an executive director [John Walters]”.  
 Relatedly, Washington State Representative Seth Rutters (White male) had 
also begun conversations about beginning a local MBK initiative in an adjacent town 
within the county. Congresswoman Beth Moore sequestered the overlap, as it was 
clear both offices were “having independent conversations with different people on 
this particular topic in parallel” (State Representative Rutters, Interview).  
 Yet the nudge and influence of legislative endorsement remained linked to 
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HMBK, as Black leaders and participants gave considerable attention to the interests 
of White legislators, power holders, and institutional leaders. As I noted, “It was not 
uncommon for the Black leaders to seek validation from white members and 
participants, or defer to the thoughts and opinions of White political leaders. John 
Walters (Executive Director, HMBK) repeatedly referred to wanting ‘to hear what 
the congresswoman [had] to say’ (referring to Congresswoman Beth Moore) or 
acceding to Harry Kennedy’s (Superintendent, HCSD) suggestions in meetings” 
(Meeting Audio, 7/15/16). Consequently, interest-convergence became a developed 
cultural norm, as Anita and Samuel also began to ask or signal for additional 
presentation time to discuss ideas or things they had been working on explicitly in 
meetings when Harry Kennedy (Superintendent, HCSD) and Richard Olson 
(Professor & Director of the Institute for the Study of Children, Families, and 
Communities, NWU) were in attendance.  
 The Consequences and Complications of White Interest Convergence in HMBK 
Space. It is important to note that HMBK leaders and participants could have been 
unaware of how their actions could be contributing to maintaining White power 
structures. As such, it is not unlikely that Black HMBK leadership could have been 
working to converge its interests (i.e. improving outcomes for young men of color) 
with the interests of the White (particularly male) committee members 
unconsciously. Nonetheless, the consequences and problematic results of privileging 
White interests as a tool (i.e. “resistance to…strategies that focus centrally on the 
elimination of racism; …acceptance of incremental gains; …the framing of 
responsibility for inequity solely on the individual rather than institutional or 
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systemic racism that exists”) were definitely evident (Alemán & Alemán, 2010, p. 
15). 
 Yet there were other ways race intersected with other matters that lent to 
conflicts and tension within the group space, and ultimately impeded on 
development of collective commitment. While these dynamics are unable to be 
evidenced in the historical case, the micro-level data from the HMBK case 
specifically enables me to identify and illuminate these dynamics64. To this end, it is 
important to understand how these intersectionalities complicated the HMBK space 
and also worked against collective progress.  
 One such complication was gender dynamics, and the attenuation of 
relationships between Black male and female team members. While both Black and 
White women that were a part of the initiative spoke of “remaining a step behind”, 
or, being cautious in their involvement with the HMBK as they understood it was an 
initiative regarding young men, issues of power and paternalism led Black female 
backbone team members feeling silenced and alienated although they could 
contribute more. During her interview, Anita repeatedly mentioned that she was 
“well-researched and trained” and approached her work with HMBK “from a space 
of passion” (Anita Jackson, Interview). Nonetheless, our conversation also pointed to 
her feeling “silenced” as a woman within the space although she knew and wanted 
“to contribute more” (Anita Jackson, Interview). As a Black female in the group, I 
understood Anita’s comments, as I had learned I had “to work around some things” 
“as one of few women at the table” (Tabitha Bentley, in Interview with Anita 
                                                        
64 It is highly possible that many of these same issues were indeed present in the historical cases, however, data 
limitations prohibit me from identifying and illuminating potentially similar dynamics.  
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Jackson). Hence, the practice of allowing male voices to dominate over others and 
the resulting strained relationships between male and female group members 
undoubtedly impeded on the group’s ability to garner collective commitment.  
 I noted this dynamic in my personal experience within HMBK as well. I 
worked as an intermediary between the executive director, community partners, 
and the HMBK VISTAs, and while all participants were generally friendly and 
respectful during interactions, I often saw that my ideas and voice within the group 
did not carry much weight. Consequently, strategies such as learning “to work 
around some things” and finding when “to let some things be until [I had] the 
capacity to change [it]” were strategies I personally used throughout time within 
HMBK (Tabitha Bentley, in Interview with Anita Jackson). For me, this experience 
was reminiscent of the historic positioning of Black women within change-making 
movements and initiatives, in which we often bear much of the burden of the work, 
but are not acknowledged as compeers (and more daringly, leaders) within these 
spaces. Hence, my own experience complicates a simple explanation of White 
interest-convergence being used as a tool within HMBK.  
 Another complication and intersection that impeded the group’s ability to 
develop collective commitment and progress were issues of racial authorization. 
Harry Kennedy mentions this matter during his interview, as he wondered if “this is 
work that has to be done by African-American leaders for African-American young 
boys” (Interview). During her interview, Ruth Nicole (Asst. Superintendent, HCSD) 
relayed a similar precaution-  
I am sometimes cautious, as a white woman taking on a perceived mantle of 
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something for black men. Like, I don't wanna speak for a Black man, because 
my voice is the one that has power, right? I'd rather find a way to create a 
space for that black man to have his voice heard directly. (Ruth Nicole, 
Interview) 
This sentiment was common among White participants. Of my 7 interviews with 
White participants, 6 relayed some type of wonder, caution, and deference to 
participating in HMBK given that they were White, and were unsure of how they 
could (or were expected) to contribute to an initiative for and about young men of 
color. Consequently, White participants were looking to Black participants and 
leadership to clarify what was to be done within the initiative, and who would be a 
part of completing the action.  
 Yet Black leaders and participants (unconsciously or not) were consistently 
attempting to converge their interests with White power holders and leaders. As I 
noted:  
It was not uncommon for the Black leaders [within HMBK] to seek validation 
from White members and participants, or defer to the thoughts and opinions 
of White political leaders. . John Walters (Executive Director, HMBK) 
repeatedly referred to wanting “to hear what the congresswoman [had] to 
say” (referring to Congresswoman Beth Moore) or acceding to Harry 
Kennedy’s (Superintendent, HCSD) suggestions in meetings (Meeting Audio, 
7/15/16).  
Moreover, instances in which Anita and Samuel (both Black participants with less 
positional power) explicitly asked for presentation time to discuss ideas or things 
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they have been working on when Richard Olson and Harry Kennedy (both White 
males with high positional power) were present at meetings reflected a developed 
and reinforced social norm in which Black participants were willing to acknowledge 
and learn from White participants with positional power, yet struggled to support 
and learn from fellow Black participants with less positional power65. The 
implications of this racial dynamic included extremely perplexing environments, 
which ultimately led to standstills in HMBK’s progress and acquisition of individual 
commitments towards the collective level.  
 In all, the case of HMBK complicates the narrative of interest-convergence in 
many ways. While Black leaders appeared to be using interest-convergence as 
strategic tool to acquire resources and maintain the support of White leaders and 
power-holders, White participants consistently relayed a hesitancy around their 
involvement as they were unsure of how they could (or were expected) to 
contribute an initiative for and about young men of color. Issues of White interest-
convergence and racial authorization were further complicated by the practice of 
allowing male voices to dominate over others and strained relationship between 
Black male and female participants. These complications point to the complex ways 
in which race intersected with other matters (i.e. gender and power), how these 
intersectionalities contributed to conflicts and tension that got in the way of 
developing collective commitment, and similar to the historical cases- why interest-
convergence strategies were insufficient.  
                                                        
65 The narrative on p. 174 and my analysis on page 227 provide clear examples in which Black leaders (often 
Black male leaders) silenced and/or struggled to support and learn from other Black participants (often Black 
females). These actions were starkly contrasted against instances where Black leaders showed deference to 
White leaders with higher positional power.  
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Summary of Interest Convergence Application and More Successful Strategies   
 Having reflected on each case and illuminated the different ways in which 
White interest-convergence was used as a tool across these cases, the pertinent 
question of “why” lingers. Why would individuals or communities of color use 
interest-convergence as a strategy to facilitate collective commitment and perceive 
it as a viable tool to achieve their desired outcomes? Secondly, why, in the majority 
of cases, did this strategy prove insufficient to connecting to individuals’ values, 
beliefs, and ideologies- the crucial foundation for developing collective 
commitment? And lastly, why did the grassroots cases prove to be more sustainable 
despite the employment of a White interest-convergence strategy?  
 Paradoxically, the conceptualization of how and why individuals and 
communities of color within these cases may have chosen to use white interest 
convergence as a strategic tool holds many similarities to the rationale for why 
groups might use cross-sector partnerships to address large social problems. 
Proponents of using cross-sector partnerships to address social challenges purport 
that “…multiple sectors of a democratic society…must collaborate to deal effectively 
and humanely with [social] challenges”, and “social change comes from better cross-
sector coordination rather than from isolated intervention of individual 
organizations”(Bryson et al., 2006, p. 44; Kania & Kramer, 2011, p. 38). 
 Likewise, proponents of using interest-convergence as a tactic acknowledge 
“it is increasingly unlikely that a single racial group can succeed independently in 
pursuing a progressive policy agenda”, and as such see interest-convergence and 
coalition politics as a pathway to addressing social challenges such as racial 
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inequality (Cashin, 2005, p. 256).  Hence, Black and Brown individuals and 
collectives within these historical cases likely assumed social change could only be 
attained if other racial groups, particularly Whites, were also supporting their 
agenda.  
 Yet this pursuit is problematic in a number of ways. First, in all cases, it 
misaligns individuals’ values and beliefs, particularly pertaining to the importance 
and acknowledgement of race and racism.  Whereas PJU and Project Quest leaders 
engaged their communities with a very conscious understanding of how policies, 
structures, and the economic environment that was impacting their Black and 
Brown communities, their appeals to White constituencies were not also based in 
these same beliefs, values, and ideologies. Instead, Project Quest leaders aligned 
with the predominately White business community’s interest around economic 
growth, and PJU aligned with Superintendent Michael Brown’s larger plan for 
redesign across several district schools. This mismatch in values caused a 
considerable breach as to how individual commitments were garnered, how racial 
interests were served, and how conversations of race and racism were driven back 
leading to the maintenance of an inequitable system.  Nevertheless, there was an 
opportunity for communities of color to bring their experiences and issues of race 
forward, and I later speak to how this seemingly contributed to comparatively 
greater success.   
 Although PUSH/Excel foregrounded race, the program’s alignment with 
White power-holders did not allow for a conversation of racism, and how the 
individual responsibilities of Black families and students alone were not going to 
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change institutional problems. Likewise, policymakers for Promise Neighborhoods 
circumvent race and racism, yet the policy attends to neoliberal values rather than 
the values of the people of color that are most impacted by the policy. Hence, again 
the misalignment of individual values and commitments and the failure to push 
social change without foregrounding race and racism again led to the maintenance 
of an inequitable system.  Additionally, HMBK Black group leaders and participants 
often attempted to align towards the ideas and needs of white institutional leaders 
and power-holders, rather than the men of color that lived in the county and would 
be most impacted by the milestone goals.  
 Consequently, all cases point to Aleman and Aleman’s (2010) assertion that  
“claiming this approach [interest-convergence as a political strategy] as the primary 
strategy for social change negatively affects social justice goals” (Alemán & Alemán, 
2010, p. 3).  Specifically, using White interest-convergence as a strategy generates a 
space where it was difficult to affirm, validate, and privilege the voices and 
experiences of people of color in an authentic way. Moreover, it more often 
decentralized the role of race and racism in the larger and direct contexts of the 
social issues each initiative was aiming to change.  
 Yet the two more successful cases within this study point to a use of 
additional strategies that did privilege the voice, needs, and desires of communities 
of color, and consequently appeared to make a critical difference in the collective 
commitment that was garnered and collective action they accomplished.  
 For PJU, this tool was political education. Political education explicitly 
allowed the Latino/a organization group to discuss matters such as race and racism, 
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discuss root causes of these topics, examine the impacts that “structural inequities 
and power structure”, and connect knowledge of a historic struggle to everyday 
lives of youth and adults with hopes of inspiring them to act (Warren & Mapp, 2011, 
p. 108; 133).  
 Likewise, Project Quest used the principles and tools of relational organizing, 
particularly organizing with rooted community leaders and conducting house 
meetings. Given that of the dislocated workers were economically disadvantaged 
Black and Latino/a workers, COPS and Metro Alliance leaders (whom most often 
were also people of color) led house meetings as a means to reconnect and build 
relationships with their neighbors, provide an opportunity for these communities of 
color to discuss “common difficulties (such as layoffs and low wages)”, as well as a 
space to “process their private pain…[and] realize others in their neighborhood 
share[d] it…” (Campbell, 1994, p. 13). Subsequently, house meetings were spaces 
where the voices, experiences, and ideas of economically displaced communities of 
color were affirmed, validated, and privileged. These experiences were 
foregrounded and explicitly used to shape the principles for the Project Quest 
program. Furthermore, house meetings also provided a means to develop collective 
commitment, which Project Quest leaders undoubtedly employed when protests, 
rallies, and the influence of community numbers were needed to push their 
collective agenda.    
 Summary. Whereas Bell (1980) presents the theory of interest-convergence 
as an analytical tool, I demonstrate how White interest-convergence can also be 
used as a strategy. Although this strategy can be traced throughout each case, the 
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outcomes each group experienced vary considerably. The critical analysis I present 
holds the greatest challenge for leaders of color in change-making spaces, as the 
cases reflected a potential belief among Black and Brown conveners and organizers 
that assumed social change could only be attained if other racial groups, particularly 
Whites, were also supporting their agenda.  Nonetheless, this belief proved to be 
problematic and insufficient, as each collective had to contend with the 
consequences of interest-convergence in some way. The grassroots cases, however, 
illuminate other intentional strategies that foregrounded race, racism, and the 
experiences of the people of color, with opportunity for them to meet together to 
explore their own interests. In Chapter 6, I continue this dialogue and discuss 
implications for the use of White interest-convergence in cross-sector work that has 
focused influence and impact within communities of color.    
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Chapter VI. Discussion 
 
  The purpose of this dissertation was to investigate the connections between 
collective commitment and collective action, how both reflect the successes (or lack 
of success) in addressing large social problems, and how race and power is 
negotiated in the process of realizing collective commitment and action. Here, I 
discuss findings and insights derived from analysis of both the realist synthesis of 
historical cases and my empirical work with Highland County’s My Brother’s 
Keeper66. In Chapter 2 I presented a theoretical grounding distinguishing between 
the power-origin and dynamics of the cases I investigated (grassroots and grass-
high). Here I represent, first, the set of findings with respect to these designations. I 
then draw conclusions from the evidence presented in Chapter 5, where I used 
critical race theory to illuminate how race and power was negotiated in the process 
of achieving (or failing to achieve) collective commitment and collective action. I 
then provide insights on the implications of these findings.  
 
Key Assertions  
  Based on my cross-case analyses of commitment in grassroots and grass-high 
                                                        
66 I also want to emphasize that this dissertation builds on the premise that the people involved see value in working 
collectively. So, collective commitment without collective engagement lies outside the scope and premise of this work.  
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cases that use multi-sector collaborations to pursue collective action as well as my 
CRT analysis, I draw the following conclusions:  
 Grassroots initiatives I studied were more successful in developing collective 
commitment than the grass-high initiatives. 
  The cases of Project Quest and Padres y Jóvenes Unidos (PJU) clearly 
demonstrate stronger examples of the development of collective commitment. In 
particular, leaders and participants within these cases did a better job of connecting 
individual values/beliefs and focusing them towards a collective goal/level. This 
was accomplished through powerful contextual features, mechanisms, and the 
development of an environment that fostered collective commitment. One recurrent 
contextual feature was a strong affiliation and connection to Black and Brown 
campaigns for civil and human rights. While Project Quest was imagined, 
researched, and brought to fruition by long-standing organizing groups that were 
formed and led by people of color, PJU considered their collective action to be a 
continuation of the Chicano movement and struggle. PJU even created a second 
multi-sector coalition that was predominately Latino/a at the end of its campaign, 
and individuals who were on this coalition all understood that Latino/a students 
were systematically underserved. As such, both cases drew heavily from the passion 
and deep emotion of the Black and Brown communities that had experienced or 
were experiencing the problem, and directed this energy and their commitment 
towards collective action. 
  Both PJU and Project Quest also used powerful mechanisms to connect to 
individual values and beliefs, and harness individual commitment to a collective 
 
 
 262 
level. PJU used political education and training, which highlighted the ways in which 
inequity functioned within systems, which leaders then connected to the events and 
issues parents and youth were facing on a daily basis. Project Quest engaged in 
relational organizing, using strategies such as house meetings, to build relationships 
for the purposes of collective action. These relationships connected and fostered the 
values and beliefs of those involved in organizing and partnering, and aided in 
developing a sustained level of collective commitment that was used to realize the 
implementation of Project Quest.   
  Moreover, PJU and Project Quest were also more successful in fostering an 
environment that could sustain collective action as measured through vision, trust, 
and space to learn. Both groups created a space that was open to the collective’s 
growth in understanding of the problem, and groups engaged in high levels of 
listening, acknowledgement, and sharing towards the development of trust. While 
Project Quest and PJU differed in how they envisioned their ultimate outcome, both 
collectives created an environment in which those in the group saw themselves as 
part of realizing a vision, and genuinely incorporated the feedback of those involved.  
  Given these conditions, Project Quest and PJU were able to successfully 
develop collective commitment, and this commitment contributed towards 
achieving collective action. Furthermore, their efforts proved more sustainable, as 
both collectives remained committed through the implementation and realization of 
their desired outcomes.  
 
 Grass-high initiatives attracted powerful people to the table, and (when 
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funded) accomplish the outcome of implementing/creating a new program67. 
However, these initiatives were less able to create sustainable programs.  
  PUSH/Excel and Promise Neighborhoods both began programming with 
funding from government entities (Congress funded Promise Neighborhoods, and 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and National Institution for 
Education funded the PUSH/Excel initiative). Hence, having more funding (in 
comparison to the grassroots cases I examined) enabled individuals within both 
initiatives to have substantial resources at the start of their journey. This in turn 
allowed them to quickly accomplish the outcome of achieving program 
implementation. 
   Both these cases and the HMBK case exemplified the utilization of powerful 
people to convey messages, garner partnerships, and build collectives around these 
initiatives. For PUSH/Excel, this person was Jesses Jackson. For Promise 
Neighborhoods, these powerful individuals were executives of local business, 
agency administrators, and elected officials. In the case of HMBK, state and local 
legislators as well as local agency leaders were drawn to the initiative during its 
early stages. While the outcomes for all three were defined in some way (i.e. 
milestones, a stakeholder evaluation, Government Performance and Results Act 
(GPRA) indicators) all three cases struggled to make progress towards these defined 
outcomes, whether that was due to having no clear strategy on how to do so, or not 
having the community capacity to strive towards the outcomes.   
                                                        
67 I use the word “program” broadly. While Promise Neighborhoods and HMBK did not aim to create or start 
new programs, I associate the creation and gathering of a new collaborative to support even existing programs 
as a new “program”.   
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  All three initiatives also reflected a failure to effectively engage or build in the 
voices of those at the neighborhood level. Although Promise Neighborhoods were 
required to involve community in the plan-making process and HMBK hosted the 
required local action summits to engage community voice, neither case nor 
PUSH/Excel found continuous ways to include local community-based perspectives 
into the initiative. Nonetheless, both initiatives included language such as 
‘neighborhoods’ and ‘community’ within their titles, as to signal they were spaces 
that were grounded in the perspectives and desires of the people they aimed to 
impact. Lack of connection to individuals at the local level undoubtedly influenced 
sustainability as well as the ability to attain and foster individual commitments.  
  Yet given that financial resources were already provided for PUSH/Excel and 
Promise Neighborhoods, and those that had power to approve implementation were 
included in the decision-making, neither case needed the individual commitments 
and ultimately collective commitment of those at the local level to initiate their 
ideas. This dynamic made it harder for the grass-high initiatives I studied to connect 
to individual values and beliefs, which in turn could have fostered greater collective 
commitment. 
  In addition, grass-high cases were less able to foster trusting, vision-
oriented, and robust spaces to learn. I found that all three cases struggled to develop 
trust across multiple levels of the initiative. There was a consistent deficit 
orientation used with schools and communities that were geographically included in 
Promise Neighborhood, despite the fact that some communities had a history of 
community engagement and commitment and were not acknowledged or listened to 
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during initiation or implementation (Horsford & Sampson, 2014). Likewise, 
organizational members of PUSH/Excel and HMBK were not heard and 
acknowledged, nor met with group willingness to listen and grapple with their 
ideas.  
 Vision operated in divergent ways across the grass-high cases. Promise 
Neighborhoods had very clear outcome and goals, PUSH/Excel struggled to create 
outcomes that reflected Jesse Jackson’s approach to educational reform, and HMBK 
struggled to find and designate goals and outcomes that would help them address 
the larger MBK milestones.  Nonetheless, I deemed each path unproductive: as the 
research revealed some Promise Neighborhoods did not have the capacity to do 
what was necessary to attain goals/outcomes, PUSH/Excel’s stakeholder evaluation 
foreseeably did not match what was being done within the movement turned 
program, and the vast majority of HMBK interviewees relayed that the initiative had 
no clear vision. These issues made it harder to create an environment that nurtured 
and sustained collective commitment.  
  Similarly, these cases did not appear to be strong spaces to learn. Initial 
external funding for PUSH/Excel and Promise Neighborhoods impelled both 
programs to quickly prove their impact, disallowing for mistakes, risks, or learning 
through doing. HMBK showed that while those at the table said they valued 
diversity in perspectives, there was little evidence of leadership or group members 
creating or encouraging each other to take risks, make mistakes, and learn from 
both successes and failures. Lack of space to learn consequently hindered an 
environment in which collective commitment could be developed. 
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 While the collective commitment in these cases did not determine if these 
initiatives were implemented or not, it is no coincidence that given the lack of 
developed collective commitment, all three initiatives were demonstrably less 
sustainable than the grassroots cases that were examined. The majority of local 
PUSH/Excel programs dissolved within five years, Congress has not reissued 
additional Promise Neighborhood grants, and HMBK remained unsure of the 
initiative’s future security. Hence, these grass-high initiatives were not able to create 
sustainable programs.  
 
 While all initiatives sought to impact people and communities of color 
(implicitly or explicitly), leaders, conveners, and policymakers within the 
cases sought to substantiate the commitments of White partners by tactfully 
converging the interests of the initiative with the interests of White power 
holders. Yet using interest convergence as a tactic did not guarantee successful 
outcomes, nor did it account for other micro-level intersectionalities that 
could have been at work.  
 
  In the previous chapter I used evidence from the five cases to show interest-
convergence had been used as a tactic in every case. I contended that leaders, 
conveners, and policymakers across these cases used White interest-convergence as 
a strategy to garner the commitments of White power holders, as they seemingly 
believed the partnerships and initiatives they worked within needed the support 
and commitment of those White individuals with power to successfully achieve their 
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goals. Nevertheless, employing White interest-convergence as a tactic did not 
guarantee successful outcomes.  
  Moreover, the application of this tactic did not come without consequences. 
In the grass-high Promise Neighborhood case, using interest convergence meant 
decentralizing race although Promise Neighborhoods more often encompassed 
communities in which Black and Brown people were the majority. Moreover the 
conversation of systematic and institutionalized racism was silenced, and was 
substituted for a lens of “intergenerational poverty” that ignored the institutional 
contributions to the function of intergenerational poverty. PUSH/Excel illustrated 
the contentions with converging White interest and a poignant message to Black 
communities to individually respond to oppression through a commitment to 
excellence. Although Jackson was Black and the leader of the initiative, his message 
and approach decentralized racism. Within HMBK leadership maintained that 
bringing powerful (and often White) individuals and institutions into conversation 
would create the space for change for young men of color within the county. Yet the 
use of interest convergence exhibited an acceptance of the incremental gain of 
having a space and conversation about young men of color, with little strategy and 
intent to address the systemic barriers that race and racism sustain. While all three 
grass-high cases presented evidence of using interest convergence as a tool, all three 
were unsuccessful in fostering collective commitment, as well as creating 
sustainable programs.  
  Leaders and participants in both grassroots cases similarly used interest 
convergence as a strategy to substantiate the commitments of White partners. 
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However, these cases were more successful in garnering collective commitment 
towards collective action, as well as attaining the outcomes they sought to make 
progress on. To this end, I illuminated how other racial negotiation tactics (such as 
political education and house meetings) served as additional mechanisms these 
groups used to strategically address and challenge systematic injustices. As such, 
these mechanisms seemed to fuel the successes of these change-making initiatives 
rather than the use of interest-convergence.  
 
Implications  
   In using theoretical perspectives from public management, human resources 
in education, and social theory and innovation to analyze my cases, I conclude that 
collective commitment was dynamically connected to individual commitment, as 
more individual commitment heightened collective commitment, and vice versa. 
While collective commitment was not necessary for collective action in these cases, 
they demonstrated that more collective commitment is better for sustainability and 
contributes to fostering individual values and beliefs; which generates individual 
commitment, and dynamically builds collective commitment.  
  Theoretically, Robertson and Tang (1995) acknowledge this very notion. Yet 
they assert that the quality and success of collective action often mirrors the quality 
and success of the collective commitment. Project Quest and PJU indeed 
demonstrated that strong collective commitment could reflect the quality and 
success of the action pursued by collaborative groups. In contrast, PUSH/Excel had 
the consensus of various sectors to partner and work together. This was enough to 
 
 
 269 
spur the development of local programs, yet the initiative never developed strong 
collective commitment, and did not make concrete progress to outcomes they cared 
about, such as youth delinquency, Black youth achievement, and building Black 
families. Likewise, HMBK and local Promise Neighborhoods struggled to foster trust, 
strategically implement a vision, be spaces to learn, and this was reflected in the 
challenges they encountered as they pursued collective action.  
  This then presents interesting implications for the use of the word 
‘community’, as the cases here demonstrated that having ‘community’ within an 
initiative name does not automatically make the initiative communal, or collectively 
committed to outcomes that impact communities. Warren and Mapp (2011) define 
community as “a group of interconnected people who share a common history, a set 
of values, and a sense of belonging, [or] in short- a culture and identity” (p. 20).  The 
grassroots cases I examine had a strong connection between these definitional 
aspects of community (i.e. connecting to individual values, developing rich 
environments that share a common history and/or set of values) and the 
development of collective commitment (e.g. trust, in which group members shared 
feelings and insights with the group believing one would be heard and 
acknowledged). The grass-high cases often included words that signaled community 
(i.e. ‘neighborhoods’, My Brother’s Keeper ‘Community’ Challenge), yet were 
unsuccessful in developing collective commitment, and subsequently a strong 
connection between definitional aspects of community.  
  Smyth (2009) confirms and discusses how the term ‘community’ has been 
attached to government initiatives, yet argues that using or having the name 
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‘community’ does not make certain that the initiative is truly for or about the 
‘community’ it claims to be for. To this end, he critiques that “the language game [of 
bottom-up yet state-funded programs] is one of invoking wholesome-sounding 
words like ‘community’ to convey the outward appearance of being ‘caring, 
responsive, and progressive’” (Smyth, 2009, p. 11). Consequently, if collective action 
initiatives seek to engage, attend to, and aspire to be a ‘community’, the cases within 
this study demonstrate that ‘community’ becomes authentic and genuine when 
leaders attended to critical factors such as trust, vision, and becoming a space to 
learn. Hence, developing environmental factors that foster collective commitment 
(trust, vision, space to learn) are critical to community building.  
  My first set of findings, then, assert that although the grass-high cases I 
studied were more likely to attract powerful people, financial capital, and 
accomplish the collective goal of achieving program implementation, the grassroots 
initiatives were more successful in developing collective commitment and 
sustainable initiatives. Yet a CRT analysis and perspective challenges the 
authenticity of individual and collective commitments in collective spaces, as the 
ways in which race and racial dynamics are negotiated appeared to be critical 
towards making progress on the groups’ collective action objectives.  
  Every case I examined provided evidence of strategically using White 
interest-convergence to attain individual and collective commitment, yet every case 
was not successful in achieving its desired outcomes. Hence, although White 
interest-convergence as a strategy proved to be insufficient as a tactic to 
successfully achieve desired outcomes, it appeared that leaders, conveners, and 
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policymakers believed it was necessary for achieving collective commitment and 
collective action. Nevertheless, the two grassroots cases utilized other strategies 
that instead privileged the voice, needs, and desires of communities of color, and 
this consequently appeared to make a noteworthy difference in the collective 
commitment that was garnered and collective action they accomplished. 
  To this end, my role as a participant-researcher within the HMBK case leads 
me to believe that even if men of color within the community who could have been 
impacted by the initiative were driving the vision and work for the group, white 
interest-convergence would still be perceived as a strategy and tactic to attain 
resources. This in turn warrants a similar question to what Alemán and Alemán 
(2010) raise- do the interests of people of color always have to converge with White 
interests? 
 I do not purport that the cases and contentions I present here suggest 
dismantling or discontinuing grass-high initiatives such as PUSH/Excel and MBK, 
nor the abandonment of the use of white interest-convergence as strategy68. Grass-
high initiatives shine a light on areas and issues that more than likely would go 
unexposed had it not been for the light shown by these projects. However, the 
                                                        
68 Here, I believe it’s important to mention a potential theory and consequence that I will not explore further in 
this piece, but plan to revisit in subsequent work. In the intersection of law and race, Delgado (1996) examines 
the idea of contradiction-closing cases. This concept refers to cases (or policies) “provide the solution when the 
gap grows too large between, on one hand, the liberal rhetoric of equal opportunity and, on the other hand, the 
reality of racism” (p.80). Hence, these verdicts and policies appear to remove inequalities, but no long-term 
progressive impact is realized nor is the reality of inequality changed. Delgado implies that these cases can serve 
as a means to prevent further reform, as they “allow business as usual to go on even more smoothly than before, 
and because now we can point to the exceptional case and say, ‘See, our system is really fair and just. See what 
we just did for minorities and the poor’” (Delgado, 1999, p. 445; in Gillborn, 2013, p. 136). As the majority of the 
grass-high cases I studied can be attributed as unsuccessful since they did not truly deliver on the outcomes they 
posed, it is possible that could serve as contradictory-closing cases, and as such, hindrances to further reform 
efforts. While the implications I suggest by no means call for abandoning efforts that attempt to rectify 
inequality, I think it is important to acknowledge that such an implication is not novel, and has been discussed 
by critical race theorists. 
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evidence does challenge conveners, organizers, and critically conscious 
policymakers alike to think about the consequences of the use of strategies such as 
White interest-convergence. This is particularly crucial as critical scholars caution 
that within alleged ‘victories’ won through interest-convergence, “apparent gains 
are quickly cut back” and in the long-run these victories may “further protect the 
racial status quo” (Gillborn, 2013, p. 134). This concept also has the greatest 
ramifications for leaders of color in change-making spaces, as they must navigate 
the clear tensions, drawbacks, and consequences of interest-convergence, realize 
how much further our society has to change in order to achieve racial equity, and 
not be tempted to be complacent with incremental gains. 
 As I started this dissertation with a keen eye towards understanding the 
potential impact of cross-sector partnerships aimed to address large social 
problems, I recognized that theorists, scholars, and collective impact practitioners 
appraise cross-sector partnerships as social processes that can deliver change and 
social innovation by operating as bridges across sector boundaries. As such, they are 
(as Seitanidi (2008) articulates) processes which involve “reframing the ‘rules of the 
market game’” and questioning fundamental assumptions that underlie established 
organizational forms (p. 2).  
 Yet, can cross-sector partnerships that fail to acknowledge the prevalence 
and ever presence of race and racism truly serve as bridges or reframe the rules of a 
market game that is seemingly played into by White and people of color alike? Or, if 
cross-sector partnerships truly are spaces that can reframe the rules of the market 
game, are leaders, reformers, and organizers of color and presumed progressive 
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White allies questioning and contesting enough? Moreover, where are the spaces 
within these initiatives in which the voices, experiences, and desires of people of 
color are not only haphazardly considered, but affirmed, validated, privileged, and 
explicitly used to drive the change being pursued? Based on the findings of this 
study, I urge those within multi-sector partnerships to reflectively look at individual 
and collective commitments made within the partnership, consider the tools that 
are being used to negotiate race and racial dynamics within the collective group and 
community at large, and challenge their cross-sector collectives to consider whose 
interests are truly being served in reforms that ostensibly aim to achieve greater 
equity. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A 
List of sectors, organizations, and institutions represented in HMBK  
Steering Committee 
 
 Washington Congressional House Office (54th district) 
 Highland County Sheriff’s Office 
 Highland County School District 
 Highland County Department of Human Services 
 The City of Brampton 
 Brampton Public Schools  
 Mentor4Youth (after-school enrichment program) 
 Northern Washington University 
 University of Washington  
 Washington at Work (local workforce development association) 
 Local business owners 
 
 
 275 
Appendix B 
Interview Protocol 
 
Context of Work  
Understanding of responsibility, collective action, and infrastructural 
context: 
1. Is there a need for an MBK initiative (nationally, and locally)? 
Why? 
2. Whose responsibility is it to ensure that boys and men of color 
have access to full opportunities  (educational, economic, second 
chance)? 
3. In your opinion, what role does HMBK play locally?  
4. From your perspective, what are the outcomes HMBK hopes to 
achieve?  
 Personal connection to the work (individual):  
1. Can you tell a little about your professional background and work 
(education, current job, etc.) and how this leads you to engaging in 
this type of cross-sector work?  
2. Plainly, what do you value about a space like this that allows you 
and others to collectively work on addressing barriers to 
opportunity for young men of color?  
3. What do you see as your contribution to HMBK? 
4. Have you worked on other initiatives that aim to support young 
men of color? Did any of those involve other partners?  
 
Core Committee Questions 
Formation of HMBK  
1. Tell me about how you became involved with HMBK. 
a. Timeline (accepting the challenge, community summit as stepping 
stones) 
b. What role were you asked to play in being a part of the initiative? 
(designated role from partner, institution, etc.).  Why did you say 
yes to participating?  
c. How does (interviewee’s organization) fit into HMBK? 
2. (Showing the MBK Building Place Based Initiatives Document) 
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a. Did you review this document at some point? To your knowledge, 
how was it used? Was it helpful?  
b. Does it seem relevant? How?  
3. Why have you chosen to engage and participate in the ways you have?  
a. Do you know how to engage and participate in this initiative?  
b. Why do you think others engaged/participated in they ways they 
have?   
c. Has your engagement, or the engagement of others changed over 
time? If so, how? 
4. How has your race and gender impacted your choices on when and how 
you participate in the initiative? 
5. Was there a time when you noticed differences in power playing a role in 
the group’s dynamics? 
6. From what you recall, what was the vision of HMBK in its early stages?  
a. Does HMBK have a clear vision as to where the initiative is 
heading now?  
b. If yes, what is it? What strategies is the group using to reach this 
vision? 
c. If no, what seems to be unclear?  
7. If you were given the task of working with a collective group of people to 
make change for young men of color, what would you do this? What 
strategies would you use?  
8. How much ownership do you feel in being a part of this initiative?  
a. Is this important to have?  
b. Why or why not?  
 
Mechanisms at Work  
1. Walk me through the things HMBK has done to accomplish its goals. What 
are things the initiative has done well? Or, what specific actions have enabled 
the HMBK to move toward change for young men of color within the county?  
2. What are things the initiative hasn’t done well? Or, what specific actions have 
prevented HMBK from making change for young men of color within the 
county? 
3. What resources, institutions, and/or people have been integral to the 
successes of HMBK?   
4. What resources, institutions, and/or people have been less helpful to the 
work HMBK has done?  
 
Progress towards Outcomes 
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1. Are the MBK milestones reflective of the change that is needed for young 
men of color in Highland County?  
a. Do you believe we’re measuring the right outcomes?  
2. Do you believe the youth council / grant is a step in the right direction for 
HMBK? How does this lead us to the group’s outcome goals?  
3. In your opinion, how much progress has HMBK made towards these 
outcomes? Are the collective decisions leading us towards progress on these 
milestones?   
  
General:  
1. Is there anything else you’d like to share?  
2. Do you have any questions for me?
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Appendix C 
Table F. HMBK Timeline of Events 
 
Phase Month Event Date Key Notes From Event 
 1 Aug-15 Formal Acceptance of the My 
Brother's Keeper Community 
Challenge 
8/15/15   
1 Oct-15 Local Action Summit I Monday, 10/12/2015 (This was a launch of the HMBK 
community. Most remember it being 
a very impactful event. I was not 
there, but have artifacts from the 
event.) 
1 Nov-15 Debrief of HMBK Local Action 
Summit I 
unknown (The artifact has key summary 
information from the summit. It 
shows the game changers, quick 
wins, and potential long-term ideas 
from the over 200 people that 
attended the summit.) 
1 Nov-15 Steering Committee Meeting Wednesday, 
11/11/2015 
(This was a follow up meeting from 
the Local Action Summit. I was not a 
part of the group yet, so I'm not sure 
exactly who was there. However, I 
do have a copy of the meeting 
agenda. Yet the agenda lacks clarity. 
There's a call to create a local action 
team and a steering committee, as 
well as discussion on MBK playbook 
steps.) 
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1 Dec-15 Washington MBK Summit  Wednesday, 
12/2/2015 
This convening was for starting 
MBK communities and was hosted 
by One Love Global. It was an all day 
event in Liberty and included youth 
participation.  
1 Dec-15 Steering Committee Meeting Monday, 12/14/2015 Steering committee talked about the 
policy document the group was 
putting together.  
 1 Jan-16 Submitted HMBK Policy Review  Friday, 1/15/2016 John Walter crafted the front end of 
this document. Linda Bay took the 
lead on crafting the work around the 
milestones. John Walters asked me 
to contribute/configure the data 
that came from the county sheriff's 
office. Lots of effort to put together, 
yet did not really fuel any of the 
work ahead.  
 1 Jan-16 MLK Celebration, My Brother's 
Keeper Session  
Monday, 1/17/2016 Panel discussion including HMBK 
steering committee members 
Amanda Saul, Tabitha Bentley, John 
Walters, and Rep. Connors. Program 
also included table discussions 
around milestones 
 1 Mar-16 Steering Committee Meeting Friday, 3/18/2016 Tabitha was asked to speak on her 
dissertation project. Josh Hill 
discusses potential of HMBK 
acquiring two VISTA workers. 
 1 Apr-16 First Round VISTA Interviews Friday, 4/29/2016 We interviewed two candidates. 
Samuel Davis was clearly the choice 
between the two, and he showed 
potential for growth and love for 
learning.  
 1 May-16 Second Round VISTA Interviews Wednesday, 
5/4/2016 
Anita Jackson interviewed as only 
candidate for the budget and 
development position. John Walters 
then submitted recommendations to 
WCSC re: employment for she and 
Samuel.  
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2 Jun-16 Meeting with JW Thursday, 6/23/2016 John Walters and I talk about 
direction for HMBK prior to VISTAs 
coming in. I attempt to get scope for 
the work they'd be doing. It ends 
w/John asking for bullet point on 
what I’m thinking. Yet I never 
received a response to this piece.  
2 Jun-16 Ali in All of Lunch (Points of Light 
Conference, Union City, WA) 
Monday, 6/27/2016 The Luncheon was a part of the 
conference Anita and Samuel 
attended to help prepare them for 
the VISTA tenures. Tabitha attended 
with Michael Johnson and a group of 
young men of color. National figures 
also attended. Learned that 
Congresswoman Moore was on the 
task force for MBK  
2 Jul-16 Meeting w/ Convenient Community 
Initiative 
Friday, 7/1/2016 TB attempting to reconnect with 
stakeholders. Bobby McQueen 
attended the MLK day, and send 
email to connect which Tabitha 
never responded to. Wanted to see 
how Bobby could connect to larger 
HMBK work 
2 Jul-16 Check in with Anita  Thursday, 7/6/2015 Decided on time; noted hesitancy 
towards direct service work 
2 Jul-16 VISTA Check-in  Wednesday, 7/8/16 TB attempts to set up consistent 
meetings (Fri w/whole team, 
Monday check-ins). Samuel talks 
about how the VISTAs will be 
allocating their time. Tabitha sees a 
danger in having only Friday 
meetings, so sets Monday 
conference call and then Wed in 
person meeting in the evenings. 
Anita is also considering the idea of 
a curriculum challenge  
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2 Jul-16 Monday Meeting w/VISTAs Monday, 7/11/16 Phone call during Samuel lunch 
hour. John sent out summary 
afterwards. 
2 Jul-16 Meeting with Samuel Wednesday, 
7/13/2016 
Given that Samuel and Anita’s 
conflicting schedules, I met 
separately with Samuel to talk about 
local action planning and ideas 
about incorporating stakeholders 
into our work  
2 Jul-16 Meeting with Washington at Work Thursday, 7/14/2016 TB and Sean Worth discuss 
connection between HMBK and 
Washington at Works youth 
employment program 
  Jul-16 Backbone Meeting  Friday, 7/15/2016 1st Friday Backbone Meeting. Prior 
to, discussion about creating social 
media space and presence for MBK. 
TB tried to set tone for inclusive 
agenda setting. However, John 
passed out his agenda at beginning 
of meeting, setting the tone.  
 2 Jul-16 Meeting with WACY Monday, 7/18/16 Invited Anita to meeting with WACY 
to talk about collective impact, as 
WACY leader was trained in collect 
impact strategies. 
 2 Jul-16 Meeting with YCS  Wednesday, 
7/20/2016 
 TB and YCS representatives discuss 
connection between HMBK and YCS 
youth employment program 
 2 Jul-16 Unity Town Hall Meeting  Thursday, 7/21/2016 This event was advertised as an 
MBK sponsored event. Yet MBK did 
not do anything much to help 
organize or sponsor. Primarily a 
panel of legislators and community 
organizers, and the sheriff  
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 2 Jul-16 Backbone Meeting  Friday, 7/22/2016 2nd Backbone Meeting held at ISD. 
First meeting with Richard Olson. 
This was considered the Host 
Orientation Site Meeting.  
 2 Jul-16 Monday Meeting w/VISTAs Monday, 7/25/16 VISTAs became agitated as many of 
their ideas were being shut down  
 2 Aug-16 Monday Meeting w/VISTAs Monday, 8/1/2016 Tabitha notes that Samuel continues 
offline conversations with John, but 
this information isn’t relayed to the 
group. Anita and Tabitha would 
later learn out about changes 
through Samuel 
 2 Aug-16 Backbone Meeting  Wednesday, 8/3/16 The longest backbone meeting on 
record. This meeting lasted 5 hours 
at NWU. 
 2 Aug-16 Monday Meeting w/VISTAs Monday, 8/8/16 Tabitha leads a weekly check-in 
with the VISTAs. Samuel concluded 
that he needed to scale down on 
some things. Anita concluded that 
she needed a mission and vision, as 
she needed direction on what to get 
done first.  
 2 Aug-16 Backbone Meeting  Wednesday, 8/10/16 The most significant part of this 
meeting was Anita’s attempt to set 
up a working agreement. The team 
went along with the idea of five 
minutes, and then John and Michael 
nullified the idea.  
 2 August 2016 Monday Meeting w/VISTAs Monday, 8/15/16 During this check-in meeting we 
focused on tasks for Joe Dulin Day 
(community fair) and also started 
preliminary talks about the youth 
arm/work of HMBK 
2 Aug-16 Backbone Meeting  Wednesday, 8/17/16 John was unable to attend, so 
Tabitha led this meeting. Group 
spent the majority of the time 
planning a recruitment strategy for 
the young brothers. Michael comes 
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in halfway through the meeting and 
he and Anita get into an altercation.  
 2 Aug-16 Backbone Meeting  Wednesday, 8/24/16 There is still a lack of understanding 
of how HMBK will go about the 
work it intends to do. Important 
concepts explored during this 
meeting include deviation from 
collective impact, making the space 
a learning community, and how to 
engage youth as active participants 
in the  
          
3 Sep-16 Backbone Meeting  Wednesday, 9/7/16 During this meeting we spent a good 
amount of time talking about MBK 
at the state level. There were 13 
MBK communities in Washington at 
the time, and Derrick Bell was trying 
to understand how to connect them 
and have them be resources to each 
other  
 3 Sep-16 Steering / Core Group Committee 
Meeting 
Monday, 9/12/16 First meeting with many 'HMBK 
originators' since March. This was 
their first introduction to the VISTAs 
and update on the youth council 
work. Mostly spent time informing 
those at the time what the backbone 
group was doing/had done over the 
past few months  
 3 Sep-16 Backbone Meeting  Wednesday, 9/14/16 During this meeting we touched on 
organization for the milestone 
groups and the summit. We never 
reached an agreement or conclusion 
on this during this meeting.  
 3 Sep-16 Backbone Meeting  Wednesday, 9/21/16 We spent most of the meeting time 
talking about the youth council 
work. We had not recruited many 
young men at this point, and the 
orientation and overnight session 
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with Neutral Zone was in a couple 
weeks. We attempt to strategize 
how we'd sign on more young men 
for the council.  
 3 Sep-16 Backbone Meeting  Wednesday, 9/28/16 Received boilerplate organizational 
language from John. The meeting 
was very tense, as the VISTA had not 
been getting along well given a 
number of miscommunications in 
planning roles for the new youth 
council.  
 3 Oct-16 Young Brother's First Meeting and 
Orientation 
Saturday, 10/1/16 I attended the orientation to help 
Anita and Samuel out in whatever 
way I could. In total, five young men 
came for the orientation. We were 
expecting and hoping for 30-40.  
 3 Oct-16 Backbone Meeting  Wednesday, 10/5/16  General meeting 
 3 Oct-16 Neutral Zone's Youth Engagement 
Institute w/Young Brothers 
Saturday, 10/8/16- 
Sunday, 10/9/16 
Overnight trip with youth council to 
camp ground in Jackson, WA 
 3 Oct-16 Backbone Meeting  Wednesday, 
10/12/16 
 During this meeting we discussed 
the MBK state youth summit being 
hosted in Union City later in the 
month. We also began to discuss 
details re: Local Action Summit II 
 3 Oct-16 Backbone Meeting  Wednesday, 
10/19/16 
 Continuation of planning for Local 
Action Summit II. Anita and Samuel 
also bring forward concerns re: 
youth council  
 3 Oct-16 Washington MBK Youth Summit [Hip 
Hop and Robots] 
Saturday, 
10/22/2016 
 5 backbone members attend full 
day program in Union City  
 3 Oct-16 Backbone Meeting  Wednesday, 
10/26/16 
Tabitha and Anita discuss plan to 
put together protocol for milestone 
group facilitators. Samuel gets 
instructions for creating an internal 
program for the event. 
 3 Nov-16 Backbone Meeting  Wednesday, 11/2/16  Samuel presents updated 
Time/Activity/Presenter worksheet 
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for Local Action Summit II. This 
worksheet focuses on front end of 
program. John Walters presents a 
document that stated what 
milestone advisory groups would be 
doing during breakout time.  
 3 Nov-16 Backbone Meeting  Wednesday, 11/9/16 Final meeting before summit. 
Tabitha presents Milestone 
Advisory Group Overview, 
Milestone and Facilitator's Protocol 
that she and Anita created. Group 
finalizes run of show.  
 3 Nov-16 Local Action Summit II Monday, 11/14/16 88 people attended the summit (not 
including backbone members). 
Attendance for the milestone 
breakout groups 8 attendees/group. 
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